

# **The Nyaya Darshana**

**Translation and commentary by John Wells**

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# Introduction

This translation reveals an interpretation of the Nyaya Darshana that is substantially different from those done by Gaṅgānātha Jhā (1939) and S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1913), both of whom follow the interpretation of the traditional commentaries, especially that of Vātsyāyana (unknown date, but earlier than 5th century C.E.) Opinions as to the exact identity of the author Gautama, and as to the dates of composition of both the original and the early commentaries are widely divergent. I have used Vidyābhūṣaṇa as one of my sources for the original text in Devanagarī script, indicated by "Vb", the other source being that available from Maharishi University of Management, indicated by "MUM", from their wonderful and carefully prepared collection available online.

In the translation I have focused on a disciplined and faithful rendering of the sentences exactly as they appear in the original, without paraphrasing, and adding as few extra words as possible, although with the sparse and highly context-dependent "sutra" style of writing, it is necessary to supply some extra words. One example is reflexive pronouns—his, its, that, such, etc.—before nouns, the sense of which would have been an integral part of an ancient reader's understanding of the style. Verbs are almost nonexistent in this style and I, like all other translators, take the liberty of reading some nouns-only sentences in a compatible subject-verb format for clarity. I often supply extra words in parentheses to clarify the meaning, and by this practice I have been able to avoid excessive explanatory commentary. The resulting simplicity of presentation has been one of my primary goals.

I have thoroughly read and understood the intent of the other translations, but I find them full of religious and school-oriented bias and technically deeply flawed. In many sutras there is no attempt at a faithful translation at all, but instead an imposition of the translators' own original work (unacknowledged as such), as if to say, "Whatever the actual text, this is what he really means." Moreover, although some passages in the Nyaya are clearly presented as a dialectic, Vātsyāyana etc. mistakenly read nearly *every* phrase beginning with "na" (no), no matter how short, as a counterargument, often with extremely shabby "reasons", reading every ablative inflection as "because", while ignoring the many other possible uses of that case. Besides missing the incisive and richly interesting observations of the author that appear with a more thoughtful and disciplined translation, their interpretation boggles the reader's mind with phony reasoning and petty irrelevant squabbles, supposedly between various schools of thought, lined up against each other like football teams. As a result, they have managed to completely obscure what I consider to be one of the original expositions of the great Yoga philosophy.

Now some say that understanding this philosophy is not just a matter of reading translations disciplined by a study of grammars and dictionaries, and that is true, but neither does it help to ignore scholarship, hoping to absorb knowledge through faith by sitting at the feet of a revered and supposedly "enlightened" master. Obviously, one cannot do a translation by simply looking up the words in the dictionary, one by one, and patching them together into a translation. Translation from Sanskrit requires a thorough knowledge of how the language works, in all its complex and fascinating aspects, and it must be accompanied by a knowledge of syntax, roots, noun formations, secondary affixes, and inflections, including special uses of, e.g., the genitive to abbreviate, the ablatives of separation and comparison, the locative absolute, etc. Still, the necessary accompaniment to all that is a devoted private *self*-examination, not devotion to a master.

Our Victorian-era teachers—Wilson, Boehtlingk & Roth, Monier-Williams (MW), etc.—produced their grammars on the basis of the great *Astādhyāyī* by Pāṇini (ante 500 BCE), and their dictionaries with the aid and guidance of contemporary Indian scholars, each in his own particular area of expertise. The enlightenment of these modern masters was that of scholarship and organizational skill, not of mystical or religious devotion. It is therefore entirely sufficient to learn the language from them, and to verify our intuitive knowledge of the philosophical principles in the Darśhanas by knowledge of the language.

There are, however, some terms in the Monier-Williams dictionary that are apparently unique to the Darśhanas and to the philosophical compendium *Sarva-darśanasamgraha* based on the early faulty interpretations. These are the only sources he cites for such words, and in these, he had no choice but to defer to his Indian Darśhana experts, who in turn depended on the dubious traditional reading. Vātsyāyana himself surely lived and breathed Sanskrit, but he did not grasp the meaning of this work, the style and substance of which were probably centuries out of date even in his day. He took undue liberties in creating many "technical" meanings which bore no relation to the proper root-based meanings, all in order to support his false vision of a "Nyaya" school of reasoning. This has never been challenged by an independent translation, perhaps in part because of the stifling effect of an entrenched culture where it is forbidden to challenge authority, and where a reverence approaching worship toward spiritual leaders is encouraged.

Not being subject to this culture, I feel free to read the text according to its obvious literal meaning. For example, *arthāpatti* means "arriving at a meaning" or "interpretation", and *jāti* means birth-rank. *Pravṛtti* can mean a report or account, *prasaṅga* "occupation with", and *yugapat* "simultaneous" *with awareness*, i.e.,

immediate or present, etc. Varṇa and suvarṇa in this work refer to caste, not color or gold. Bhāva is used variously by the author as "being" (existence), or a human "being", but also a *way* of being or thinking (see MW), i.e., a theory of being or ontology. (For simplicity, I have used "view".) "Abhāva" is sometimes used as the first element in bahuvrīhi compounds, meaning devoid of being or "empty".

As for the structure of the work, it is evident to me that the numbering of sutras and so-called "books" in the Nyaya, as in the other Darshanās, was not part of the author's original text, but rather added later as an editorial device. Many of these incorrect numbered divisions actually break up proper sentences and tend to disrupt a sensible reading of the original. Like the other Darshanās, I read this work as constructed of an orderly series of full statements (which I have numbered), rather than a string of tiny "aphorisms". Most of these statements consist of three connected ideas in the form of phrases or short sentences, arranged eighteen to a "chapter", with nine chapters in all. This all becomes evident by the distinctness of the statements and chapters, each with a clear beginning and end, by their natural thematic progression, by the physical length of each statement, which is remarkably consistent throughout the work; and by other clues, like the many statements containing clustered repetitions of a word, and many where "apraṭiṣedha" is the last word (the subject, whose predicate is stated in 1.2.14 to be the opening premise (1.1.1), and implied in every instance thereafter.)

Hopefully, by the foregoing, one may understand my main motivations for producing this translation (and the others) from a fresh perspective, unfettered by any obligation to conform with a flawed tradition. I fully understand that the fraction of the population that would be interested in this subject matter in the first place is already very small, and of those, the number that would find their way to *this* work would be even less. Still, anyone who has read my translations of the Darshanās will understand the irony that the thesis of this author, which is fundamentally the same as that of the authors of the other Darshanās, is inherently inconsistent with its being popular. So perhaps our isolation in this reading, both from tradition and from the general population, is as it should be, and we may now proceed from justifications to the happy task of enlightening ourselves in this philosophy.

John Wells



## 1.) Introduction and pramāṇa-prameya

प्रमाणप्रमेयसंशयप्रयोजनदृष्टान्तसिद्धान्तावयवतर्कनिर्णयवादजल्पवितण्डाहेत्वाभासच्छ  
लजातिनिग्रहस्थानानां तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसाधिगमः। दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञाना-  
नामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः।

(1.1.1) **pramāṇa-prameya**- the act of proving or validating vs. that which is to be validated **-saṁśaya-prajojana-** uncertainty vs. motivation **-dr̥ṣṭānta-siddhānta-** standard vs. doctrine **-avayava-tarka-nirṇaya-vāda-** analysis – discussion, examination – (for the sake of) settlement – dialectic **-jalpa-** prattle, gossip **-hetu-ābhāsa-** grounds for knowing – fallacious **-vitaṇḍā-chala-** cavil, baseless argument for the sole purpose of winning – fraud, trickery, false persuasion (e.g. equivocation) **-jāti-nigraha-sthānānām** class, birth-rank – subjugation, domination – taking a stance (*The compound is gen. pl. We are expected to recognize the obvious dvandvas. The author seems to have chosen his words for that purpose.*) **tattva-jñānāt** (abl. by) essence – true comprehension **niḥśreyasa-adhigamaḥ** "without superior", highest – attaining, finding (1.1.2) **duḥkha-janman – pravṛtti-doṣa – mithyā-jñānānām** (gen. pl. belonging to, held or claimed by those) suffering – born – account(s) – false – mistakenly – comprehending **uttara-uttara-apāye** (loc. once there is) higher and higher advancement – withdrawal **tat-anantara-apāyāt** (abl. by) that – uninterrupted, continuous – going away, withdrawal **apavargaḥ** completion, fulfilment

**1.1-2) Finding the highest (dharma) is by truly comprehending the essence:**  
1.) of our validation (of truth), vs. that (truth) which is to be validated, 2.) of our uncertainty vs. our motivation, 3.) of our standard vs. our doctrine, and 4.) of the dialectic for settlement by discussion using the formal subdivision, vs. prattle: fallacious grounds, false persuasion for the purpose of hitting back, and taking a stance by dominating (the discussion) by virtue of (high) birth-rank; (whereas) the fulfilment of that (dharma), once there is (initial) withdrawal from the (dharma of) higher and higher advancement claimed by those mistakenly comprehending the false account of being born in suffering, is by (a state of) *uninterrupted* withdrawal from that.

प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानि। इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यभि-  
चारि व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम्।

(1.1.3) **pratyakṣa – anumāna-apamāna-śabdāḥ** (*pratyakṣa is ibc (beginning the compound), functioning like an indeclinable, and qualifying the other three words in the compound.*) "right before the eye(s)", directly perceived, based on perception – inference – comparison – testimony **pramāṇāni** validations (of truth)  
(1.1.4) **indriya-artha-saṁnikarṣa-utpannam** sense – object – "together-in-drawing" – invested with **jñānam** knowledge // **avyapadeśyam** not to be designated, named, represented, etc. **avyabhicāri-vyavasāya-ātmakam** not deviating from – determination, resolve – characterized by **pratyakṣam** perception

**1.3) Our ways of validating (truth) are: perception, inference, comparison, and testimony, where "perception" is a true comprehension, as one invested (only) with the drawing in together of his senses and their objects, not to be represented (by name or explanation), characterized by one's (uninterrupted 1.1.2) determination not to deviate from that (by naming and explaining).**

This is equivalent to YD 1.8, "Discipline is the resolve for staying in that state (of yoga) ... with earnest attention to long-term continuance." I have freely supplied the pronouns "our" and "their" in the translation throughout the work, to indicate the author's unique and controversial Yogic thesis, vs. the more customary view of the would-be objector. Every translator does this in his own way. The two opposing views are seldom explicitly delineated by the authors of the Darshanas (in the sparse "sutra" style), but they are unmistakably implied.

अथ तत्पूर्वकं त्रिविधम्। नुमानं पूर्ववच्छेषवत्सामान्यतो दृष्टं च। प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात्साध्यसा-  
धनमुपमानम्। आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः।

(1.1.5) **atha-tat\_pūrvakam** following on that as the basis **trividham** threefold **anumānam** inference **pūrvavat** (vatup ind.) having (the nature of) the previous **śeṣavat** (vatup ind.) having (the nature of) remaining after **sāmānyataḥ-drṣṭam** commonly known, universally agreed to **ca** and (1.1.6) **prasiddha-sādharmyāt** (abl. of comparison w/upamānam; apart from) well-known – conformity **sādhya-sāadhanam** to be established (the premise) – establishing **upamānam** comparison  
(1.1.7) **āpta-upadeśaḥ** trusted authority – teaching **śabdāḥ** testimony



1.4) With that (perception) as the basis for it, there is our threefold inference, 1.) having the nature of that previous thing (immediate personal perception), (but also) 2.) having the nature of remaining after it and 3.) being universally agreed to. Our "comparison" establishes our premise (that the highest dharma is by true comprehension) as apart from conforming with a dharma that is well known, "testimony" being the teaching of a trusted authority.

स द्विविधो दृष्टादृष्टार्थत्वात् । आत्मशरीरेन्द्रियार्थबुद्धिमनः प्रवृत्तिदोषप्रेत्यभावफलदुःखाप-  
वर्गास्तु प्रमेयम्।

(1.1.8) **sa** that **dvividhaḥ** two ways **dr̥ṣṭa-adr̥ṣṭa-artha-tvāt** (abl. according to) commonly known – not commonly known – meaning – being (1.1.9) **ātma-śarīra** – **indriya-artha** – **buddhi-manah** individual self – body – sense(s) – object(s) – conceptual understanding **pravṛtti-doṣa** – **pretya-bhāva-phala-duḥkha** – **apavargāḥ** (pl. ?) (*Singular makes more sense.*) account – faulty, false – "state of having passed on", afterlife – "fruit", consequence – suffering – having done with (*Pravṛtti here takes its secondary meaning, not the progress of life itself, but of the "news" or accounting of it. It is always associated with 'telling' words, like śabda here, vāk in 1.1.17, and yathokta in 4.1.1)*) **tu** but **prameyam** (meant) to be validated

1.5) That (testimony) can (also) be seen two ways according to its meaning being either commonly known or not commonly known; but what we mean to validate is (not the testimony but) the conceptual understanding of the self (ātman) with its body, and the senses with their objects, having done with the false account (testimony) of its (the ātman's) existence after having passed on, of consequence (karma), and of suffering.

The author's prameya is literally what is "to be validated" by this examination. and his definition of it here is actually a concise statement of the thesis of this work. In the following pages he argues forcefully against the doctrines of karma and reincarnation on the part of many souls, and in favor of profound comprehension (jñāna) of the creation of the body, senses, and objects, through the agency of the pervasive consciousness of the one individual self or soul. This treatise is a comparison between a system based on faith and interpretation of scripture against a personal examination based on immediate experience.

इच्छद्वेषप्रयत्नसुखदुःखज्ञानानि आत्मनः लिङ्गम्। चेष्टेन्द्रियार्थाश्रयः शरीरम्। घ्रणरसन-  
चक्षुस्त्वक्श्रोत्राणीन्द्रियाणि भूतेभ्यः। पृथिव्यापस्तेजो वायुराकाशमिति भूतानि। गन्धर-  
सरूपस्पर्शशब्दाः

(1.1.10) **iccha-dveṣa-prayatna – sukha-duḥkha-jñānāni** desire – aversion – endeavor – happiness – suffering – conceptions **ātmanah** (gen. of) individual self **liṅgam** indicator (1.1.11) **ceṣṭa-indriya-artha-āśrayaḥ** physical behavior – senses – object(s) – seat **śarīram** body (1.1.12) **ghraṇa-rasana-cakṣus-tvac-śrotrāṇi** smelling – tasting – seeing – skin – hearing **indriyāṇi** senses **bhutebhyaḥ** (abl. known by) gross elements (1.1.13) **prthivī** earth **āpaḥ** water **tejaḥ** fire **vāyuḥ** air **ākāśam** ether **iti** called, known as **bhūtāni** gross elements (1.1.14) **gandha-rasa-rūpa-sparśa-śabdāḥ** smell – taste – form – feel – sound

**1.6-7) The indicator of our 'self' is (in) its endeavors associated with desire vs. aversion, and (in) conceptions regarding happiness vs. suffering, and its "body" is the seat of the objects of both physical behavior and the senses. The senses, known by their gross elements, are the (mental) acts of smelling, tasting, seeing, feeling, and hearing, which are the (actual) smell, taste, form, feel, and sound (of things), their gross elements being those known as "earth, water, fire, air, and the ether" (respectively).**

Here he begins to expand on the points made in sutra 1.1.9, treating the individual, the body, and the senses. Of course, the fleshy physical organs are not the subject of philosophy. The words used in 1.1.12 indicate rather the mental "act" of smelling, tasting, etc. Finding the word "tvac", meaning literally "skin", among the action nouns is a strong indication that, like modern teachers, the author and his audience must have known it as the sense of touch in the whole body. Because this type of sensation is obviously not limited to the fingertips, or even the skin, I find the word "feel" to be a more suitable English translation than the phonetically similar "touch" for tvac.

पृथिव्यादिगुणास्तदर्थः। बुद्धिरूपलब्धिर्ज्ञानमित्यनर्थान्तरम्। युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो  
लिङ्गम्। प्रवृत्तिर्वाग्बुद्धिशरीरारम्भः।

(1.1.14 cont.) **pr̥thivī-ādi-guṇāḥ** earth – etc. – essential constituents **tat-arthāḥ** those – meanings (1.1.15) **buddhiḥ** knowing **upalabdhiḥ** observation **jñānam** true comprehension **iti** these words, quotes // **an-artha-antaram** without – meaning – alternate (1.1.16) **yugapat-jñāna-anutpattiḥ** simultaneous (with awareness), without passage of time, present, immediate – true comprehension – lacking the coming into existence **manasaḥ** (gen. of) mind **liṅgam** indicator (1.1.17) **pravṛttiḥ** life activity; or news of, account of (*see "gospel" etymology*) **vāk** declaration **buddhi – śarīra-ārambhaḥ** knowing – body – origination

1.8) The meanings of those (gandha, etc.) is that they are the essential constituents of earth and the others (water, fire, air, ether). This (principle) is our "knowing", "observation", and "true comprehension", (whereas) the indicator of our mind without that alternate (or "inner") meaning is that the immediate true comprehension does not come to exist. The declaration that the origination of this 'body' is in the knowing of it, is our account of life.

In Indian philosophy, the word "manas" for mind is defined by its ten subdivisions: the five jñāna indriyas and the five karma indriyas. Unlike the common western use of the word, this mind has nothing to do with understanding.

प्रवर्तनालक्षणा दोषाः। पुनरुत्पत्तिः प्रेत्यभावः। प्रवृत्तिदोषजनितोऽर्थः फलम्। बाधना-  
लक्षणं दुःखम्। तदत्यन्तविमोक्षोऽपवर्गः।

(1.1.18) **pravartanā-lakṣanā** (*√pravṛt*, in "ā" fem. the causative sense, imperative, inciting to action, cleverly used in contrast with *pravṛtti* in 1.1.17 from the same root) commandment – f. ind. ifc ("in fine compositi", ending the compound) having the mark of **doṣāḥ** faulty or false ones (1.1.19) **punar-utpattiḥ** remanifestation, reincarnation **pretya-bhāvaḥ** after having passed on – state (1.1.20) **pravṛtti-doṣa-janitaḥ** accounts – false – produced or induced by **arthaḥ** meaning, or object, goal // **phalam** fruit, result, consequence (1.1.21) **bādhana-lakṣanam** affliction – (n. ind.) having the mark of **duḥkham** suffering (1.1.22) **tat-atyanta-vimokṣaḥ** such – ultimate – final liberation **apavargaḥ** leaving off

1.9) The false ones (accounts) have the mark of commandments. The meaning that is induced by the false accounts is that there is reincarnation, that there is an existence after having died, that marked by affliction, one's suffering is a *consequence* (of something). Our 'having done with that' (however) is the ultimate liberation from such (suffering).

समानानेकधर्मोपपत्तेर्विप्रतिपत्तेरुपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थातश्च विशेषापेक्षो विमर्शः संश-  
यः। यमर्थमधिकृत्य प्रवर्तते तत्प्रयोजनम्। लौकिकपरीक्षकाणां यस्मिन्नर्थे बुद्धिसाम्यं स  
दृष्टान्तः।

(1.1.23) **samāna-aneka-dharma-upapatteḥ** (gen. of) same – many – duty, destiny – evidence **vipratipatteḥ** (abl. by) differing in understanding **upalabdhi-anupalabdhī – avyavasthātaḥ** (tasil by) observing – not observing – not persevering (*avasthā (or avasthāna) means stability or settledness in one's life circumstance, abiding in a certain condition and maintaining a certain world-view, while vyavasthā here means fixity or perseverance in that. Both are nearly synonymous with dharma.*) **ca** and **viśeṣa-apekṣaḥ** differences – consideration **vimarśaḥ** examination, investigation **saṁśayaḥ** doubt, uncertainty (1.1.24) **yam** (acc. on) which **artham** (acc. toward) goal **adhikṛtya** (ind.part.) having made it the priority **pravartate** "he (one) proceeds" **tat** that **prayojanam** motivation (1.1.25) **laukika-parīkṣakāṇām** (gen. of) (*This genitive compound has the same referent, "vipratipatti", as the genitive compound at the beginning of 1.1.23.*) living an ordinary life – examining **yasmin\_arthe** (loc. abs. = yatra) in such a way that the goal is **buddhi-sāmyam** conceiving – equal in value **sa** it, such **dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ** the "visualized goal", a standard, paragon or ideal; a vision or example of what is desired. (*In these early statements we find a predominance of terms in the nominative case, whereas later there is heavy use of the ablative.*)

**1.10-11) Our 'uncertainty' is an investigation, a consideration of the particular things (senses and objects 1.10-14) by differing in our understanding of the evidence of the dharmas of the many all the same, and by not persevering there, whether observing or not observing (our dharma). Our "motivation" is the thing on which we proceed toward that goal, having made it the priority. That (differing in understanding of the dharmas) of those just living life and those seeking to examine it, in such a way that the goal is to conceive of them as equal in value, is our "standard"**

He continues to define the terms of the opening sutra. Again, the reason I have supplied the word "our" in every case is that he is setting up the meaning of these terms only for the purpose of his thesis, rather than creating a glossary of universally accepted meanings.

Finding the investigation difficult, one may give up in frustration, but that is not what the author means by "uncertainty" here. Conversely, giving up one's perseverance in a rigid and exclusive belief system may lead to uncertainty, but a contemplative investigation of that very uncertainty may lead to "liberation" (see 1.1.22 and 2.1.6). One's motivation then shifts from perseverance in ritual practices and objective thinking to a determined (1.1.4) investigation of the subjective reality.

तन्त्राधिकरणाभ्युपगमसंस्थितिः सिद्धान्तः। स चतुर्विधः सर्वतन्त्रप्रतितन्त्राधिकरणाभ्युप-  
गमसंस्थित्यर्थान्तरभावात् ।

(1.1.26) **tantra-adhikaraṇa-abhyupagama-saṁsthitih** framework, system, model, theory – creating a priority – accepting – combined stance **siddhāntaḥ** doctrine (1.1.27) **sa** this **catur-vidhaḥ** four ways **sarva-tantra-prati-tantra - adhikaraṇa-abhyupagama - saṁsthitī-artha-antara-bhāvāt** (abl. according to) everyone – system, framework (lit. "warp threads"), theory – opposing – theory – putting at the head, creating a priority – going along with, accepting – coexistence – meanings – separate – being, way or theory of "being" (MW), view

1.12) Our "doctrine" is the combined stance that we create that *priority* (as opposed to equal value 1.1.25) as our theory *and* that we accept it. This can be seen four ways according to a view of separate meanings in the coexistence of a theory for everyone as an opposing theory, vs. creating the priority and accepting it.

सर्वतन्त्राविरुद्धस्तन्त्रेऽधिकृतोऽर्थः सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्तः। समानतन्त्रसिद्धः परतन्त्रसिद्धः  
प्रतितन्त्रसिद्धान्तः।

(1.1.28) **sarva-tantra-aviruddhaḥ** everyone – theory – no prohibition **tantre** (loc. in) theory **adhi-kṛtaḥ** made the priority **arthaḥ** meaning **sarva-tantra-siddhāntaḥ** everyone – theory – doctrine (1.1.29) **samāna-tantra-siddhaḥ** equivalent – principal – established **para-tantra-siddhaḥ** others – theory – established **prati-tantra-siddhāntaḥ** opposing – theory – doctrine

1.13) We do not prohibit a theory for everyone, (so) our doctrine of a theory for everyone is that in that theory, our meaning ("artha" 1.1.14 and

1.1.15 as opposed to 1.1.20) is made the priority, while our doctrine of an opposing theory is established as an *equivalent* (see Chapter Nine) to that theory, that is established as a theory for others.

यत्सिद्धावन्यप्रकरणसिद्धिः सोऽधिकरणसिद्धान्तः। अपरीक्षिताभ्युपगमात्तद्विशेषपरीक्ष-  
णमभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तः।

(1.1.30) **yat\_siddhau** (loc. upon) the establishment of which **anya-prakarana-siddhiḥ** other – subject – establishment **saḥ** the thing **adhikarana-siddhāntaḥ** creating a priority – doctrine (1.1.31) **aparīkṣita-abhyupagamāt** (abl. apart from; *aparīkṣita* vs. *parīkṣaṇam*) who has not carefully examined – acceptance. **tat-viśeṣa-parīkṣaṇam** that – particular(s) – carefully examining **abhyupagama-siddhāntaḥ** agreeing, acceptance – doctrine

1.14) (Likewise,) our doctrine of creating a priority is the thing *upon* the establishment of which there is (then) the establishment of the subject (of dharma) for others, while our doctrine regarding acceptance is to carefully examine the particulars of that (theory), as apart from the mere acceptance on the part of one who has not carefully examined it.

प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनान्यवयवाः। साध्यनिर्देशः प्रतिज्ञा। उदाहरणसाधर्म्या-  
त्साध्यसाधनं हेतुः। तथा वैधर्म्यात्।

(1.1.32) **pratijñā-hetu-udāharaṇa-upanaya-nigamanāni** assertion – grounds – general rule – application – conclusion **avayavāḥ** subdivisions or parts of the syllogism (1.1.33) **sādhya-nirdeśaḥ** "to be established", premise – dictating (before proving it) **pratijñā** assertion (1.1.34) **udāharaṇa-sādharmyāt** (abl. by) general rule – conformity **sādhya-sādhanam** premise – establishing **hetuḥ** grounds (1.1.35) **tathā** similarly **vaidharmyāt** (abl. by) nonconformity

1.15) The (formal) subdivisions (of that examination) are: the assertion, the grounds for it, the general rule (that applies to the assertion and the grounds), the application (of the rule), and the conclusion. Our assertion (1.1.1) (simply) *dictates* our premise (that the highest dharma is by true comprehension), and our grounds establishes that premise by conformity with our general rule, and similarly, by nonconformity (of the opposite).

साध्यसाधर्म्यात्तद्धर्मभावीदृष्टान्त उदाहरणम्। तद्विपर्ययाद्वा विपरीतम्। उदाहरणापेक्ष-  
स्तथेत्युपसंहारो न तथेति वा साध्यस्योपनयः।

(1.1.36) **sādhya-sādharmyāt** (abl. by) premise – conformity **tat-dharma-  
bhāvī** his – duty – destined to **dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ** standard **udāharaṇam** general rule, the  
conditional statement "if ... then" (1.1.37) **tat-viparyayāt** (abl. by) it – opposition  
**vā** or **viparītam** reverse (1.1.38) **udāharaṇa-(inst.)-apekṣaḥ** general rule –  
consideration **tathā** so **iti** saying **upasaṃhāraḥ** conviction, conclusion **na\_tathā**  
not so **iti** saying **vā** or **sādhyaśya** (gen. for) premise **upanayaḥ** application

1.16) Our general rule is our standard (1.1.25), that one is destined to his  
dharma either by conformity with our premise, or the reverse, by opposition  
to it; and the application (of the rule) for our premise, is our conviction,  
considered by means of that rule, saying either, "It is so", or "It is not so."

हेत्वपदेशात्प्रतिज्ञायाः पुनर्वचनं निगमनम्। अविज्ञाततत्त्वेऽर्थे कारणोपपत्तितस्तत्त्वज्ञा-  
नार्थमूहस्तर्कः।

(1.1.39) **hetu-apadeśāt** (abl. according to) reason – pointing out (*as opposed to  
nirdeśa in the assertion*) **pratiññāyāḥ** (gen. of) assertion **punar-vacanam** re-  
affirmation **nigamanam** conclusion (1.1.40) **avijñāta-tattve\_arthe** (loc. absolute;  
"given that") not understood – essence \_ object **kāraṇa-upapattitaḥ** (tasil  
resulting from) cause – becoming evident **tattva-jñāna-artham** essence –  
comprehending – (ifc) for the purpose of **ūhaḥ** deliberation (see SD 12.7) **tarkaḥ**  
discussion

1.17) The conclusion is the reaffirmation of our assertion (but this time) by  
pointing out our grounds. The discussion of that (grounds), given that its  
object is that essence which is not yet understood, is a deliberation for the  
purpose of the true comprehension of that essence that results from our  
'cause' (īśvara 4.1.19) becoming evident.

विमृश्य पक्षप्रतिपक्षाभ्यामर्थवधारणं निर्णयः। प्रमाणतर्कसाधनोपालम्भः सिद्धान्ताविरु-

द्धः पञ्चावयवोपपन्नः पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहो वादः।

(1.1.41) **vimṛśya** (indeclinable participle) after having investigated **pakṣa-prati-pakṣābhyām** (inst. dual; by means of) side – opposing – side **artha-avadhāraṇam** object – confirmation **nirṇayaḥ** settlement (1.2.1) **pramāṇa-tarka-sādhana-upālambhaḥ** (*The inflection is singular, not the dual: "supporting and condemning".*) means of validation – discussing – establishment – criticizing **siddhānta-aviruddhaḥ** doctrine – without prohibition **pañca-avayava-upapannaḥ** five – members – invested **pakṣa-prati-pakṣa-parigrahaḥ** side – opposing side – claiming as one's own **vādaḥ** dialectic

**1.18) Settlement means confirmation of that object, after having investigated by means of (comparing) the one side and the opposing side; and the dialectic (presented in this treatise), claiming both the one side and the opposing side as our own, criticizes the establishment (of our claim) by discussing our means of validation as one invested with those five subdivisions of analysis, but *without* prohibiting our doctrine.**

The author is not inventing the formal five-part syllogism here. These definitions of the five are only as they apply to his thesis of dharma. In fact, this work is not a treatise on logic in general, just because it contains a description of the five steps (the "syllogism") and mentions a few examples of obstacles to sound reasoning. He makes it abundantly clear throughout the work that his thesis, like that of the Vaisheshika, is about dharma. There is no mistaking it.

1.) The assertion is his premise that if one is to find the highest dharma, then there must be true comprehension of the essence of the principles given in the opening sutra, considered against their complements, also given. (This is a conditional "if A then B", not a simple subject/predicate assertion.) 2.) The reason or grounds for knowing this is that one does comprehend this essence, because its "cause" has become evident (see 1.1.40). The author explicitly declares in 4.1.19 that his cause (kāraṇa) is Īśvara, meaning not "God" as a religious concept, but rather the supreme human spirit that can be identified in meditation and in activity as one's own consciousness (See YD 2.1-6). *Direct experience* of this provides the grounds, not dogma. The opposing side's cause ("nimitta") is karma. 3.) The general rule is dual: that if either version of dharma is to be known, then its cause must be known (either Īśvara for the highest dharma, or karma for common dharma). This rule is 4.) applied to our premise with a thorough examination, and then the assertion is 5.) reaffirmed. Those are the five subdivisions.



## 2.) Prattle

यथोक्तोपपन्नश्छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानसाधनोपालम्भो जल्पः। स प्रतिपक्षस्थापनाहीनो वितण्डा।

(1.2.2) **yathā-ukta** – **upapannaḥ** so it has been declared (*by scripture, not "earlier in this text"*) – invested **chala** – **jāti-nigraha-sthāna** – **sādhana-upālabhaḥ** false persuasion – birth-rank – dominating – standing firm, taking a firm stance – establishing – censure, reproach, prohibition (*The word "jāti" means birth-rank, especially of the high-born, and "sthāna" is their stance. These are key terms here and they serve as the basis for the following material. The translation of jāti as a futility or futile argument is unfounded and utterly wrong.*) **jalpaḥ** idle talk, prattle, gossip (1.2.3) **sa** it, this **pratipakṣa-sthāpanā** opposing side – causing to stand, propping up **hīnaḥ** inadequate **viṭaṇḍā** hitting back

2.1) Prattle, as one who is invested with the (traditional) 'so it has been declared (by scripture)', is the way in which there is attaining that (settlement) through establishing it by false persuasion and by taking a stance by dominating (the discussion) by virtue of high (scholarly, priestly) birth-rank, which is merely hitting back, propping up an opposition that is (otherwise) inadequate.

सव्यभिचारविरुद्धप्रकरणसमसाध्यसमकालातीता हेत्वाभासाः। अनैकान्तिक सव्यभिचारः। सिद्धान्तमभ्युपेत्य तद्विरोधी विरुद्धः।

(1.2.4) **savyabhicāra-viruddha-** having deviation from something (*Adhering to the context, the referent is sthāna 1.2.2.*) – prohibited **-prakaraṇa-sama-** subject – equivalent, substitute **-sādhya-sama-** premise – equivalent **-kāla-atītaḥ** to be done – equivalent – time – past **hetu-ābhāsāḥ** reason or motive, grounds for knowing – pretenses (1.2.5) **anaikāntikaḥ** not exclusively one way **savyabhicāraḥ** deviation (1.2.6) **siddha-antam** (acc.) doctrine **abhyupetya** (ind. part.) having agreed to (w/acc.) **tat-virodhī** it – in direct opposition to **viruddhaḥ** prohibition

2.2) Their pretenses as to grounds are: that any deviation from that (stance) is prohibited, that that (stance) is *equivalent* (see Chapter Nine) to our

subject (dharma), that it is equivalent to our premise (that the highest dharma is by true comprehension), and that there is a time gone by (past life). Our deviation is not just the one way, (and) having agreed to our doctrine (of coexistence 1.1.26), such a prohibition (against deviation from their way) would be in direct contradiction to it.

यस्मात्प्रकरणचिन्ता स निर्णयार्थमपदिष्टः प्रकरणसमः। साध्याविशिष्टः साध्यत्वात्साध्य-  
समःकालात्यापदिष्टः कालातीतः।

(1.2.7) **yasmāt** (abl. ind.) whatever such **prakaraṇa-cintā** subject – anxious thought **sa** that (*functions as "tasmāt"*) **nirṇaya-artham** settlement – (ifc) with the object of **apadiṣṭaḥ** offered as a pretext **prakaraṇa-samaḥ** subject – equivalent (1.2.8) **sādhya-aviśiṣṭaḥ** premise – undistinguished **sādhya tvāt** (abl. because) yet to be demonstrated **sādhya-samaḥ** premise – equivalent (1.2.9) **kāla-atyaya-apadiṣṭaḥ** time – lapsing – offered as a pretext **kāla-atītaḥ** time – lapsed

2.3) Whatever such anxious thought there may be about the subject (dharma), that (anxiety over prohibition, reproach 2.1.65) is then offered as an equivalent to the subject, as a pretext with the object of settlement (by intimidation). That is an undistinguished premise because it has yet to be demonstrated, (but is offered as) an equivalent of our premise (that the highest dharma is by true comprehension). Their 'time gone by' is a pretext about the lapsing of time.

Their worry arises from the *smṛti* (guṇa-śabda 2.1.65) and its promises of bliss vs. threats of punishment.

वचनविघातोऽर्थविकल्पोपपत्त्या छलम्। (तत्त्रिविधं वाक्छलं सामान्यच्छलमुपचारच्छलं  
च।) अविशेषाभिहितेऽर्थे वक्तुरभिप्रायादर्थान्तरकल्पना वाक्छलम्।

(1.2.10) **vacana-vighātaḥ** statement, thesis – a blow or attack against **artha-vikalpa-upapattyā** (inst. by) meaning – diversity – making evident, effecting **chalam** false persuasion (1.2.11) (*tat trividham vāk-chalam sāmānya-chalam upacāra-chalam ca; It is of three kinds: false persuasion by speech, false persuasion by generalization, and false persuasion by figure.*) (1.2.12) **aviśeṣa-abhihite** (loc. while) no distinction – it is held **arthe** (loc. in) meaning **vaktuḥ**

(gen. of) speaker, author **abhiprāyāt** (abl. w/antara; apart from) intended **artha-antara-kalpanā** meaning – alternate – making up **vāk-chalam** speech – false persuasion

2.4) "False persuasion" is an attack against our thesis by effecting this diversity of meanings. False persuasion by speech (equivocation) is making up an alternate meaning, apart from the author's intended one, while it is held that there is *no* distinction in the meaning.

सम्भवतोऽर्थस्यातिसामान्ययोगादसम्भूतार्थकल्पना सामान्यच्छलम्। धर्मविकल्पनिर्देशोऽर्थसद्भावप्रतिषेध उपचारच्छलम्।

(1.2.13) **sambhavataḥ** (tasil; because) possible **arthasya** (gen. of) meaning **ati-sāmānya-yogāt** (abl. by) absolutely – universally agreed to – joining **asambhūta-artha – kalpanā** (a karmadhāraya compound; ind. "where") not-arisen-meaning – making up **sāmānya-chalam** generality – false persuasion (1.2.14) **dharma-vikalpa-nirdeśe** (loc. in) duties, roles in life – diversity – dictating **artha-sat-bhāva-pratiṣedhaḥ** meaning – truly existent, true – denying **upacāra-chalam** metaphor, figure – false persuasion

2.5) Where such making up of the meaning has not arisen, there is false persuasion by universality, because it is possible by just joining along with a meaning that absolutely universally agreed to. False persuasion by figure, in dictating a diversity of dharmas, denies the true meaning (of dharma).

वाक्छलमेवोपचारच्छलं तदविशेषात्। न तदर्थान्तरभावात्। अविशेषे वा किञ्चित्साध-  
म्यादेकच्छलप्रसङ्गः।

(1.2.15) **vāk-chalam** speech – false persuasion **eva** just as, the same **upacāra-chalam** metaphor, figure (*Many of the definitions of "figure" contribute well to the meaning of upacāra here.*) – false persuasion **tat-aviśeṣāt** (abl. since) that – no distinction (1.2.16) **na** not the case **tat-artha-antara-bhāvāt** (abl. because) (to) that – meaning – alternate – view (1.2.17) **aviśeṣe** (loc. when) no distinction **vā** or **kiñcit** some, a little // **sādharmyāt** (abl. because of) conformity **eka-chala-prasaṅgaḥ** a certain – false persuasion – adhering to, occupied with

2.6) (One may say) that we falsely persuade by figure, just as there is false persuasion by speech, because no distinction is held in that (meaning 1.2.12); but there is no such (false persuasion) arising from our view of the alternate meaning from that, or, there *is* a little when we don't make the distinction (as to dharma). Because of our conformity (with dharma see 2.1.1-3), we are occupied with a certain false persuasion (of our own).

साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानं जातिः। विप्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिपत्तिश्च निग्रहस्थानम्। तद्विक-  
त्त्याज्जातिनिग्रहस्थानबहुत्वम्।

(1.2.18) **sādharmya-vaidharmyābhyām** (inst. dual; established by) conformity – conformity **pratyavasthānam** opposition of one's life-standing (*In this work, the author uses terms like "avasthā" and "dharma" and their compounds in the higher sense of "life purpose", not in an overly general sense to describe techniques of argument.*) **jātiḥ** class-ranking by birth, caste (1.2.19) **vipratipattiḥ** difference of understanding **apratipattiḥ** lack of understanding **ca** indeed **nigraha-sthānam** (by) dominating – taking a stance (1.2.20) **tat-vikalpāt** (abl. from) that – diversity **jāti-nigraha-sthāna-bahu-tvam** (high) birth-rank – domination – standing, taking a stance – many – notion of

2.7) Ranking by birth (caste) is the mutual opposition of life standing as established by conformity vs. conformity (with duty or personal quality determined by birth), and taking a stance by dominating (the other classes) is a difference of understanding, that is indeed a *lack* of understanding. From the (notion of) diversity of that (dharma), there arises the notion of the many taking a stance that results from domination by the high-born.

As in the Vaisheshika, **sādharmya** and **vaidharmya** here as "similarity vs. dissimilarity" does not refer to the attributes of objects, but to inclusion and exclusion of people by castes according to the qualities of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. We all know a bird by its attributes, as opposed to a dog, and all the other classes and sub-classes, and their names too, but children's lessons of observing, classifying, and naming objects in the world, are unworthy of higher philosophy.

In traditional religious thinking, conformity vs. conformity with one's natural born dharma or duty in past lives is the main cause of one's status in the present life, for better or worse. Standing firm through domination by class is the obstruction of independent thinking through the claim of intellectual superiority by

virtue of such birth-rank, or by training, title, reputation, veneration, or divine inspiration.

It even extends to the fraudulent pretense to the possession of supernatural abilities or to infallibility by virtue of "enlightenment" or sainthood, either by direct claims on the part of spiritual leaders, or by their failure to deny any such naive assumptions held by their followers. Too often a title earned by training serves only as a formal sign that one has demonstrated a commitment *not* to think independently but rather to follow and possibly attempt to build on a certain pre-established line of thought. This works well enough for science, but not for ontology or epistemology.

समानानेकधर्माध्यवसायादन्यतरधर्माध्यवसायाद्वा न संशयः। विप्रतिपत्त्यव्यवस्थाध्यव-  
सायाच्च। विप्रतिपत्तौ च सम्प्रतिपत्तेः। (अव्यवस्थात्मनि व्यवस्थितत्वाच्चाव्यवस्थायाः।)

(2.1.1) **samāna-aneka-dharma-adhyavasāyāt** (abl. because) same – many – dharma – firm resolve **anyatara-dharma-adhyavasāyāt** (abl. about) the other of the two – dharma – firm resolve (See "absence of dispute, like it is with dharma" SD 7.4.) **vā** or **na** no **samśayaḥ** uncertainty (This section recalls 1.1.23) (2.1.2) **vi-pratipatti** – **avyavasthā** – **adhyavasāyāt** (abl. due to) considering a contrary opinion – without perseverance – a state of resolve **ca** and (2.1.3) **vipratipattau** (loc. even when) difference of opinion or understanding **ca** and **sampratipatteḥ** (abl. due to) agreement (The *vā* clause followed by a *ca* clause indicates a one-to-one relation between their respective terms, as it does in SD 8.13.) [(2.1.4) *avyavasthā ātmani / vyavasthitatvāt ca avyavasthāyāḥ*; The failure to persevere is within one's soul, and it results from being fixed in that situation, which results (in turn) from one's (previous) failure to persevere.]

2.8) There is no uncertainty there, either because of the firm resolve that there is a dharma for the many all the same, or (in our case) because of the (contrary) firm resolve as to that *other* (inner) dharma (cf. 1.1.23); and this is (in the first case) due to that firm resolve being without any perseverance in considering the contrary opinion, and (in our case) due to agreement (with that first) even when one *does* have a contrary opinion.

Again there is the lesson that one must abide by law and duty, even if one comes to understand the truth of solipsism and subjective idealism, but to resolve against those concepts without constant examination of them is unacceptable.

तथात्यन्तसंशयस्तद्धर्मसातत्योपपत्तेः। यथोक्ताध्यवसायादेव तद्विशेषापेक्षात्संशयेनासं-  
शयो नात्यन्तसंशयो वा । (यत्र संशयस्तत्रैवमुत्तरोत्तरप्रसङ्गः।)

(2.1.5) **tathā** in that way, that is how **atyanta-saṁśayaḥ** ultimate – uncertainty **tat-dharmaḥ** tat (*refers to anyatara in 2.1.1*) **ātatya-upapatteḥ** (abl. known from) (ṣyaṁ bhāvārtha form of ātata) being spread – evidence (2.1.6) **yathā-ukta** – **adhyavasāyāt** (abl. from) declared so far – resolve **eva** indeed **tat-viśeṣa-apekṣāt** (abl. arising from) them – difference – considering **saṁśayena** (inst. by means of) uncertainty **asaṁśayaḥ** freedom from uncertainty **na** not **atyanta-saṁśayaḥ** ultimate – uncertainty **vā** instead [(2.1.7) **yatra saṁśayaḥ tatra evam uttara-uttara-prasaṅgaḥ**; *Wherever there is doubt (of dharma), there it surely becomes more and more advanced.*)(Reinforcing his statement in 2.1.4, the commenter says again that we should accept our dharma as prescribed by verbal authority, without examination. That is the very antithesis of this work.)]

**2.9) That is how there arises the ultimate uncertainty that the dharma of that (other way "anyatara" 2.1.1) is known from the evidence of its being spread (among the many "aneka" 2.1.1). Indeed, from one's resolve (motivation) upon what has been declared (here), it is rather by means of the uncertainty that arises from considering the difference between them that there is instead freedom from uncertainty, and not that ultimate uncertainty.**

At this point, it should be clear to anyone that the Nyaya Darshana is not an investigation of the science of reasoning or logic. It is an attempt to form a reasoned reconciliation between two undeniable but seemingly mutually exclusive ways of understanding the experience of life itself.

He ends this half of the chapter by mentioning uncertainty. Interestingly, he appears to be saying that this uncertainty should never be resolved, and the motivation to resolve it should never cease. Apparently it is the constant adventure of the inner investigation itself, with the principles of the Darshanas in mind, that is the important thing, as opposed to formulating a pat answer that can be expressed by a few aphorisms and then forgotten, or as opposed to persisting in religious rituals. The way of Yoga is the regular practice of investigation into one's own consciousness, along with some awareness of these principles in daily life, but not so that we might one day snap into a permanent state of "enlightenment" and bliss. According to the Darshanas, Yoga (4.2.42) is both the way *and* the goal.

## Pramāṇa and Prameya and Pratyakṣa

### Pramāṇa (validation of knowledge)

प्रत्यक्षादीनामप्रामाण्यं त्रैकाल्यासिद्धेः। पूर्वं हि प्रमाणसिद्धौ नेन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षात्प्रत्य-  
क्षोत्पत्तिः।

(2.1.8) **pratyakṣādīnām** (gen. pl. of) perception etc. **aprāmāṇyam** lack of credibility **traikālyā-asiddheḥ** (abl. because) threefold time – no affirmation (2.1.9) **pūrvam** before, past **hi** for **pramāṇa-siddhau** (loc. when) validation – affirmation **na** no **indriya – artha – saṁnikarṣāt** (abl. through) sense – object – together-in-drawing **pratyakṣa-utpattiḥ** perception – manifestation

2.10) There is a certain lack of credibility of perception and the others, because we cannot affirm threefold time: for when we (try to) affirm our validation for past (incarnations) there is no (present) manifestation (of reality) by perception, through the drawing in together of sense and object.

पश्चात्सिद्धौ न प्रमाणेभ्यः प्रमेयसिद्धिः। युगपत्सिद्धौ प्रत्यर्थनियतत्वात्क्रमवृत्तित्वाभावो  
बुद्धीनाम्।

(2.1.10) **pāścāt** (abl. ind.) hereafter, future **siddhau** (loc. when) affirming **na** no **pramāṇebhyaḥ** (abl. by) means of validation **prameya-siddhiḥ** to be validated – affirmation (2.1.11) **yugapat** (ind.) simultaneous (with awareness), immediate, present **siddhau** (loc. when) establishing **pratyartha-niyatatvāt** (abl. ind.) in every case, each one – being fixed, defined **krama-vṛttitva-abhāvaḥ** stages – modes of existence – no such thing **buddhīnām** (gen. of) intellects, minds

2.11) When we try to affirm that (validation) for future (incarnations), there is no affirmation of our prameya ("to be validated") (including the denial of future incarnation. See def. of prameya 1.1.9.) by those means of validation. When (however) we affirm that (validation) as immediate (present), there is no such thing as modes of life by stages (incarnations), on the part of intellects (plural), each one being so defined (by his stage).

त्रैकल्यासिद्धेः प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः। सर्वप्रमाणप्रतिषेधाच्च प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः। तत्राप्रामाण्ये वा न सर्वप्रमाणविप्रतिषेधः।

(2.1.12) **traikalya-asiddheḥ** (abl. because) threefold time – not affirming **pratiṣedha-anupapattiḥ** denial – no evidence (2.1.13) **sarva-pramāṇa-pratiṣedhāt** (abl. since) whole – process of validation – denial **ca** and **pratiṣedha-anupapattiḥ** denial – no evidence (2.1.14) **tat-prāmāṇye** (loc. if) that (*ref. is yugapat 2.1.11*) – credibility **vā** on the other hand **na** no **sarva-pramāṇa-vipratiṣedhaḥ** whole – process of validation – comprehensive denial

2.12) There is no evidence for denying (our premise, the true meaning of dharma 1.2.14), because there can be no affirmation of threefold time, and there is no evidence for that denial because it would be a denial of our whole means of validation. On the other hand, (it may be also be argued that) if there is credibility in that (immediate present), one cannot deny our whole means of validation (of dharma).

त्रैकाल्याप्रतिषेधश्च। शब्दादातोद्यसिद्धिप्रसङ्गः। प्रमेया च तुलाप्रामाण्यवत्। प्रमाणतः

सिद्धेः प्रमाणानां प्रमाणान्तरसिद्धिप्रसङ्गः।

(2.1.15) **traikālya-apratiṣedhaḥ** the threefold time – not denying **ca** and (*paired with the following ca*) **śabdāt** (abl. by) sound **ātodya-siddhi-prasaṅgaḥ** "to be struck", a drum or other musical instrument, a *means* of producing sound – establishing – a possibility or contingency becoming true or evident (2.1.16) **prameyā** (f. to match *tulā*) (the need) to be validated **ca** it is also true that **tulā-prāmāṇyavat** (vatuṣ as ind.) a balance scale – the having validity (2.1.17) **pramāṇataḥ** (tasil resulting from) validation **siddheḥ** (abl. by) affirmation **pramāṇānām** (gen. of) various (pl.) means of validation **pramāṇa-antara-siddhi-prasaṅgaḥ** means of validation – inner – affirmation – occupation with life

2.13) Not denying the threefold time, the affirmation of a musical instrument (for example) becomes evident by its sound (in the present), but it is also true that a measuring scale needs to be validated (calibrated) to have validity. (So) the occupation with life that is affirmed by our inner means of validation is (also affirmed) by the affirmation of the (three) means of validation, which results from validation (of them).



## Prameya ("to be validated")

तद्विनिवृत्तेर्वा प्रमाणसिद्धिवत्प्रमेयसिद्धिः । नप्रदीपप्रकाशसिद्धिवत्तत्सिद्धेः । कचिन्नवृत्तिदर्शनादनिवृत्तिदर्शनाच्च कचिदनेकान्तः ।

(2.1.18) **tat-vinivṛtteḥ** (abl. by) that – turning away **vā** on the other hand **pramāṇa-siddhivat** (vati just like) validation – affirmation **prameya-siddhiḥ** to be validated – affirmation (2.1.19) **na** not **pradīpa-prakāśa-siddhivat** (vati like) lamp – light – affirmation **tat-siddheḥ** (abl. through) those – affirmation (2.1.20) **kvacit** in one **nivṛtti-darśanāt** (abl. ind.) cessation – seeing **anivṛtti-darśanāt** (abl. ind.) non-cessation – seeing **ca** and **kvacit** in another **anekāntaḥ** not just one

2.14) On the other hand, by turning (one's attention) away from those (means), there is, just like the affirmation by our means of validation, the (immediate) affirmation of what is to be validated, like the affirmation of a lamp by its light, which is not through affirmation by those means of validation. Seeing cessation (of a past condition) in the one case, and seeing no cessation in the other case, there cannot be just the one way.

If the light from a lamp is concealed by a pot, the normal view is that it still exists, but according to the subjectivist philosophy, it does not. He assumes that we are familiar with this example, which is similar to the well-known *philosophical* question (the one that isn't satisfied by the obvious, yet so very obtuse, scientific answer): "If a tree falls in a forest, without anyone to hear, does it make a sound?"

## Pratyakṣa (Perception)

प्रत्यक्षलक्षणानुपपत्तिरसमग्रवचनात् । नात्ममनसोः संनिकर्शाभावे प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तिः ।

दिग्देशकालाकाशेष्वप्येवं प्रसङ्गः ।

(2.1.21) **pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇa-anupapattiḥ** perception – qualities – no evidence **asamagra-vacanāt** (abl. ind) lack of a whole – asserting (2.1.22) **na** not **ātma-manasoḥ** (gen. dual; of the two) individual self – mind **saṁnikarṣa-abhāve** (loc.) drawing-in-together – in/loc. in the absence of, without **pratyakṣa-utpattiḥ** (see also 2.1.9) perception – coming into existence (2.1.23) **dik-deśa – kāla – ākāśeṣu** (loc. with) direction and location – time – space **api** even **evam** exactly as it is **prasaṅgaḥ** occupation with life

2.15) There can be no evidence of the qualities of a perception by asserting the lack of (perception as) a whole. Without the drawing in together of the individual *self* and the mind, perception would not even come to exist. That (self) is our occupation with life, just as it is, even with (the qualities of) direction and location, time, and space.

ज्ञानलिङ्गत्वादात्मनो नानवरोधः। तदयौगपद्यलिङ्गत्वाच्च न मनसः। प्रत्यक्षनिमित्तत्वाच्चेन्द्रियार्थयोः संनिकर्षस्य स्वशब्देन वचनम्।

(2.1.24) **jñāna-liṅga-tvāt** (abl. since) true comprehension – indicator(s) – existing as **ātmanah** (gen. of) individual self **na** not **anavarodhaḥ** without separating out (see *nirodha* in YD) (*The meaning here is very dependent on the context.*) (2.1.25) **tat-ayaugapadya-liṅga-tvāt** (abl. because) it – without immediacy – indicator – the fact that **ca\_na** but not **manasaḥ** (gen. of) mind (*has the same referent as ātmanah*) (2.1.26) **pratyakṣa-nimitta-tvāt** (abl. because) perception – instrumental cause – would be **ca** and // **indriya-arthayoḥ** (gen. dual; of) sense – object **saṁnikarṣasya** (gen. of) drawing in together **svaśabdena** (inst. by way of) one's own testimony **vacanam** assertion

2.16) That (self) is not (known) without separating that (evidence) out, since that (evidence) exists only as an indicator in the true comprehension of oneself; but not of one's mind, because of the fact that without the immediacy (of true comprehension) that (mind) is also just an indicator of it, and because it would be the *instrumental* cause of perception. By way of our self-testimony, *that* (statement about mind) is an assertion of the drawing in together (only) of sense and object (not self).

सुप्तव्यासक्तमनसांचेन्द्रियार्थयोः संनिकर्षनिमित्तत्वात्। तैश्चापदेशो ज्ञानविशेषाणाम्।

व्याहतत्वादहेतुः।

(2.1.27) **supta-vyāsakta-manasām** (gen. pl. of; *ref. is the same as that of saṁnikarṣasya*) asleep – stuck – minds **ca** also **indriya-arthayoḥ** (gen. dual; of) sense – object **saṁnikarṣa-nimitta-tvāt** (abl. arising from) perception – instrumental cause – the notion (2.1.28) **taiḥ** (inst. with) those **ca** and **apadeśaḥ** pointing out **jñāna-viśeṣāṇām** (gen. pl. of) comprehension – particulars (2.1.29) **vyāhatatvāt** (abl. because) being in conflict **ahetuḥ** without grounds

**2.17) There is also that (assertion) of minds that are asleep and attached, arising from the notion of that (the object) being the *instrumental* cause in the drawing in together of sense and object, and it is with those (minds) that we would find their pointing out the *particulars* of their comprehension, which is without (our) grounds for knowledge because of its being in conflict with that.**

The word "supta" refers to his assertion or assumption of all the supposed *other* minds that would have had no inkling of the higher philosophy of self-realization, and "vyāsakta" refers to their attachment to worldly life and their devotion to routine religious practices. The statement that the teaching among "them" is the ordinary knowledge of the particulars regarding laws and religious customs and practices, is very familiar. We find it in the Upanishad, Brahma Sutra, Yoga Sutra, etc.

नार्थविशेषप्राबल्यात्। प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमेकदेशग्रहणादुपलब्धेः। न प्रत्यक्षेण यावत्तावदप्यु-  
पलम्भात्।

(2.1.30) **na** not **artha-viśeṣa**-(gen.)-**prābalyāt** (abl. following from) object – particular – predominance, pre-existence (2.1.31) **pratyakṣam** perception // **anumānam** inference **ekadeśa-grahaṇāt** (abl. by) single individual – grasp, personal understanding or apprehension (*Ekadeśa means a part of a whole. Here it is a "single individual" as part of the whole of humanity. Grahaṇa is not sensory perception like pratyakṣa.*) **upalabdheḥ** (gen. of ref.=*prābalya*) observation (2.1.32) **na** no **pratyakṣeṇa** (inst. by) perception **yāvat\_tāvat** just as much as, just as true as **api** either **upalambhāt** (abl. for) a matter of personal recognition

**2.18) (But) perception does not follow from the predominance of particular objects. That (predominance) of observation by personal apprehension on the part of each single individual is (only) inference. That (inference) is not just as true as it would be by (direct) perception either, for that is a matter of (personal) recognition.**

One's own personal "grasp" of ideas is known by direct experience, but that of others is inferred, which is obvious but of little importance outside the theories of subjective idealism and solipsism. That there is *sensory* perception and mental processing on the part of others is a solid inference within the (Darwinian) theory of human beings (including oneself) as soulless purposeless particle-based life machines, representing a single, accidentally self-propagating species.

Moreover, the idea that others have a grasp of abstract ideas, or of a soul, or indeed that they *are* souls or selves, as true as that may be, must be modeled after one's own grasp. Anything beyond the idea of robotic data processing and sharing through the interface of language begins to require a belief in "some kind of" abstract higher being. But let's face it, this means God, a human-like being with qualities like will, the capacity to discriminate or judge, to love, to be pleased, displeased, appeased, etc. We imagine God as like us, but not limited in knowledge or power, not mortal, and of course not visible, and not limited to being physically present in any particular location. That's the best we can do, but these attributes of greatness are nothing but naive negations of our own perceived limitations.

Outside of the remembered, school-taught, explanation of humanity as soulless life "forms", all one knows for sure, in the present—where all knowledge is found—is one's own inner knowledge of what it feels like to be alive and aware and human. It is an immediate, unmistakable, and yet unexplained, sphere of perception beginning with ethereal sound, breath, and feel. It is by that model that we infer a similar inner humanity in others. This so-called "inference", as vital and true as it *must* be, belongs neither to reason, science, or the philosophies of solipsism, subjective idealism, or any other philosophy, but to religion.

Thoughtful religious people the world over find themselves compelled to accept science, but the reverse is not the case. Even modern masters in philosophy distance themselves from the issue of self or soul, as they would certainly distance themselves from religion. It is, however, within the religious perspective that one finds some acknowledgement of the inescapable duality of the two humanities, and that is why I consider theism to be superior to atheism, but solely in the abstract, for I have no affection for the antagonistic tribalism of institutional religion.

The teaching of the Darshanas, on the other hand, transcends that of science, philosophy, and religion, even though it may be difficult to grasp. The problem with understanding it is that the principles being revealed, as close as they are to the intuitive intelligence of the sensitive reader, are necessarily foreign or even hostile to his schooled or tribal mind. Therefore, the task at hand, for anyone who is receptive and motivated to come to an understanding, is to earnestly and persistently engage in an effort to reconcile the two opposing views in order to bring them to union. This journey is called Yoga. It is not any kind of self-help. In fact, all the authors agree that it is not a matter of seeking the ultimate happiness but of seeking the ultimate dharma, which is the understanding itself.

### 3.) Inference, Comparison, and Testimony

#### Inference

साध्यत्वादवयविनि संदेहः। सर्वाग्रहणमवयव्यसिद्धेः। धारणाकर्षणोपपत्तेश्च। सेनावन-  
वद् ग्रहणमिति चेत्

(2.1.33) **sādhyaṭvāt** (abl. because) having to be demonstrated **avayavini** (loc. about) having parts, a subdivided whole **saṁdehaḥ** doubt (2.1.34) **sarva-agrahaṇam** everyone (*all things?*) – no personal apprehension **avayavi-asiddheḥ** (abl. because) possessor of parts – no affirmation (2.1.35) **dhāraṇā - ākarṣaṇa-upapatteḥ** (abl. since) holding in mind, remembering – drawing in – evidence **ca** and (2.1.36) **senā-vanavat** (vati like) army in battle array – forest **grahaṇam** personal apprehension **iti\_cet** to the objection: (*This objection and reply format is meant to be read, where appropriate, until 2.2.6, being refreshed in 2.2.9.*)

**3.1) To the objection that there is doubt about a subdivided whole (self), because that would have to be demonstrated; that because there is no affirmation of that subdivided whole, there can be no personal apprehension of one being 'everyone' (implied in 2.1.30-32); and that because our evidence is (only) a 'drawing in' of something we hold in mind, our personal apprehension (of a whole) must be like a (figurative) forest of an army, ...**

Here the doubter in us leans toward the theory that the parts of a whole are the prior reality, underlying the concepts of whole things. We consider, for example, that we only know of a whole entity like an "army" from directly seeing the soldiers as its parts, and that the concept of an army is learned and remembered, not perceived. This is a sound argument, and it holds absolutely true in the common view of things, but in the higher philosophy of self-realization being taught here, the order is reversed.

नातीन्द्रियत्वादणूनाम्। रोधोपघातसादृश्येभ्यो व्यभिचारादनुमानमप्रमाणम्। नैकदेशत्रा-  
ससादृश्येभ्योऽर्थान्तरभावात्।

(2.1.36 cont.) **na** not the case **ati-indriyatvāt** (abl. because) being beyond the senses **aṇūnām** (gen. of) minute things (2.1.37) **rodha-upaghāta-sādrśyebhyaḥ** (abl. by) blocked – struck – likenesses **vyabhicārāt** (abl. for) deviation

**anumānam** inference **apramāṇam** not means of validation (2.1.38) **na** not (just) **ekadeśa-trāsa-sādrśyebhyaḥ** (abl. by) single individual – fear – likenesses **artha-antara-bhāvāt** (abl. according to) meaning – alternate – view

**3.2)** (the reply is:) **That is not the case, because of the (most) minute things' being beyond one's powers of sense. The inference of them is not our means of validation** (see 2.1.30-31), **for our deviation would be by likenesses (of soldiers) being blocked and struck, and not just by likenesses of the single individuals' (soldiers') fear (of being blocked and struck), (this) according to the view of our alternate meaning.**

The mention of fear, blocking, striking, and falling, are obviously meant to flesh out the analogy of an army in battle. The word "aṇūnām" (2.1.36) does not mean "of atoms", or sub-atomic particles as we know them today. (We *do* infer them now from empirical evidence.) It refers to the smaller and smaller parts that make up any whole in general. The ancients must have guessed, as well as anyone would, that what was visible to the naked eye was not the limit of minuteness. While in a way it is true that one perceives the individual soldiers and not the "army" as a whole, that doesn't really work, because it doesn't stop there. We could just as easily say that the concept of the "whole" soldier is only secondary to perceiving his limbs, which are in turn secondary to their parts, and so on down to where the most minute parts of all must be imperceptible. That is the author's point in his first remark.

The definition of inference for the purposes of this treatise is found early on, in sutra 1.1.5b. Based on immediate perception, it is the affirmation that the thing being perceived is something that remains after the perceiving is done and that the perception of it may be commonly shared by others, which goes a step deeper than the more general definition of inference in traditional logic. The fact that the object remains and the fact that others may share the experience are not known from the direct experience itself but are a secondary knowledge. Those two criteria, however, are not the case for all kinds of experience, but serve as a way of confirming that the experience is real only in a physical objective sense. Things like fantasy, pain, and fear, on the other hand, do not remain after one stops thinking of them, nor are they available for others to perceive.

Interestingly, whereas "fear" here is a certain anticipation of possible *future* events, "being blocked or struck" is expressed in the *past* passive participle, and "falling" is expressed with the *present* participle.

वर्तमानाभावः पततः पतितपतितव्यकालोपपत्तेः। तयोरप्यभावो वर्तमानाभावे तदपेक्ष-  
त्वात्।

(2.1.39) **vartamānā-bhāvaḥ** existing in the present **patataḥ** (gen. (of patat) of) falling (*ref.=trāsa* 2.1.38) **patita-patitavya-kāla-upapatteḥ** (abl. because) fallen – yet to have fallen (fut. pass. part.) – time – evidence (2.1.40) **tayoḥ** (gen. of) those two **api** indeed **abhāvaḥ** no existence, absence **vartamānā-bhāve** (loc. when) in the present – being **tat-apekṣatvāt** (abl. because) them – consideration

3.3) That (fear) of falling (dying in battle) would exist in the present, because there is evidence of time (only) in his having already fallen or in his having yet to fall. There is indeed a complete absence of those two things (past and future) when being in the present moment, because that (evidence) is only a (mental) consideration of them.

नातीतानागतयोरितरेतरापेक्षासिद्धिः। वर्तमानाभावे सर्वाग्रहणम्प्रत्यक्षानुपपत्तेः। कृतता-  
कर्तव्यतोपपत्तेस्तूभयथा ग्रहणम्।

(2.1.41) **na** no **atīta-anāgatayor** (gen dual; of) past – future **itare tara-apekṣā-siddhiḥ** one against the other – (by) considering – proof (2.1.42) **vartamānā-bhāve** (loc. as) (in) the present – existing **sarva-agrahaṇam** everyone – lack of personal apprehension **pratyakṣa-anupapatteḥ** (abl. coming from) perception – missing the evidence (2.1.43) **kṛtatā-kartavyatā-upapatteḥ** (abl. because) the having done – the having yet to be done – evidence **tu** but, however **ubhayathā** both ways **grahaṇam** personal apprehension

3.4) There is no proving past and future (incarnations) by considering one (person) against another. The lack of personal apprehension of being 'everyone' comes from missing the evidence regarding perception as it exists in the present. Our personal apprehension, however, is both ways, because there is (also) the evidence of there being something done and something yet to be done.

It is easy to think of time as a line that one can trace backward or forward in opposite directions, and in that simplistic sense, the past might seem to be the "opposite" of the future ("that which is not the future" cf. Vidyābhūṣaṇa), but no one thinks of past and future in that way. One thinks of the past as what one did

and what happened in the world as it might affect one's own health, wealth, status, enjoyment, etc. One thinks of the future as what one intends to do or what will probably happen as it might affect those things. In any case, memory, as well as planning and anticipation, occupy the present—not the point on a timeline designated as the present, but the only-time present of immediate awareness. For the yogin in his solipsist mode, there does not exist a past, present, or future out there in the universe, independent of his own contemplation of them, because there does not even exist a universe "out there" independent of that contemplation.

The phrase "what has been done and what has to be done" (kṛtatā-kartavyatā) in 2.1.43 recalls "establishing the conclusion that is to be established" (sādhya-sāadhanam) in the definition of comparison in 1.1.6, and that sets up the next topic in the series, comparison.

### Comparison

अत्यन्तप्रायैकदेशसाधर्म्यादुपमानासिद्धिः। प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यादुपमानसिद्धेः यथोक्तदोषानु-  
पपत्तिः प्रत्यक्षेणाप्रत्यक्षसिद्धेः।

(2.1.44) **atyanta-prāya-ekadeśa-sādharmyāt** (abl. because) utterly – prominent – single individual – conformity to dharma **upamāna-asiddhiḥ** comparison – no proof (2.1.45) **prasiddha-sādharmyāt** (abl. coming from) well-known by all – conformity with dharma **upamāna-siddheḥ** (abl. because) comparison – proof // **yathā-ukta-doṣa-anupapattiḥ** previous assertion – false – failure (2.1.46) **pratyakṣeṇa** (inst. by) direct perception **apratyakṣa-siddheḥ** (gen. of) without direct perception – proof

**3.5) (To the objection:) that there is no (valid) proof by our comparison (defined in 1.1.6), because it is (rather) the conformity to dharma on the part of single individuals that is utterly prominent (in society); that since the proof by comparison must come from our conformity with the dharma that is well-known by all, there is no evidence of fault in that which has been declared (smṛti, law), for the proof of the unperceived (dharma) must be by perception of those (single individuals).**

नाप्रत्यक्षे गवये प्रमाणार्थमुपमानस्य पश्यामः। तथेति उपसंहारादुपमानसिद्धेर्नाविशेषः।

शब्दोऽनुमानमर्थस्यानुपलब्धेरनुमेयत्वात्।



(2.1.47) **na** no **apratyakṣe\_gavaye** (loc. abs. in the case of) unperceived – ox **"pramāṇa-artham** validation – meaning **upamānasya** (gen. of) comparison **paśyāmaḥ** (1st.pl.present) we see (*actual verbs are rare in the Darshanās. This is meant to stand out.*) (2.1.48) **tathā** that way" **iti** saying // **upasamhārāt** (abl. by) conclusion **upamāna-siddheḥ** (abl. because) comparison – affirmation **na** not **aviśeṣaḥ** no difference, the same thing (2.1.49) **śabdaḥ** testimony **anumānam** inference **arthasya** (gen.) an object's **anupalabdheḥ** (abl. resulting from) lack of observation **anumeyatvāt** (abl. because) its having to be inferred

**3.6)** (The reply is:) **There is no saying** (testimony)—**in the case of some unperceived ox (for example)—that "the meaning of the validation of comparison is that we (all) see it that way". It is not the same thing, because the (true) affirmation by comparison is by that conclusion** (of 1.1.6). **That testimony (about the ox) is an inference, because a thing's having to be inferred results from the lack of actual observation of it.**

This statement makes the transition from the discussion on inference and comparison to the discussion on testimony. The idea that "we all" would see an ox in the same way is a solid inference, but only within the paradigm of robotic human beings, each with an identical sensory apparatus. On the other hand, for one who considers his awareness to exist independently of the robot paradigm, the assumption that another person has the identical experience or memory of an ox, for example, indicated by his use of the words "brown ox", is not so solid.

For him it is a matter of the experience *itself*, in the present, as opposed to the subsequent labeling, explanation, and prediction of experience. He could just as easily imagine that, purely experientially, his "brown" is another person's "red". Now, one may say that it is a matter of wavelengths of electro-magnetic radiation, receptors in the retina, neural pathways, brain regions, etc., and it certainly is, neurologically speaking; but there is a disconnect between the neurology and the experience, just as there is a disconnect between the verbal explanation and the experience. One might object that there is no disconnect when, for example, a surgeon probes a brain a certain way and the patient reports a burning smell. Well, the patient may report the sensation, but to anyone else it is only a report, really just a memory of a story, and it falls completely within the scope of reasoned explanation, not experience. This is also true of those who report supernatural experiences, not just from the point of view of their audience, but for them as well.

## Testimony (the 'word')

उपलब्धेरद्विप्रवृत्तित्वात्। सम्बन्धाच्च। आप्तोपदेशसामर्थ्याच्छब्दार्थसम्प्रत्ययः। प्रमाणतः अनुपलब्धेः। Vb) पूरणप्रदाहपाटनानुपलब्धेश्च सम्बन्धाभावः। शब्दार्थव्यवस्थानादप्रतिषेधः।

(2.1.50) **upalabdheḥ** (abl. according to) observation **a-dvi-pravṛtti-tvāt** (abl. known from) not – two – accounts – their having (2.1.51) **sambandhāt** (abl. due to) kinship **ca** and (2.1.52 ?) **āpta-upadeśa-sāmarthyāt** (abl. known from) authorities – teaching – their having a common interest / **śabdāt** (abl. taken from) testimony **artha-sampratyayaḥ** meaning – community of belief (2.1.53) **pramāṇataḥ** (tasil based on) means of validation **anupalabdheḥ** (abl. because) lack of observation (2.1.54) **pūraṇa-pradāha-pāṭana-anupalabdheḥ** (abl. just because) satisfying – splitting – burning **sambandha-abhāvaḥ** kinship – not existing (2.1.55) **śabda-artha-vyavasthānāt** (abl. just by) testimony – meaning – persevering **apratīṣedhaḥ** no denying (*refers to our premise, see 1.2.14, 2.12-14*)

**3.7-8) From their not having the two accounts (of life) according to our observation, and from their having a common interest in the teaching of authorities, due to their own kinship with them, we know this community of belief in the meaning taken from the word (the Veda). Because of (their) lack of observation based on our means of validation, (and) because of (our) lack of observation of their satisfying (the gods), splitting (the wood), and burning (the sacrifice), there exists no kinship (between us). There is no denying (our premise) just by persevering in that (ritual) meaning of the 'word'.**

The lesson on comparison is about doing what ought to be done toward the finding the highest dharma, rather than following the mass belief in scripture.

न सामयिकत्वाच्छब्दार्थसम्प्रत्ययस्य । जातिविशेषे चानियमात् । तदप्रामाण्यमनृतव्याघातपुनरुक्तदोषेभ्यः ।

(2.1.56) **na** not **sāmayikatvāt** (abl. deriving from) being according to formal custom, ordination by tradition / **śabda-artha-sampratyayasya** (gen. on the part of) word – meaning – community of belief (2.1.57) **jāti-viśeṣe** (loc. regarding) birth-rank – distinguished **ca** indeed **anīyamāt** (abl. because) no rule (2.1.58) **tat-**

**aprāmāyam** their – lack of authority **anṛta-vyāghāta-punarukta-doṣebhyaḥ** (abl. because of) untruth – absurdity – redundancy – faults

**3.9) That (class kinship) does not derive from any ordination by (Vedic) tradition on the part of that community of belief in that (ritual) meaning of the 'word', indeed because there is (actually) *no* such rule (in the Veda) regarding their distinguished birth-rank. Their lack of authority is due to the faults of that untruth, of absurdity, and of tautology.**

The tautology is their proof of the validity of the karmic caste system merely by pointing out the existence of people of various castes.

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न कर्मकर्तृसाधनवैगुण्यात्। अभ्युपेत्य कालभेदे दोषवचनात्। अनुवादोपपत्तेश्च। वाक्यवि-  
भागस्य चार्थग्रहणात्।

(2.1.59) **na** not **karma-kartṛ-sādhana-vaigunyaṭ** (abl. known by) rite – performer – way – unvirtuous (2.1.60) **abhyupetya** having agreed on // **kāla-bhede** (loc. regarding) time – division **doṣa-vacanāt** (abl. known by) false statement (2.1.61) **anuvāda-upapatteḥ** (abl. known by) explanation – evidence **ca** and (2.1.62) **vākya-vibhāgasya** (gen. of) spoken words – distribution **ca** indeed **artha-grahaṇāt** (abl. by) meaning – personal apprehension

**3.10) Those (faults) are not known by anything unvirtuous in their way of 'performer and rite' —(both sides) having agreed on that. They are known by the (earlier 2.1.12-15a) false statement regarding the division of time (see also SD 2.5-9 on time), known by the evidence of our explanation of that (2.1.15b-19), and by personal apprehension of the meaning of distributing that ('word') into recited words.**

विध्यर्थवादानुवादवचनविनियोगात्। विधिर्विधायकः। स्तुतिर्निन्दा परकृतिः पुराकल्प इ-  
त्यर्थवादः। विधिविहितस्यानुवचनमनुवादः।

(2.1.63) **vidhi-** **arthavāda-** **anuvāda-vacana -viniyogāt** (abl. by) injunction – analysis of meaning, explanation – statement by reiteration – application (2.1.64) **vidhiḥ** injunction **vidhāyakaḥ** containing injunction (2.1.65) **stutiḥ** praise **nindā**

reproach **parakṛtiḥ** action of another, example **purā-kalpaḥ** "(in) the olden time", legend **iti** these **arthavādaḥ** explanation of the meaning (2.1.66) **vidhi-vihitasya** (gen. of) injunction – ordered **anuvacanam** rephrasing **anuvādaḥ** reiteration

**3.11) By their application of the (Vedic) "vidhi", "arthavāda" (explanation), and "anuvāda"; the vidhi contains the injunction; the arthavāda is praise and reproach (of the smṛti), example, and legend; and the anuvāda is a rephrasing of what has been ordered by the injunction.**

This obliquely recalls the three main elements of the syllogism in terms of three different kinds of Vedic texts. Injunction represents the initial assertion or theory, analysis represents the reason, and rephrasing represents the conclusion.

नानुवादपुनरुक्तयोर्विशेषः शब्दाभ्यासोपपत्तेः। शीघ्रतरगमनोपदेशवदभ्यासान्नाविशेषः।

(मन्त्रायुर्वेदप्रामाण्यवच्च तत्प्रामाण्यमाप्तप्रामाण्यात्। Vb)

(2.1.67) **na** no **anuvāda-punaruktayoḥ** (loc. between) explanation – redundancy **viśeṣaḥ** difference **śabda-abhyāsa-upapatteḥ** (abl. based on) words – repetition – evidence (2.1.68) **śīghratara-gamana-upadeśavat** (vatup ind. having) faster – going – teaching **abhyāsāt** (abl. because) repetition **na** not **aviśeṣaḥ** no difference, the same (2.1.69) **mantra-ayurveda-prāmāṇyavat** (vati like) verses – exposition on medical science – authority **ca** and **tat-prāmāṇyam** whose – authority **āpta-prāmāṇyāt** (abl. deriving from) experts – authority

**3.12) Based on the evidence of the (mere) repetition of the words, there would be no difference between their explanation and redundancy, but there is some difference because their repetition has the (smṛti's) teaching of going more quickly (see 3.2.29) and it is like the authority of the mantras of the Ayurveda, whose authority derives from the authority of experts.**

न चतुष्ट्वमैतिह्यार्थापत्तिसम्भवाभावप्रामाण्यात्। शब्द ऐतिह्यानर्थान्तरभावात् अनुमानेऽ-  
र्थपत्तिसम्भवाभावानर्थान्तरभावाच्चाप्रतिषेधः।

(2.2.1) **na** not the case **catuṣṭvam** there being four **aitihya** – **arthāpatti-sambhava** – **abhāva-prāmāṇyāt** (abl. by) tradition – "arriving at a meaning", interpretation – (ifc) derived from – devoid of authority (*a bahuvrīhi compound*) (2.2.2) **śabde** (loc. in) testimony **aitihya** -**an-arthā-antara-bhāvāt** (abl. just

because) oral tradition – lack of – meaning – alternate – view / **anumāne** (loc. with regard to) inference **arthāpatti-sambhava** – **abhāva-an-artha-antara-bhāvāt** (abl. just because) interpretation – (ifc) derived from – devoid (=abhāva-prāmāṇya 2.2.1 and 2.2.7) – lack of – meaning – alternate – view **ca** and **apratishedhaḥ** no denying (*With "arthāpatti", as unfortunately with so many other terms unique to the Darshanas, lexicographers like MW had no choice but to defer to the incorrect medieval readings and commentaries, and to the Sarvadarśanasamgraha, which is based on them.*)

**3.13) There being four (expositions), by (the inclusion of) that one which is devoid of that (Vedic) authority (the smṛti), derived from their interpretation of the oral tradition (of the three 2.1.63), is not the case. There is no denying (our premise) just because there is no (mention of our) view with an alternate meaning in the word (itself), and just because there is no (mention of our) view with an alternate meaning in the one that is devoid (of authority, the smṛti), derived from their interpretation (of the word).**

He sees the inner meaning of the Veda and rejects any altered meaning that would codify a system of oppressive class divisions and stifling civil and religious law.

अर्थापत्तिप्रमाणमनैकान्तिकत्वात्। अनर्थापत्तवर्थापत्त्यभिमानात्। प्रतिषेधाप्रामाण्यं  
चानैकान्तिकत्वात्। तत्प्रामाण्ये वा नार्थापत्त्यप्रामाण्यम्।

(2.2.3) **arthāpattiḥ** interpretation **apramāṇam** without authority **anaikāntikatvāt** (abl. for) not being only one way (2.2.4) **anarthāpattau** (loc. against) misinterpretation **arthāpatti-abhimānāt** (abl. on the basis of) interpretation – ego involvement (2.2.5) **pratiṣedha-apramāṇyam** denial – no authority **ca** moreover **anaikāntikatvāt** (abl. since) not being only one way (2.2.6) **tat-prāmāṇye** (loc. if) such – authority **vā** on the other hand **na** not **arthāpatti-apramāṇyam** interpretation – lacking authority

**3.14) That is an interpretation without any authority, for there is not just that one way. Moreover, since there is not just the one way, there should be no authority to deny on the basis of an ego involvement in one's interpretation against some 'misinterpretation'. If, on the other hand, one had the authority for such (a denial), one's interpretation would *not* lack authority.**

## Prameya

नाभावप्रामाण्यं प्रमेयासिद्धेः। लक्षितेष्वलक्षणलक्षितत्वादलक्षितानां तत्प्रमेयसिद्धिः।

असत्यर्थे नाभाव इति चेत्

(2.2.7) **na** no **abhāva-prāmāṇyam** devoid of authority (*The referent of abhāva is anaikāntikatva in 2.2.5.*) **prameya**-(gen.)-**asiddheḥ** (abl. just because) to be validated – not an affirmation (2.2.8) **lakṣiteṣu** (loc. pl. when) things indicated (*Theses plural terms usually refer to people.*) **alakṣaṇa-lakṣitatvāt** (abl. because) without indication – the way of being indicated **alakṣitānām** (gen. "of") (*ref. is siddhi*) things not indicated // **tat** such **prameya-siddhiḥ** to be validated – proof (2.2.9) **asati\_arthe** (loc. abs. given that when) not actually so – meaning **na** it does not mean **abhāvaḥ** doesn't exist **iti\_cet** to the objection (*Again he demonstrates repetition, this time with lakṣ words.*)

3.15) To the objection that it is not 'devoid of authority' just because there is no affirmation of our prameya; that that (affirmation) of all those (souls) that are not (perceptually) indicated happens when they *are* indicated, because that is the way of being indicated for something having no (sensory) indication; that *that* is the affirmation of prameya, given that when something is not actually so (indicated), that doesn't mean it doesn't exist, ...

नान्यलक्षणोपपत्तेः। तत्सिद्धेरलक्षितेष्वहेतुः। न लक्षणावस्थितापेक्षासिद्धेः। प्रागुत्पत्ते-

रभावोपपत्तेश्च।

(2.2.9 cont.) **na** no such thing **anya-lakṣaṇa-upapatteḥ** (abl. known by) different – indication – evidence (2.2.10) **tat** it is thus **siddheḥ** (abl. because) proof **alakṣiteṣu** (loc. with) not indicated **ahetuḥ** grounds (2.2.11) **na** not **lakṣaṇa-avasthita-apekṣā-siddheḥ** (abl. known by) indicator – stationed or abiding in – considering – proof (2.2.12) **prāñc-utpatteḥ** (gen. of) prior – coming into existence, birth **abhāva-upapatteḥ** (abl. because) not existing, empty – evidence **ca** and

3.16) (The reply is:) No such (non-indicated) thing is known by evidence that indicates a different thing. With things that are not (immediately) indicated, (saying) 'it is thus because that (indication) is the proof', is no grounds. That (soul) cannot be known by some (tautological) proof by

considering how it is *stationed* in its indicator (body), and by some empty evidence of a prior-to-birth state. (as opposed to constancy)

आदिमत्त्वादैनद्रियकत्वात्कृतकवदुपचाराच्च। न घटाभावसामान्यनित्यत्वान्नित्येष्वप्यनि-  
त्यवदुपचाराच्च।

(2.2.13) **ādimattvāt** (abl. w/upacāra; compared to) "the having a beginning", origination **aındriyakatvāt** (abl. from) a state consisting of the powers of sense **kṛtakavat** (vatup ind.) having artificiality **upacārāt** (abl. ind.) taken figuratively **ca** and (2.2.14) **na** not **ghaṭa-abhāva -sāmānya-nityatvāt** (abl. from) pot, vessel – in the absence of – universal – constant state // **nityeṣu api** (loc. pl. w/api) even though they remain constant (*The referent must be plural. Indriyas fits well.*) **anityavat** (vatup ind.) having inconstancy **upacārāt** (abl. ind.) figuratively **ca** and

**3.17) That (indicator) has an artificial nature and is taken as a figure, compared to our origination (also "birth") which arises out of a state consisting (only) of the powers of sense, not out of any (supposed) constant state of that (soul) which is universally agreed to, in the absence of that 'vessel' (body). Even while those (powers of sense) remain constant, that (physical birth) has an inconstant nature and is taken as a figure.**

He is not saying that one is right and the other wrong, but that there are two complementary definitions of "origination" or "birth" in this teaching. Neither of these, however, include the doctrines of karma, reincarnation, or caste.

तत्त्वभाक्तयोर्नानात्वस्य विभागात् अव्यभिचरः। संतानानुमानविशेषणात्। कारणद्रव्यस्य  
प्रदेशशब्देनाभिधानात्।

(2.2.15) **tattva-bhāktayoḥ** (loc. dual; when considering) essence – "fed", subservient, secondary **nānātvasya** (gen. of) manifoldness **vibhagāt** (abl. because) disjunction **avyabhicārah** not deviating (2.2.16) **saṁtāna-anumāna-viśeṣaṇāt** (abl. since) continuous – inference – the act of distinguishing (2.2.17) **kāraṇa-dravyasya** (gen. of) cause – physical **pradeśa-śabdena** (inst. by way of) "pointing-out", expository – speech **abhidhānāt** (abl. for) telling, utterance

**3.18) Because there is a disjunction of that manifoldness (of vessels) when considering the essential vs. the secondary, we are not really deviating (from**

the scholarly stance cf. 1.2.2-4), since we are just distinguishing between that *continuous* thing (the essence) and that inference (the secondary) (cf YD), for (after all) this very (audible) utterance (like the Veda) comes by way of an expository speech whose cause *is* physical. (cf. 2.1.6-7 and BU 3.23.)

#### 4.) Hearing the Continuous Sound

प्रागुच्चारणादनुपलब्धेरवरणाद्यनुपलब्धेश्च। तदनुपलब्धेरनुपलम्भादावरणोपपत्तिः।

अनुपलम्भादप्यनुपलब्धिसद्भाववत्

(2.2.18) **prāk-(prāñc)-uccāraṇāt** (abl. developing from) first, just prior – audible pronunciation, sounding audibly **anupalabdheḥ** (abl. stemming from) failure to observe **āvaraṇa-ādi-anupalabdheḥ** (abl. from) concealing – at the beginning – no observation **ca** and (2.2.19) **tat-anupalabdheḥ** (abl. arising from) that (*The referent is saṁtāna* 2.2.16) – failure to observe **anupalambhāt** (abl. coming from) lack of recognition **āvaraṇa-upapattiḥ** concealing – evidence (2.2.20a) **anupalambhāt** (abl. because) lack of recognition **api** indeed **anupalabdhi-sat-bhāva-vat** (vati like, as if) failure to observe – primary reality

4.1 There is evidence of a concealing effect of that (speech), which comes from a certain lack of recognition that arises from failure to observe that (continuous essence), stemming from the failure to observe that develops from its first emergence into audible pronunciation, and from the failure to observe the concealing effect itself, at the beginning (of language). Indeed because of that lack of recognition, it's as if that (state of) failure to observe (the continuous) *were* the primary reality.

नावरणानुपपत्तिरनुपलम्भात्। अनुपलम्भात्मकत्वादनुपलब्धेरहेतुः। अस्पर्शत्वात्। न कर्मानित्यत्वात्।

2.2.20b) **na** not **āvaraṇa-anupapattiḥ** concealing – lack of evidence **anupalambhāt** (abl. just because) failing to recognize (2.2.21) **anupalambha-ātmakatvāt** (abl. for) non-recognition – (ifc) being the very nature of **anupalabdheḥ** (abl. due to) failure to observe **ahetuḥ** lack of grounds for knowledge (2.2.22) **asparśatvāt** (abl. from) being without a feel for it (2.2.23) **na** not **karma-anityatvāt** (abl. from) proper religious and civil acts – inconstancy



4.2 It's not that there is no evidence of the concealing effect, just because one may fail to recognize it. The lack of grounds for knowledge is due to the failure to observe (the continuous), for that (failure) is the very nature of the failure to recognize. It results from not having the feel of it, not from inconstancy in one's karmas.

नाणुनित्यत्वात्। सम्प्रदानात्। तदन्तरालानुपलब्धेरहेतुः। अध्यापनादप्रतिषेधः। उभयोः

पक्षयोरन्यतरस्याध्यापनादप्रतिषेधः।

(2.2.24) **na** nor **aṇu-**(gen.)-**nityatvāt** (abl. coming from) minutiae – constancy (2.2.25) **sampradānāt** (abl. for) handing down by tradition (2.2.26) **tat-antarāla-anupalabdheḥ** (gen. of (*ref.=nityatva*) that – inner domain – failure to observe **ahetuḥ** not grounds for knowledge (2.2.27) **adhyāpanāt** (abl. by) lecturing, teaching **apraṭiṣedhaḥ** no denying (2.2.28) **ubhayoḥ\_pakṣayoḥ** (loc. abs. given that) both wings **anyatarasya** (gen. of) one or the other **adhyāpanāt** (abl. by) teaching **apraṭiṣedhaḥ** no denying

4.3 Nor does that (grounds for knowledge) come from constancy of the minutiae (of karmas and recitations), for that is just handed down by tradition. That (constancy) of not observing the *inner* domain of that (feel), lacks our grounds for knowledge. There is no denying (our premise) just by that teaching. Given that there are both wings (in our premise), there is no denying it by the teaching of one or the other.

(अभ्यासात्।) नान्यत्वेऽप्यभ्यासस्योपचारात्। अन्यतन्यस्मादनन्यत्वादनन्यदित्यन्यता-

भावः। तदभावे नास्त्यनन्यता तयोरितरेतरापेक्षासिद्धेः।

[(2.2.29) **abhyāsāt**] (2.2.30) **na** neither **anyatve\_api** (loc. even though) its being the other (side) **abhyāsasya** (gen. of) repetition (*ref=apraṭiṣedhaḥ*) **upacārāt** (abl. because) a metaphor or figure (2.2.31) "**anyat** (that) other **anyasmāt** (abl. of comparison w/anyatva; than) the other **ananyatvāt** (abl. because) there being nothing other than (w/abl.) **ananyat**" not something other **iti** to say (w/quotes) **anyatā-abhāvaḥ** otherness – missing the existence (2.2.32) **tat-abhāve** (loc.) that – (in. loc.) without the existence **na\_asti** (w/loc.) there could be no **ananyatā** non-otherness **tayoḥ** (loc. dual; between) the two **itare tara-apekṣā-siddheḥ** (abl. for) one against the other – considering – proof

4.4 Neither can there be that (denial) of repetition (of words), even considering its being the other (side), because that (repetition) is a figure (of the continuous). To say "that 'other' (of which you speak) is not something other, because of there being nothing other than that (Vedic) other," misses the existence of otherness (altogether) and without the existence of that, there could be no 'non-otherness' (sameness) between the two (sides), for the proof of *that* (sameness) is (also) by considering one side vs. the other. (cf 2.1.41).

In order to argue that there is no other point of view, one has to have another in mind to be able to reject that one so his own "other" would remain. With these two world-views, a reciprocating consideration of both (saṁyama, as described in the Yoga) constitutes the completeness of the knowledge, not just consideration of one side or the other exclusively.

\* The commenter offers a wry observation on the first part of this convoluted statement by saying: "*(Because of his own repetition, ...)*" I agree. The author first mentions abhyāsa in 2.1.68, but he demonstrates the idea of repetition of words by expanding it to almost comic proportions, for example: pramāṇa/prameya and siddhi in 2.1.16-20, arthāpatti in 2.2-6, lakṣaṇa/īta in 2.2.7-11, anupalabdh/lambh in 2.2.18-21, and anyat here.

विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेः। अश्रवणकारणानुपलब्धेः सततश्रवणप्रसङ्गः। उपलभ्यमाने

चानुपलब्धेरसत्त्वादनपदेशः।

(2.2.33) *vināśa-kāraṇa-anupalabdheḥ* (abl. ind.) completely doing away with – cause, reason – without observing (2.2.34) *aśravaṇa-kāraṇa-anupalabdheḥ* (abl. ind.) not hearing the Veda (*śravaṇa=śruti here*) – cause, reason – not observing *satata-śravaṇa-prasaṅgaḥ* the continuous – hearing – occupation with (2.2.35) *upalabhya-māne* (loc. considering) comprehensible – considering *ca* and again *anupalabdheḥ* (abl. just because) not observing *asat-tvāt* (abl. ind. that) its not being real *anapadeśaḥ* no pointing out

4.5 (So) without observing any cause for not hearing the Veda, without observing any cause for doing away with it, we are occupied with hearing the continuous, and again (see also 2.2.20b), considering that it *can* be comprehended, there is no pointing out that it isn't real just because one doesn't observe it.

पाणिनिमित्तप्रक्षेपाच्छब्दाभावे नानुपलब्धिः। विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेश्चावस्थाने तन्नित्य-  
त्वप्रसङ्गः। अस्पर्शत्वादप्रतिषेधः।

(2.2.36) **pāṇi-nimitta-praśleṣāt** (abl. w/nimitta caused by) hands – cause – clasp-  
ing, clapping **śabda-abhāve** (loc. even in) sound – absence **na** not **anupalabdhiḥ**  
without observation (2.2.37) **vināśa-kāraṇa-anupalabdheḥ** (abl. since) doing away with –  
cause, reason – not observing **ca** (w/neg.) either **avasthāne** (loc. even within) life  
circumstance **tat-nityatva-prasaṅgaḥ** that (=satata-śravaṇa 2.2.34) – constancy –  
occupation with (2.2.38) **asparśatvāt** (abl. just because) not having the feel of **apra-  
tiṣedhaḥ** no denying

**4.6 Even in the absence of any sound caused by (e.g.) clapping the hands, we are still not without observation of that (continuous sound). Since (however) we do not observe any cause for doing away with that (caused sound) either, the occupation with the constancy of that (continuous sound) must be within one's circumstance. There is no denying (our premise) just because one does not have the feel (of the continuous).**

The word for life-circumstance also means fixity or steadiness in living life the way one is supposed to. In this lesson the author also points out two conflicting notions of constancy (nityatva). He rejects the constancy of the minute atoms and of the minutiae of Vedic karmas (aṇu-nityatva 2.2.23 and karma-nityatva 2.2.24) in favor of hearing or feeling (very closely related in consciousness) the constancy of the prime sound (satata-śravaṇa-nityatva (2.2.34 and 2.2.37).

#### Conflicting definitions of "transformation"

विभक्त्यन्तरोपपत्तेश्च समासे। विकारादेशोपदेशात्संशयः। प्रकृतिविवृद्धौ विकारविवृद्धेः।

न्यूनसमाधिकोपलब्धेर्विकाराणामहेतुः।

(2.2.39) **vibhakti-antara-upapatteḥ** (abl. because) coming apart – inner – becoming evident **ca** moreover **samāse** (loc. in) coming together (2.2.40) **vikārāt** (abl. about) transformation **eśa-upadeśāt** (abl. from) this (*stands out*) – teaching **saṁśayaḥ** uncertainty (2.2.41) **prakṛti-vivṛddhau** (loc. as) prime originator – expansion **vikāra-vivṛddheḥ** (abl. for) transformation – expansion (2.2.42) **nyūna-sama-adhika-upalabdheḥ** (abl. known by) deficient – balanced – excessive – observing **vikāraṇām** (gen. of) transformations **ahetuḥ** not grounds

4.7 Moreover, because in the coming *together* of that (circumstance) an inner coming *apart* becomes evident, uncertainty arises from *this* our teaching, for (in this teaching) there is the expansion of the transformation (of the continuous) as the expansion of the prime originator (*prakṛti*). Our grounds for knowledge is not that of the transformations (incarnations) that are known by observing the deficient vs. the balanced vs. the excessive (representing the three *guṇas*: *tamas*, *sattva*, and *rajas*).

The continuous sound is linked with the ether, which is always associated with *maḥat*. *Maḥat*'s expansion and transformation is through his *prakṛti* aspect. (see SD)

द्विविधस्यापि हेतोरभावादसाधनं दृष्टान्तः। नातुल्यप्रकृतीनां विकारविकल्पात्। द्रव्य-  
कारवैषम्यवद्वर्णविकारविकल्पः।

(2.2.43) *dvi*vidhasya (gen. on the part of) twofold *api* clearly *hetoḥ* (gen. of) grounds for knowledge *abhāvāt* (abl. for) no existence *asāadhanam* not the way *dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ* paragon, standard (2.2.44) *na* not so *atulya-prakṛtīnām* (gen. pl. on the part of) unequal – prime originators (*The use of the plural for the most definitely singular concept of prakṛti is clearly antithetical.*) *vikāra-vikalpāt* (abl. because) transformations – diversity (2.2.45) *dravya-vikāra-vaiśamyavat* (*vati* like, just as) physical – diversity – inequality *varṇa-* (*varne* Vb) *-vikāra-vikalpaḥ* caste – transformations – diversity

4.8 (To the objection) that our (twofold) standard is not the way, for on the part of something that is clearly twofold, there can be no existence of our (clearly singular) grounds for knowledge; that it is not (the way), because there would be a diversity of our 'transformation' (by expansion of the prime originator, *prakṛti*) on the part of (many) prime originators who are unequal; that there is (instead) a diversity of transformations of people of various castes, just as there is inequality in the diversity of physical things.

न विकारधर्मानुपपत्तेः। विकारप्राप्तानामपुनरापत्तेः। सुवर्णादीनां पुनरापत्तेरहेतुः (न

*MUM*) तद्विकाराणां सुवर्णभावाव्यतिरेकात्।

(2.2.46) *na* no *vikāra-dharma-anupapatteḥ* (because) transformation – dharma – unfitting, doesn't work (2.2.47) *vikāra-prāptānām* (gen. belonging to,

held by) transformation – authorities **apunarāpatteḥ** (-āvṛtteḥ in *Vb*) (abl. because) without recurrence (2.2.48) **suvarṇa-ādinām** (gen. on the part of) fine (skin) color, fine appearance, good caste (not "gold" here) – and the like **punar-āpatteḥ** (abl. known by) happening again, recurrence **ahetuḥ** not grounds for knowledge (2.2.49) **tat-vikārāṇām** (gen. of) those – transformations (*This recalls the same term from 2.2.42, and tat recalls its qualifier compound.*) **suvarṇa-bhāva-avyatirekāt** (abl. for) good caste – view – lacks exclusion

4.9 (The reply is:) No, because our dharma doesn't work as that (kind of) transformation, because it is without that recurrence (reincarnation) held by the authorities on transformation. That is not our grounds, just because the (theory of) recurrence belongs to people of good caste and their like, for it (our grounds) lacks the exclusion of those (lower) transformations, which is the view of the good caste.

This lesson compares two conflicting definitions of vikāra (transformation). The opponent's is the well-known reincarnation and exclusion of lower classes, while the author's refers to the creation of one's body and environment through the abstract personal identity, mind, and senses, as described in the Sankhya.

(वर्णत्वाव्यतिरेकाद्वर्णविकाराणामप्रतिषेधः। सामान्यवतो धर्मयोगो न सामान्यस्य। *Vb*)

नित्यत्वेऽविकारादनित्यत्वे चानवस्थानात्। नित्यानामतीन्द्रियत्वात्तद्वर्मविकल्पाच्च वर्ण-  
त्वाव्यतिरेकाद्वर्णविकाराणामप्रतिषेधः।

(2.2.50) [*varṇatva-avyatirekāt varṇa-vikārāṇām apratiṣedhaḥ* (copied from 2.2.51) *sāmānyavataḥ dharma-yogaḥ / na sāmānyasya*; (Regarding this passage,) the yoga of dharma results from its universality, but there is no such (yoga) of the universal itself.] **nityatve** (loc. in the case of, with) constancy **avikārāt** ("vikārāt" in *Vb*) (abl. since) no transformation / **anityatve** (loc.) without constancy **ca** and **anavasthānāt** (abl. since) no steadiness (2.2.51) **nityānām** (gen.pl. of) those who are constant (*Finding this word in the plural confirms that it is not the usual "eternal", but "constant in" or "devoted to".*) **ati-indriyatvāt** (abl. due to) being beyond their powers of sense **tat-dharma-vikalpāt** (abl. since) their – duty – diversity **ca** (connecting a positive term to the previous two negative terms) and yet / **varṇatva-avyatirekāt** (abl. just because) caste system – exclusion **varṇa-vikārāṇām** (gen. of) caste – transformations **apratīṣedhaḥ** no denying

4.10 1.) Since there is no such (recurring) transformation with our constancy (of the continuous sound 2.2.37), and 2.) since there is no steadiness without that constancy, and yet 3.) since, on the part of those who remain constant (in their duty 2.2.24) due to that (continuous sound) being beyond their power of sense, there is a diversity of roles; (we say) there is no denying (our premise) just because there is exclusion of those transformations of (lower) caste on the part of the caste system.

अनवस्थायित्वे च वर्णोपलब्धिवत्तद्विकारोपपत्तिः। विकारधर्मित्वे नित्यत्वाभावात्कालान्तरे विकारोपपत्तेश्चाप्रतिषेधः।

(2.2.52) **anavasthāyitve** (loc. while) not being steady in life circumstance **ca** as well **varṇa-upalabdhivat** (vati like) caste – observing // **tat** thus, in that way **vikāra-upapattiḥ** transformation – evidence (2.2.53) **vikāra-dharmitve** (loc. in) transformation – observing dharma **nityatva-abhāvāt** (abl. by) constancy – empty **kāla-antare** (loc. across) time – interval **vikāra-upapatteḥ** (abl. by) transformation – evidence **ca** and **apratishedhaḥ** no denying

4.11 It is like observing (the reality of) caste, while *not* also having to be steady in that life circumstance. Such is our evidence for transformation. There is no denying (our premise) by their empty constancy in observing a dharma of (karmic) transformation, and by their evidence of transformation across a period of time.

### The Rule of Prakṛti

प्रकृत्यनियमाद्वर्णविकाराणाम्। अनियमे नियमान्नानियमः। नियमानियमविरोधादनियमे नियमाच्चाप्रतिषेधः।

(2.2.54) **prakṛti-anīyamāt** (abl. just because) prime originator – no rule **varṇa-vikārāṇām** (gen. pl. of) caste – transformations (2.2.55) **anīyame** (loc. where) no rule **nīyamāt** (abl. since) rule **na** it is not the case **anīyamaḥ** no rule (2.2.56) **nīyama-anīyama-virodhāt** (abl. by) rule – no rule – logical contradiction **anīyame** (loc. where) no rule **nīyamāt** (abl. by) rule **ca** w/neg. nor **apratishedhaḥ** no denying

**4.12** Just because there is no rule (definition) of a prime originator of transformations by caste, since that is a rule (made up) where there is no rule, it is not the case that there is no rule (of prakṛti) at all. There is no denying (our premise) by a (seeming) logical contradiction between their rule and what is not that rule, nor by (dictating) a rule where there is no rule.

Prakṛti (the three guṇas) remains the underlying subject right through to 3.1.27. In this short comparison the author demonstrates once again the idea of repetition of words, this time by repeating the word "rule" eight times. I can't honestly say that I understand what he hoped to accomplish with this awkward technique.

गुणान्तरापत्त्युपमर्दहासवृद्धिलेशश्लेषेभ्यस्तु विकारोपपत्तेर्वर्णविकारः। ते विभक्त्यन्ताः

(पदम्। तदर्थे) व्यक्त्याकृतिजातिसंनिधावुपचारात्संशयः।

(2.2.57) **guṇa-antara-āpatti** -(abl.)- **upamarda-hrāsa** – **vṛddhi** -(gen.)- **leśa** - (inst.)- **śleṣebhyaḥ** (abl. pl. known through) **guṇas** (clearly plural in the context of prakṛti) – other kind – happening, becoming, changing into – crushing decrease – increase – a mere trace amount – double meanings, alternate meanings **tu** instead (enclitic, referring to the whole clause) **vikāra-upapatteḥ** (abl. by) transformations – evidence **varṇa-vikāraḥ** caste – transformation (2.2.58) **te** (pl.) these (guṇas) (remember the context!) **vibhakti-antāḥ** partitions – ends (Reading this compound as "grammatical terminations", because of its proximity to "padam" is tempting but incorrect. The larger context must be adhered to, with "padam" recognized as part of the interpolation with tadarthe. cf. interpolation of pada-arthaḥ in 2.2.66.) // **padam tat-arthe**; where the meaning is that (**vibhakti-antāḥ**), that (**guṇa**) is the word for it. Vb) **vyakti-ākṛti-jāti-saṁnidhau** (loc. as) individual – physical form – birth or birth-rank – (ifc) in the context of **upacārāt** (abl. ind.) meant figuratively **saṁśayaḥ** uncertainty

**4.13** Transformation by caste (personal quality), according to *our* evidence of transformation (of prakṛti see 2.2.41), is known instead through the alternate meanings that have only a trace of the crushing decrease (tamas) and the increase (rajas) that are known by the 'becoming' that happens on the part of that other kind of guṇas (the threefold). (See "abounding in sattva..." SD 12.10.) There is the uncertainty that these (guṇas) are the boundaries of the (three) partitions (by caste cf SD 12.10), vs. the term (guṇa) taken figuratively as in the context of our birth of the physical form of the individual.

According to the author's thesis, the transformation or "becoming" of one's personal quality from the prime originator (prakṛti) aspect happens when the (purely theoretical) balance of the three guṇas is "disturbed". The ideal state of this disturbance is one where sattva predominates and where rajas and tamas are diminished to a trace amount (elimination being impossible). The opponent's three, on the other hand, delineate three dharmic social strata representing the personal qualities of dullness, passion, and purity. Both of those definitions are accepted by the author, as long as they have nothing to do with the doctrine of reincarnation.

या शब्दसमूहत्यागपरिग्रहसंख्यावृद्ध्युपचयवर्णसमासानुबन्धानां व्यक्तवुपचाराद्यक्तिः। न  
तदनवस्थानात्।

(2.2.60) yā (fem.) whoever (referring to the fem. vyakti) śabda-samūha – tyāga – parigraha – saṁkhyā-vṛddhi – upacaya-varṇa-samāsa – anubandhānām (gen. plural; of the various) Vedic testimony – community – abandoning or giving away – possessing wealth or receiving gifts – reckoning – increase – growing – caste – aggregation – representatives vyaktau (loc. w/yā) whoever the individual // upacārāt (ind. figuratively, as a figure) vyaktiḥ (manifestation of) an individual (2.2.61) na not tat-anavasthānāt (abl. ind. as complementing upacārāt) his – without circumstance

**4.14 (But) whoever the individual is—of the various representatives of the aggregation of castes, growing (in their dharma) whether their increase is reckoned in the collective of the (Vedic) 'word' (priests), in giving things away (rulers), or in receiving them (renunciants)—that individual manifestation is considered as a figure (of the continuous; see 2.2.30), (but) not considered as one who exists apart from that life circumstance (between incarnations).**

Out of the various castes and stages of human life, he mentions only the "good" ones—priest, ruler, and renunciant—referring to them by descriptions of their acts, which was a very common technique for the ancient authors. The following material reinforces these three examples, even explicitly naming two of the particular life-circumstances. Interestingly, the words tyāga and parigraha can both have double meanings here. Tyāga means either abandoning like a renunciant, or giving away like a wealthy donor. Similarly, parigraha can mean either the possession of wealth, family, and power, or "taking", as in receiving donations.



सहचरणस्थानतादर्थ्यवृत्तमानधारणसामीप्ययोगसाधनाधिपत्येभ्यो ब्राह्मणमञ्चकटराज-  
सक्तुचन्दनगङ्गाशाटकान्नपुरुषेषु

(2.2.62) **saha-carāṇa-sthāna-tādarthya** – **vṛttamāna-dhāraṇa-sāmīpya** – **yoga-sādhana-ādhipatyebhyaḥ** (abl. pl. known from) (*Each three-word subcompound ends with a śyañ bhāvārtha termination. Long compounds in close proximity often have a respective correspondence of their internal subcompounds.*) collective-endeavor (cf samūha 2.2.60) – taking a stance – having the purpose of — life (*See vartamāna MW. He has already used that variation to mean "the present". cf 2.1.39-42*) – holding, having – being near or imminent — union – way of accomplishing – supremacy, sovereignty, power **brāhmaṇa-mañca-kaṭa** – **rāja-saktu-candana** – **gāṅgā-śāṭaka** – **anna-puruṣeṣu** (loc. considering) brahmin – fire stand, altar (cf. mañcaka MW) – twisted straw or grass for weaving things like straw mats, used as kindling – king, ruler – grain, meal – lit. sandalwood, but (ifc) finest – Ganges – strip of cloth, loincloth – foods – people

**4.15 They are known from the (priests') having the purpose of taking their stance in their collective endeavor, the (rulers') being near** (through their increase, see 2.2.60) **to having that (priestly) life, and the (renunciants') supremacy in the way of Yoga; considering the 'foods' of these people as (respectively) the twist of straw on the altar of the priest** (food for Agni), **the finest grains for the ruler, (but only) the loincloth and the holy Ganges** (symbolically, no food for the renunciant).

अतद्भावेऽपि तदुपचारः। आकृतिस्तदपेक्षत्वात्सत्त्वव्यवस्थानसिद्धेः। व्यक्त्याकृतियुक्तेऽप्य-  
प्रसङ्गात्प्रोक्षणादीनां मृद्वके जातिः।

**atat-bhāve\_ api** (loc. w/api even though) not that – existence **tat** that (*vs. atat*) **upacāraḥ** figure (2.2.63) **ākṛtiḥ** form **tat-apekṣatvāt** (abl. because) that – its being considered **sattva-vyavasthāna-siddheḥ** (abl. because) purity – persevering – affirmation (2.2.64) **vyakti-ākṛti-yukte\_ api** (loc. w/api; even though) individual – manifestation of – linking **aprasaṅgāt** (abl. ind.) without occupation (w/gen.) **prokṣaṇādīnām** (gen.) consecration by sprinkling water – etc. **mṛd-gavake** (loc. as it would be for) clay – cow figurine **jātiḥ** birth rank

4.16 Even though one's existence is *not* that, one's figure *is* that. It is one's (outer) form, because that is what one *considers* it to be, because the affirmation of that (existence) is known by perseverance in (the constant) *sattva* (vs. the decrease and increase of *tamas* and *rajas*. cf. 2.2.57). And even though one is linked with his manifestation as an individual (body), it is his 'birth rank' only as that would be so for a clay cow figurine (BU 1.4.10 "like an animal"), being unoccupied with any rites of consecration etc. (for that).

नाकृतिव्यक्त्यपेक्षत्वाज्जात्यभिव्यक्तेः। व्यक्त्याकृतिजातयस्तु पदार्थः। व्यक्तिर्गुणविशेषाश्र-  
यो मूर्तिः। आकृतिर्जातिलिङ्गाख्या।

(2.2.65) *na* not so *ākṛti-vyakti-apekṣatvāt* (abl. because) manifestation – individual – being considered // *jāti-abhivyakteḥ* (abl. since) birth rank – appearance (2.2.66) *vyakti-ākṛti-jātaḥ* individuals – manifestation – birth ranks *tu* but, rather *pada-arthaḥ* word, term – meaning, referring to (2.2.67) *vyaktiḥ* individual *guṇa-viśeṣa-āśrayaḥ* qualities – distinct, unequal – seat *mūrtiḥ* the physical body (f.) (2.2.68) *ākṛtiḥ* manifestation *jāti-liṅga-ākhyā* birth rank – indicator – called

4.17 (To the objection) that it is not so, because of that manifestation being considered as a single individual, and the meaning of the term (*guṇas*) here referring rather to the (three) birth-ranks of the manifestation of single individuals, since they *do* appear through birth-rank, and that the single individual that is that body, the manifestation that is called the indicator of his birth-rank is the seat of those distinct (*unequal*) *guṇas* (levels of caste).

Though the word *mūrti* can mean any physical form, they are talking specifically about the form of a person and the sight of one's own body and those of others sorted into three layers of human worth, vs. the purity, passion, or crushing that are felt internally by a person, but not shared.

समानप्रसवात्मिका जातिः। दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यामेकार्थग्रहणात्। न विषयव्यवस्थानात्।

तद्व्यवस्थानादेवात्मसद्भावादप्रतिषेधः।

(2.2.69) *samāna-prasava-ātmikā* equal, balanced – forces – consisting of *jātiḥ* birth or birth rank (3.1.1) *darśana-sparśanābhyām* (abl. by) sight – feel *eka-artha-grahaṇāt* (abl. through) same – meaning – personal apprehension

(3.1.2) **na** not **viṣaya-vyavasthānāt** (abl. through) physical sphere – perseverance  
 (3.1.3) **tat-vyavasthānāt** (abl. known by) that – perseverance **eva** alone **ātma-sat-bhāvāt** (abl. apart from) (ibc) oneself – true – existence **apraṭiṣedhaḥ** no denying

**4.18** (The reply is:) **One's true birth consists of the (three) equal (balanced) forces (of prakṛti, the three guṇas), through a personal apprehension that has the same meaning, but through sight and feel, not through perseverance in the physical sphere. There is no denying (our premise) just by the primary reality of the self being known by perseverance in that (physical sphere) alone.**

## 5.) Body and Soul

शरीरदाहे पातकाभावात्। तदभावः सात्मकप्रदाहेऽपि तन्नित्यत्वात्। न कार्याश्रयकर्तृव-  
 धात्। सव्यहृष्टस्येतरेण प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्।

(3.1.4) **śarīra-dāhe** (loc. when) body – burning **pātaka-abhāvāt** (abl. since) causing to fall away or die – no real existence, no substance (3.1.5) **tat-abhāvaḥ** that – no substance // **sātmaka-pradāhe\_api** (loc. w/api even though) having a soul or self (see sātman MW) – burning away **tat-nityatvāt** (abl. because) its – being constant or eternal (3.1.6) **na** it does not **kārya-āśraya-kartṛ-vadhāt** (abl. caused by) made, done, performed – seat – maker, creator – killing or destruction of a person (3.1.7) **savya-dṛṣṭasya** (gen. of) on the left (ibc) – what is seen **itareṇa** (instr. by) the other **pratyabhijñānāt** (abl. for) recognition

**5.1** Since there is no substance in (the notion of) its (the *self*) falling away when the physical body is burned, there is (also) no substance in that (perseverance). Because of its being eternal, even though the thing that (supposedly) 'has' a soul burns away, such (a burning) is not caused by the *creator's* act of destroying the seat (the body) of the performed (karma), for the recognition of what is seen by the left (eye, the self) must be the same by means of the other (eye, the creator).

He has mentioned both the individual self or "soul", and the creator. By left and right he is referring to the eyes as symbols of the two complementary "views" of reality. The creator is supposedly responsible for the physical world and the soul for its awareness of it. He says again that both roles belong to one and the same being, as both eyes belong to the same face.

नैकस्मिन्नासास्थिव्यवहिते द्वित्वाभिमानात्। एकविनाशे द्वितीयाविनाशान्नैकत्वम्। अवय-  
वनाशेऽप्यवयव्युपलब्धेरहेतुः। दृष्टान्तविरोधादप्रतिषेधः।

(3.1.8) **na** not **ekasmin** (instr. by *The referent is "itarena" 3.1.7.*) the one **nāsa-  
asthi-vyavahite** (loc. when) nose – bone (bridge) – separated **dvitvā-abhimānāt**  
(abl. proved) that there are two – personal conviction (3.1.9) **eka-vināśe** (loc.  
when) the one, the first – destruction **dvitīya-avināśāt** (abl. just because) the  
second – no destruction **na** neither **ekatvam** oneness, the being one alone (3.1.10)  
**avayava-nāśe\_api** (loc. w/api even when) parts – destruction **avayavi-  
upalabdheḥ** (abl. just because) having parts (whole) – observing **ahetuḥ** not (our)  
grounds knowledge (3.1.11) **drṣṭānta-virodhāt** (abl. by) doctrine – logical  
contradiction **apratishedhaḥ** no denying

**5.2 (What is seen) by that one (eye, the self) is not proved by a personal conviction that when separated by the bridge of the nose there are two, (but) neither is there a oneness, since that non-destruction of the second is when there is destruction of an (actual) first. That (oneness) is not our grounds for knowledge, just because we observe the whole even when the parts are destroyed; (so) there is no denying (our premise) just by the (seeming) logical contradiction of our (twofold) doctrine.**

इन्द्रियान्तरविकारात्। न स्मृतेः स्मर्तव्यविषयत्वात्। तदात्मगुणसद्भावादप्रतिषेधः।

(अपरिसंख्यानाच्च स्मृतिविषयस्य। Vb)

(3.1.12) **indriya-antara-vikārāt** (abl. since) sense(s) – inner – transformation  
(3.1.13) **na** not **smṛteḥ** (abl. from) the law texts (smṛti) **smartavya-viśayatvāt**  
(abl. known from) having to be memorized – existence of the sphere, world  
(3.1.14) **tat** that **ātma-guṇa-sadbhāvāt** (abl. by) individual(s) – qualities – real  
truth **apratishedhaḥ** no denying (**aparisaṁkhyānāt** (abl. because) not reckoning  
**ca** and **smṛti-viśayasya** (gen. belonging to) law texts, or 'memory' – sphere Vb)

**5.3 Since ours is a transformation (of prakṛti) through the inner senses (the mind), it is not the one known from the existence of the sphere that has to be memorized from the law texts. There is no denying (our premise) just by its (smṛti's) 'actual truth' about the qualities of individual souls, and just because we do not reckon everything around as belonging to the sphere of that law.**

नात्मप्रतिपत्तिहेतूनां मनसि सम्भवात्। ज्ञातुर्ज्ञानसाधनोपपत्तेः। संज्ञाभेदमात्रम्। निय-  
मश्च निरनुमानः।

(3.1.15) **na** not the case **ātma-pratipatti-hetūnām** (gen. pl. of) individual soul(s) – knowing – reasons **manasi** (loc. in) the mind **sambhavāt** (abl. because) origin (3.1.16) **jñātuḥ** (gen. for) one who truly comprehends **jñāna-sādhana-upapatteḥ** (abl. arising from) true comprehension – establishment – evidence **saṃjñā** awareness // **bheda-mātram** partition, kind, sort, species (caste) (*In the darshanas this word always refers to the partition of one's perceived world into individuals and classes.*) – only (3.1.17) **niyamaḥ** rule **ca** and, while **niranumānaḥ** without inference, leaving out inference

5.4 That ('actual truth') is not the case, because the origin of all those reasons (given in the *smṛti*) for knowing about individual souls is in one's mind, and the awareness of this arises from the evidence of the establishment of true comprehension, for one who truly comprehends, while the rule (of *prakṛti*) as merely the partition (of castes) leaves out (that it is an) inference.

पूर्वाभ्यस्तस्मृत्यनुबन्धाज्जातस्य हर्षभयशोकसम्प्रतिपत्तेः। पद्मादिषु प्रबोधसम्मिलनविकारवत्तद्विकारः।

(3.1.18) **pūrva-abhyasta-smṛti** – **anubandhāt** (abl. known by) previously – learned – remembering – outward sign, "facial expression" (*in this context*) **jātasya** (gen. of) born **harṣa-bhaya-śoka-sampratipatteḥ** (abl. since) excitement – fear – grief – mutual understanding (3.1.19) **padma-ādiṣu** (loc. pl. in, of) lotus – and so on **prabodha-sammilana-vikāravat** (vati like) opening, awakening – closing (eyes or petals) obscuring **tat-vikāraḥ** that – transformation

5.5 Since any (supposed) *mutual* understanding of the (e.g.) excitement, fear, or grief of the *born* form would be known (merely) by the (facial, bodily) expression, based on remembering what has been learned previously, the transformation of that (*prakṛti*) is like the transformation by the opening and closing of lotus petals and the like (an analogy for mind, see 1.1.12).

नोष्णशीतवर्षाकालनिमित्तत्वात्पञ्चात्मकविकाराणाम्। प्रेत्याहाराभ्यास्कृतात्स्तन्याभि-  
लाषात्।

(3.1.20) **na** not so **uṣṇa-śīta-varṣā-kāla-nimitta-tvāt** (abl. because) hot – cold – rainy – at the time – instrumental cause – would be **pañca-ātmaka-vikārāṇām** (gen. pl. of) fivefold – transformations (3.1.21) **pretya** – **āhāra-abhyāsa-kṛtāt** (abl. apart from; *because of the contrast of meaning*) having died – taking food – repetition, habit – being done **stanya-abhilāṣāt** (abl. because) milk – craving

**5.6** (To the objection) **that it is not so, because its being hot, cold, or rainy at the time** (metaphors for rajas, tamas, and sattva?) **would be the real cause of those (opening and closing) transformations of the fivefold (lotus), (or) because it is (rather like) one's craving for milk, as opposed to one's being done with the habit of taking food, having died, ...**

The metaphor illustrates the blossoming of awareness from within vs. the outer visual indication. During the uncertainty phase, the same analogy would mean that awareness is caused by physical forces acting on or within a living physical body.

अयसोऽयस्कान्ताभिगमनवत्तदुपसर्पणम्। नान्यत्र प्रवृत्त्यभावात्। वीतरागजन्मादर्शना-  
त्। सगुणद्रव्योत्पत्तिवत्तदुत्पत्तिः।

(3.1.22) **ayasah** (gen.) lit. "iron's", but "iron" is more sensible **ayaskānta-abhigamanavat** (vati like) lodestone, magnet – going close, approaching **tat-upasarpaṇam** that (*The referent is still jñāna from 3.1.16, the same as that of the previous "tat" in 3.1.19.*) – approaching (3.1.23) **na** not **anyatra** the other way **pravṛtti-abhāvāt** (abl. for) account – without substance, empty (3.1.24) **vīta-rāga-janmā** (n.sg. of janman) gone away – passion – birth **darśanāt** (abl. known by) seeing (3.1.25) **saguṇa-dravya-utpattivat** (vati as) comprised of essential constituents – physical – manifestation **tat-utpattiḥ** that – manifestation

**5.7** (The reply is:) **The act of approaching that (prakṛti, as sattva), like iron pulling close to a magnet, is rather the birth of one who is freed from passion. It is not the other way, for that account is without substance. The manifestation of that (prakṛti) exists as the manifestation of the physical sphere comprised of its essential constituents (guṇas).**

न संकल्पनिमित्तत्वाद्वादीनाम्। पार्थिवं गुणान्तरोपलब्धेः। श्रुतिप्रामाण्याच्च। कृष्णसारे  
सत्युपलम्भात्।

(3.1.26) **na** not **saṅkalpa-nimittatvāt** (abl. known from) mental conception – being the cause **rāga-ādīnām** (gen. of) passion – and the others (3.1.27) **parthivam** consisting of **prthivī**, organic substance, "earth" **guṇa-antara-upalabdheḥ** (abl. for) quality – inner – observation (*A block of text had been mistakenly transposed here and numbered 3.1.28-30.*) (3.1.31) **śruti-prāmāṇyāt** (abl. ind.) veda – accepting the authority **ca** as well as (3.1.32) **kṛṣṇa-sāre\_sati** (loc. in) the reality of the eyeball **upalambhāt** (abl. by) comprehending

**5.8 That (the body) which consists of organic substance (earth) is not known from its cause being a conception of passion and the others (the three guṇas as planes of existence), for it is the observation of the (eight) inner guṇas (of Vaisheshika), as well as accepting the authority of śruti by comprehending it in the reality of the eyeball.**

(पार्थिवाप्यतैजसं तद्गुणोपलब्धेः। निःश्वासोच्छ्वासोपलब्धेश्चातुर्भौतिकम्। गन्धक्लेदपाकव्यू-  
हावकाशदानेभ्यः पाञ्चभौतिकम्। MUM)

(3.1.28) **pārthiva-āpya-taijasam** the consisting of earth, water, and fire **tat-guṇa-upalabdheḥ** (abl. known by) their – essential constituents – observing (3.1.29) **niḥ-śvāsa – ut-śvāsa (ucchvasa) – upalabdheḥ** (abl. known by) inhaling – exhaling – observing **cātur-bhautikam** the consisting of four elements (3.1.30) **gandha-kleda-pāka-vyūha-avakāśa-dānebhyaḥ** (abl. known by) smell – moisture – cooking – arranging – space – offerings of food **pāñca-bhautikam** the consisting of five elements

**5.9 The consisting of (the three elements that are seen by the eyeball:) earth, water, and fire, is known by observing their (inner) guṇas.** (This is the world of objects). **The consisting of four elements is known by observing (air as well, by) inhaling and exhaling.** (This world includes the human). **The consisting of five elements is known by offerings of food, with the smell of it (earth), the moisture of it (water), the cooking of it (fire), the arranging of it (touch, air), and the space (provided) for it.** (This world includes the gods.)

व्यतिरिच्य चोपलम्भात्संशयः। महदणुग्रहणात्। रश्म्यर्थसंनिकर्षविशेषात्तदग्रहणम्।

तदनुपलब्धेरहेतुः।

(3.1.32 cont.) **vyatiricya** (ind. part.) having excluded **ca** also **upalambhāt** (abl. because) recognition **saṁśayaḥ** doubt, uncertainty (3.1.33) **mahat-aṇu-grahaṇāt** (abl. since) great – minute – personal apprehension (3.1.34) **raśmi – artha-saṁnikarṣa-viśeṣāt** (abl. just by) ray of light, straight line like a taut string – object – drawing in together (of object and sense; 1.1.4) – (ifc) particular **tat-agrahaṇam** that (*jñāna* 3.1.16) – no personal apprehension (3.1.35) **tat-anupalabdheḥ** (abl. ind.) that – failing to observe **ahetuḥ** not grounds for knowledge

5.10) (So,) there is uncertainty, because there is *also* a certain recognition having excluded that, (but) since it is a matter of personal apprehension as both the great *and* the minute, there is no such personal apprehension just through the particular (visual) drawing-in of an object by line of sight. Failure to observe that (great and minute together) is not our grounds for knowledge.

नानुमीयमानस्य प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुपलब्धिरभावहेतुः। द्रव्यगुणधर्मभेदाच्चोपलब्धिनियमः।

अनेकद्रव्यसमवायाद्वपविशेषाच्च

(3.1.36) **na** not the case **anumīyamānasya** (gen. of the pres. part. of the passive; of) "being inferred" (MW) **pratyakṣataḥ** (tasil resulting from) direct perception **anupalabdhiḥ** lack of observation **abhāva-hetuḥ** empty – grounds for knowing (3.1.37) **dravya-guṇa-dharma-bhedāt** (abl. inferred from) physical – qualities – duty – division **ca** both/and **upalabdhi-niyamaḥ** observation – rule (3.1.38) **aneka-dravya-samavāyāt** (abl. known from) multiplicity – physical – inherence **rūpa-viśeṣāt** (abl. inferred from) form – particular **ca** both/and

5.11 (To the objections:) that it is not the case that the lack of observation that would result from direct perception of a thing that is being inferred, constitutes 'empty' grounds for knowing it; (and) that the rule of observation is satisfied both by the division of dharmas according to physical qualities that are known from the inherence of multiplicity (of forms) in the physical (sphere), and by one's own particular form, ...



रूपोपलब्धिः। कर्मकारितश्चेन्द्रियाणां व्युहः पुरुषार्थतन्त्रः। (अव्यभिचाराच्च प्रतिघातो भौ-  
तिकधर्मः।Vb) मध्यन्दिनोल्काप्रकाशानुपलब्धिवत्तदनुपलब्धिः।

(3.1.38 cont.) **rūpa-upalabdhiḥ** forms – observation (3.1.39) **karma-kāritaḥ** caused to be made or done **ca** and **indriyāṇām** (gen. of) senses **vyuhaḥ** arrangement, ordering **puruṣa-artha-tantraḥ** human – purpose – principle (*avyabhicārāt* (abl. known by) not deviating **ca** and **pratighātaḥ** dismissed **bhautika-dharmaḥ** gross elements – duty; and the dharma of that (body) which consists of gross elements, known by not deviating, is dismissed. Vb) (3.1.40) **madhyam̐dina-ulkā-prakāśa-anupalabdhivat** (vati like) midday – shooting stars – light – not observing **tat-anupalabdhiḥ** them – not observing

**5.12** (The reply is:) The observation of (human) forms and the karmas they are made to do, as a principle of 'human purpose', is just an ordering of one's senses. If one doesn't observe them, it is only like not observing the light of shooting stars at midday.

He says that in the bright daylight of immediate self-awareness, the little comings and goings of temporary lives are not that noticeable.

न रात्रावप्यनुपलब्धेः। बाह्यप्रकाशानुग्रहाद्विषयोपलब्धेः अनभिव्यक्तितोऽनुपलब्धिः।

अभिव्यक्तौ चाभिभवात्।

(3.1.41) **na** not the case **rātrau** (loc. at) night **api** surely **anupalabdheḥ** (abl. since) no observation (3.1.42) **vāhya-prakāśa-anugrahāt** (abl. through) borne – light – aid **viśaya-upalabdheḥ** (abl. since) sphere – observation // **anabhivyaktitaḥ** (tasil due to) no manifestation **anupalabdhiḥ** lack of observation (3.1.43) **abhivyaktau** (loc. when) manifestation **ca** indeed **abhibhavāt** (abl. because) predominance

**5.13** (To the objection) that it is not so, because one *does* observe them at night, since the observation of that sphere is through the aid of the lights that belong to those (souls) being borne (across the sky); that any lack of observation of them is due to there being no (bodily) manifestation of them, indeed because when there is manifestation, *that* is the predominant thing.

नक्तञ्चरनयनरश्मिदर्शनाच्च। अप्राप्यग्रहणं काचाभ्रपटलस्फटिकान्तरितोपलब्धेः। कुड्या-  
न्तरितानुपलब्धेरप्रतिषेधः।

(3.1.44) **naktaṁcara-nayana-raśmi-darśanāt** (abl. by) nocturnal prowlers – leading – straight lines or "rays" of light – seeing **ca** also (3.1.45) **aprāpya-grahaṇam** imperceptible – personal apprehension // **kāca-abhra-paṭala-sphaṭika-antarita-upalabdheḥ** (abl. for) glass – cloud – veil – crystal – hidden – observing (3.1.46) **kuḍya-antarita-anupalabdheḥ** (abl. just because) barrier – obscured – no observing **apratishedhaḥ** no denying

**5.14** (The reply is:) **There is also a personal apprehension of that which is imperceptible (by day) by seeing by line of sight the light leading from (the eyes of) nocturnal creatures. There is no denying (our premise) just because one cannot observe something obscured by a barrier, for one can observe what is screened by (e.g.) glass, (thin) cloud cover, a veil, or ... a crystal.**

A tiger camouflaged in the jungle may be unseen by day, but seen at night by the light from its eyes, which is known to be reflected, not produced like starlight.

अप्रतिघातात्संनिकर्षोपपत्तिः। आदित्यरश्मेः स्फटिकान्तरेऽपि दाह्येऽविघातात्। नेतरे-  
तरधर्मप्रसङ्गात्।

(3.1.47) **apratighātāt** (abl. for) no dismissing **saṁnikarṣa-upapattiḥ** drawing together – evidence (3.1.48) **āditya-raśmeḥ** (gen. of) a name of Sūrya, the sun god – line of sight **sphaṭika-antare\_ api** (loc. w/api even if) crystal – in between **dāhye** (loc. to) "to be burned", flammable **avighātāt** (abl. since) no obstruction (3.1.49) **na** neither is there **itaretara-dharma-prasaṅgāt** (abl. by) respective – duty – adhering, being devoted

**5.15** (To the objection) **that such (a line of sight) is the evidence of drawing-in-together, for there is no dismissing it; that since there is no obstruction of (the god) Sūrya's line of sight to the flammable (sacrifice to him), even if there is a crystal (a human soul) in between, neither is there any (obstacle) by being devoted to one's respective dharma (of sacrificing).**

आदर्शोदकयोः प्रसादस्वाभाव्याद्वपोपलब्धिवत्तदुपलब्धिः। दृष्टानुमितानां नियोगप्रतिषे-  
धानुपपत्तिः।

(3.1.50) **ādarśa-udakayoḥ** (loc. in) mirror – water **prasāda-svābhāvyāt** (abl. through) clarity, serenity – state of self-existence **rūpa-upalabdhivat** (vati like) form – observation **tat-upalabdhīḥ** him – observation (3.1.51) **dr̥ṣṭa-anumitānām** (gen. pl. of things) learned – inferred **niyoga-pratiṣedha-anupapattiḥ** necessity – denial – unfitting, doesn't work

5.16 (The reply is:) The observation of him (Sūrya) is like the observation of one's form (reflected like 3.1.44) in a mirror or water, through the state of self-existence in its clarity, (so indeed) it doesn't work to deny the necessity of things that are learned and inferred (from scripture, e.g., BU 1.4.10 "The rishi Vamadeva affirmed 'I am the original man, and I became the god Sūrya'.")

स्थानान्यत्वे नानात्वादवयविनानास्थानत्वाच्च संशयः। त्वगव्यतिरेकात्। (नेन्द्रियान्तरा-  
र्थानुपलब्धेः। Vb)

(3.1.52) **sthāna-anyatve** (loc. in) stance – the other **nānātvāt** (abl. arising from) multiplicity (see *sthāna bahutva* 1.2.20) **avayavi-nānā-sthānatvāt** (abl. because) having parts – (gen.)– multiplicity – the stance **ca** and also **saṁśayaḥ** uncertainty (3.1.53) **tvac-avyatirekāt** (abl. known by) feel – not excluding **na** not **indriya-antara-artha-anupalabdheḥ** (abl. known by) senses – inner – objects – failure to observe

5.17 There is uncertainty, because there is a multiplicity (of parts) in the other stance, and because there is also the stance that the multiplicity belongs to the one who *has* the parts, which is known by not excluding (the sphere of) feel, not by failure to observe objects as the inner sense.

न युगपदर्थानुपलब्धेः। (त्वगवयवविशेषणधूमोपलब्धिवत्तदुपलब्धिः। व्याहतत्वादहेतुः  
Vb) विप्रतिषेधाच्च

(3.1.54) **na** neither **yugapat artha-anupalabdheḥ** (abl. by) immediate – object – failing to observe **tvac-avayava-viśeṣaṇa-dhūma-upalabdhivat** (vati

like) feel – part, subdivision – the act of distinguishing – smoke – observing **tat-upalabdhiḥ** such – observation **vyāhatatvāt** (abl. because) absurdity **ahetuḥ** no grounds (3.1.55) **vipratīṣedhāt** (abl. because) general denial **ca** and

**5.18 (On the other hand,)** neither is it by failing to observe that there is an immediate (physical) object. Such an observation would be like observing (physical) smoke by distinguishing it as a subdivision of feel. That is not our grounds for knowledge, because of its absurdity and because it would be generally denied.

## 6.)

न त्वगेका। इन्द्रियार्थपञ्चत्वात्। न तदर्थबहुत्वात्। गन्धत्वाद्यव्यतिरेकात् गन्धादीनामप्र-  
तिषेधः ।

**na** and not **tvac-ekā** feel (f.) – as only one (f.) (3.1.56) **indriya-artha-pañcatvāt** (abl. since) those (senses) – objects – being five in number (3.1.57) **na** not **tat-artha-bahu-tvāt** (abl. known by) their – objects – multiplicity (3.1.58) **gandha-tva-ādi-avyatirekāt** (abl. just because) smell – abstract essence of – and the others – not excluding **gandha-ādīnām** (gen. pl. belonging to) smell – and the others **apratīṣedhaḥ** no denying

**6.1) It is not a matter of feel as only one (sense), because of the objects of sense being five, (but) those (senses) are not known just by the multiplicity of their objects. That (multiplicity) is no denying (our premise) just because we do not exclude the abstract essence of smell and the others that belongs to (physical) smell and the others.**

विषयत्वाव्यतिरेकादेकत्वम्। न बुद्धिलक्षणाधिष्ठानगत्याकृतिजातिपञ्चत्वेभ्यः। (भूतगुण-

विशेषोपलब्धेस्तादात्म्यम्। MUM) (गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शशब्दानां। स्पर्शपर्यन्ताः

पृथिव्याः। असेजोवायूनाम् पूर्वं पूर्वमपोद्वाकाशस्योत्तरः। MUM)

(3.1.59) **viṣaya-tva-avyatirekāt** (abl. known by) sphere of objects – the abstract essence of – not excluding **ekatvam** wholeness (3.1.60) **na** not **buddhi-lakṣaṇa – adhiṣṭhāna – gati-ākṛti-jāti – pañca-tvebhyaḥ** (abl. pl. known by) possessed of wisdom – ruler – transmigration, incarnation – physical form – birth

rank – five – the existence (3.1.61-3) **bhūta-guṇa-viśeṣa-upalabdheḥ** (gen. of) gross elements – essential constituents – particular – observation **tādātmyam** affinity in the character (*gandha-rasa-rūpa-sparśa-śabdānām sparśa-paryantāḥ / prthivyāḥ ap-tejo-vāyūnām // pūrvam pūrvam apas hi ākāśasya uttarah;* *That (affinity) of smell, taste, form, feel, and sound (?), is that they are encompassed by feel. That (affinity) of water, fire, and air, is by earth. Because water is (syntactically) previous to the first, the higher place would belong to ether.*) The commenter tries to explain the strange idea of not reaching beyond feel, by referring to *Vaisheshika* 2.1-5, which describes the encompassing role of feel (but he is wrong about sound, and of course feel doesn't encompass itself). Otherwise, this enumeration of senses and elements is out of place here in the broader context of the opposing dharmas of subjectivism vs. class divisions.

**6.2** The wholeness that is known by not excluding the essence of that sphere is not known by the existence of those five in the birth-rank of some physical form as (for example) an incarnation of one possessed of wisdom (a priest), or of a ruler. It is rather an affinity in the character of observation of their particular gross elements and that of their essential constituents (guṇas).

न सर्वगुणानुपलब्धेः। एकैकश्येनोत्तरोत्तरगुणसद्भावादुत्तरोत्तराणां तदनुपलब्धिः। (संस-  
र्गाच्च अनेकगुणग्रहणम्। Vb)

(3.1.64) **na** not the case **sarva – guṇa-anupalabdheḥ** (abl. since) all together – levels of merit (*the opponent's definition*) – no observation (3.1.65) **ekaikaśyena** (ind.) severally, one by one **uttara-uttara – guṇa-sadbhāvāt** (abl. since) "higher and higher", progression, hierarchy (*both apply here*) – merit – reality **uttara-uttarāṇām** (gen. of) more and more advanced things **tat-anupalabdhīḥ** that, such – no observation (**samsargāt** (abl. coming from) combination **ca** and, whereas **aneka-guṇa-grahaṇam** several – qualities – personal apprehension Vb)

**6.3** (To the objection) **that that (wholeness) is not the case, because one cannot observe guṇas as a totality; that there is no observation of that (totality) of more and more advanced beings, since the reality of the guṇas as more and more advanced must be one at a time, whereas our personal apprehension as the several guṇas (prakṛti) would come from a combination of them.**

विष्टं ह्यपरम्परेण। न पार्थिवाप्ययोः प्रत्यक्षत्वात्। पूर्वपूर्वगुणोत्कर्षात्तत्तत्प्रधानम्। तद्व्य-  
स्थानं तु भूयस्त्वात्। सगुणानाम्

(3.1.66) **viṣṭam** (n.) that which encompasses (*cf.*  $\sqrt{\text{veṣṭ}}/\text{veṣṭa}$  (n.) *MW*, not a past participle) **hi** because **a-param-pareṇa** (ind.) without – one following another (3.1.67) **na** there is no **pārthiva-āpyayoḥ** (gen. dual of) consisting of earth – consisting of water **pratyakṣatvāt** (abl. since) perception (*The abstract form is for emphasis.*) (3.1.68) **pūrva-pūrva** – **guṇa-utkarṣāt** (abl. due to) one thing over the previous thing – merit (*He cleverly uses a third meaning of guṇa.*) – superiority **tat-tat-pradhānam** one over another – principal (3.1.69) **tat-vyavasthānam** that (*the referent is pratyakṣatva*) – perseverance **tu** rather **bhūyastvāt** (abl. w/tu apart from, opposed to) the becoming more advanced (*This is the sense of superiority or importance rather than size or abundance.*) (3.1.70) **sa-guṇānām** (gen. pl. on the part of) possessed of – quality, merit, virtue

6.4 (The reply is:) Because it (**prakṛti**) is that which encompasses (everything), without the one (incarnation) following the other, because of its being a perception of those (bodies) consisting of earth and water, it's not that one is chief over the other due to the superiority in merit of one (incarnation) over the previous. It is rather a matter of perseverance in that ('being' a perception), as opposed to the becoming more advanced on the part of those possessed of merit.

(इन्द्रियभावात्। तेनैव तस्याग्रहणाच्च। न शब्दगुणोपलब्धेः।) तदुपलब्धिरितरेतरद्रव्यगु-  
णवैधर्म्यात्। कर्माकाशसाधर्म्यात्संशयः। विषयप्रत्यभिज्ञानात्। साध्यसमत्वादहेतुः।

**indriya-bhāvāt** (3.1.71) **tena eva tasya** (*The author would have used "tat" in compound*) **agrahaṇāt ca** (3.1.72) **na śabda-guṇa-upalabdheḥ**; That (*abstract perception*) would not result from observation of the essential constituent of sound (*the ether*), because there exists a sense organ for that (*the ear*), and surely there is no personal apprehension by that means. (*The practical-minded commenter doesn't get the abstraction of sound into ether; mentioned here by the author.*) (3.1.73) **tat-upalabdhiḥ** it – observation **itara-itara-dravya-guṇa-vaidharmyāt** (abl.) (*As the opposite (sa vs. vi) of the following term in the ablative without "ca", this ablative sense is "apart from", or "as opposed to".*) respective – tangible, physical thing – merit – inconsistency (3.2.1) **karma-ākāśa-**

**sādharmyāt** (abl. according to) the performance of proper actions – ether (*This refers obliquely to satata, the continuous sound 2.2.34.*) – consistency with dharma **saṁśayaḥ** uncertainty (3.2.2) **viśaya-pratyabhijñānāt** (abl. by) sphere of objects – recognition (3.2.3) **sādhya-samatvāt** (abl. from) premise – substitution **ahetuḥ** no true grounds or basis for knowledge

**6.5 The uncertainty is the observation of it according to our (thesis of) consistency of both the karmas and the ether, as opposed to the inconsistency of the (three dharmic) guṇas as the respective physical forms. No true grounds for knowledge can come from any 'equivalent' of our premise (that the highest dharma is by true comprehension), by recognizing only that sphere (of physical forms).**

The karmas are the repetitions of daily rituals, and the ether is the element associated with hearing the continuous sound. The author clearly states in 2.2.30-38 that these two realities are to be taken together.

न युगपदग्रहणात्। अप्रत्यभिज्ञाने च विनाशप्रसङ्गः। क्रमवृत्तित्वादयुगपदग्रहणम्। अप्र-  
त्यभिज्ञानञ्च विषयान्तरव्यासङ्गात्।

(3.2.4) **na** not the case **yugapat\_agrahaṇāt** (abl. because) immediate – no personal apprehension (3.2.5) **apratyabhijñāne** (loc. if) no recognition at all (*The referent is viśaya 3.2.2*) **ca** and **vināśa-prasaṅgaḥ** passing out of existence – occupation with life (3.2.6) **krama-vṛttitvāt** (abl. because) stages – modes of existence **ayugapat** not simultaneous **grahaṇam** personal apprehension (3.2.7) **apratyabhijñānam** failure to recognize **ca** moreover **viśaya-antara-vyāsaṅgāt** (abl. due to) sphere – inner – ardent devotion to

**6.6 (To the objection) that it is not the case, because there is no such immediate personal apprehension, and if there were no recognition of those (physical forms) at all, then we are occupied with passing out of existence; that the personal apprehension is not immediate, because there are modes of existence by stages (incarnations), and that the failure to recognize it is due to our own ardent devotion to our inner sphere, ...**

न गत्यभावात्। स्फटिकान्यत्वाभिमानवत्तदन्यत्वाभिमानः। (न हेत्वभावात् Vb) स्फटके-  
ऽप्यपरापरोत्पत्तेः क्षाणिकत्वाद्यक्तीनामहेतुः।

(3.2.8) **na** not so **gati-abhāvāt** (abl. because) transmigration – without existence or substance, empty (3.2.9) **sphaṭika-anyatva-abhimānavat** (vati just like) crystal – being something other – self-conception **tat-anyatva-abhimānaḥ** that (*referent* = *viśaya-antara* 3.2.7) – the being something other – self-conception (**na hetu-abhāvāt Vb**) (3.2.10) **sphaṭake\_api** (lo. concessive w/api even though) crystal **apara-apara-utpatteḥ** (abl. by) one following the other – birth, incarnation **kṣāṇikatvāt** (abl. through) momentariness, ephemerality (*not a reference to Buddhism*) **vyaktīnām** (gen. of) individuals **ahetuḥ** no grounds

6.7 (The reply is:) No, because that (notion of) transmigration (reincarnation) is without substance. Any self-conception of being something other than just that (inner sphere) is just like the self-conception of being something other than the crystal. Even though one is the crystal (figuratively), there can be no true grounds for knowledge through (the notion of) the ephemerality of individuals by one birth following another.

(नियमहेत्वभावाद्यथादर्शनमभ्यनुज्ञा।) नोत्पत्तिविनाशकरणोपलब्धेः। क्षीरविनाशे कारणानुपलब्धवद्ध्युत्पत्तिवच्च तदुत्पत्तिः। लिङ्गतो ग्रहणान्नानुपलब्धिः।

((3.2.11) *niyama-hetu-abhāvāt yathā darśanam abhyanuññā; Because he gives no reason for this rule, it is a matter of seeing whatever he permits.*) (3.2.12) **na** not **utpatti-vināśa-kāraṇa-upalabdheḥ** (abl. according to) birth, coming into existence – annihilation (intrans.), passing out of existence – cause(s) – observation (3.2.13) **kṣīra-vināśe** (loc. when) milk – passing out of existence **kāraṇa-anupalabdhat** (vatup having) cause – not observed / **dadhi-utpattivat** (vati like) curds – coming into existence **ca** and **tat-upapattiḥ** those (*The referent is vyaktīnām in 3.2.10*) – evidence (3.2.14) **liṅgataḥ** (tasil: resulting from) indicator (*This usually refers to the body.*) **grahaṇāt** (abl. because) personal apprehension **na** not **anupalabdhīḥ** without observation

6.8 (To the objection) that it is not so, according to the observation of causes of coming into existence and passing out of existence; that when milk passes out of existence (by curdling), this has a cause, which is (however) not observed, and that the evidence of those (individuals) is like the coming into existence of the curds, because personal apprehension results from (seeing) one's (physical) indicator, which does not go without observation.



We remind ourselves that the actual cosmic workings of karma and re-incarnation remain unseen, but that those principles are proved by what is seen, i.e., the various life circumstances according to caste, health, wealth, etc.

(न पयसः परिणामगुणान्तरप्रादुर्भावात्।) व्यूहान्तराद्रव्यान्तरोत्पत्तिदर्शनं पूर्वद्रव्यनिवृत्ते-  
रनुमानम्। क्वचिद्विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेः क्वचिचोपलब्धेरनेकान्तः।

((3.2.15) *na payasaḥ pariṇāma-guṇa-antara-prādurbhāvāt; (He says) no, because it is a matter of manifestation on the part of the inner guṇas in the transformation of the milk. This seems to be interpolation, probably meant to explain the terms vyūha-antara and dravya-antara. The commenter uses terminology from YD 6.15: "abhibhava-prādurbhāvau nirodha-kṣaṇa-citta-anvayaḥ nirodha-pariṇāmaḥ" He uses the YD word for transformation, rather than this author's, and he even uses a different word for milk.*) (3.2.16) **vyūha-antarāt** (abl. according to) arrangement – inner **dravya-antara-utpatti-darśanam** the physical (reality) – inner – coming into existence – seeing // **pūrva-dravya-nivṛtteḥ** (gen. of) existing previously – physical (reality) – cessation **anumānam** inference (3.2.17) (see the similar 2.1.19-20) **kvacit** in one case **vināśa-kāraṇa-anupalabdheḥ** (abl. since) passing out of existence – cause – non-observance **kvacit** in the other case **ca** and **upalabdheḥ** (abl. since) observation **anekāntaḥ** not just the one way exclusively

6.9 (The reply is:) According to the inner arrangement, one sees the coming into existence of what is inner to its (milk's) physical reality, (but) of the cessation of a physical reality previous (to its curdling) there is only inference (see śeṣavat 1.1.5), since in that case there is *no* observation of a cause of (the previous thing) passing out of existence. Moreover, since in the other case (the coming into existence) there *is* observation, it cannot be just the one way.

नेन्द्रियार्थयोस्तद्विनाशेऽपि ज्ञानावस्थानात्। युगपज्ज्ञेयानुपलब्धेश्च न मनसः। तदात्मगु-  
णत्वेऽपि तुल्यम्।

(3.2.18) **na** not **indriya-arthayoḥ** (gen. dual; of) sense – object **tat-vināśe** (loc. where; *The usual "even though" w/api doesn't work here.*) that – passing out of existence – even considering **api** (*emphatic*) surely must **jñāna-avasthānāt** (abl. known by) true comprehension – life condition (3.2.19) **yugapat** in the immediate presen **jñeya-anupalabdheḥ** (abl. knon by) to be comprehended – failure to

observe **ca\_na** and not **manasaḥ** (gen. on the part of, by) the mind's (3.2.20) **tat-ātma-guṇatve** (loc. where) that – essence – guṇa-state –even considering **api** surely must **tulyam** (ind.) equally, w/cana, not any more than

**6.10 That (inner arrangement) is not known (exclusively) by a life of comprehension of (only) the sense and its physical object—where that (object) surely *must* pass out of existence—any more than it is known (exclusively) in the immediate present by *non*-observation of that (physical object) which would be comprehended by the mind—where it surely *must* be (only) the guṇa-state, as the essence of that (object).**

इन्द्रियैर्मनसः संनिकर्षाभावात्तदनुत्पत्तिः। नोत्पत्तिकारणानपदेशात्। विनाशकारणानुप-  
लब्धेश्चावस्थाने

(3.2.21) **indriyaiḥ** (inst. with) senses **manasaḥ** (gen. of) mind **saṁnikarṣa-abhāvāt** (abl. ind.) drawing in together – in the absence of **tat-anutpattiḥ** that – no coming into existence (3.2.22) **na** cannot be **utpatti-kāraṇa-anapadeśāt** (abl. ind. w/na + privative alpha (=abl.+*rte*)) coming into existence – cause – without assigning (3.2.23) **vināśa-kāraṇa-anupalabdheḥ** (abl. ind.) passing out of existence – cause – without observing **ca** moreover **avasthāne** (loc. in) life circumstance, situation

**6.11 There is no coming into existence of that (object) in the absence of the drawing-in-together of *mind* with the senses (not just object and senses 3.2.18), which (mind) cannot be without assigning a cause of *its* coming into existence, and this is without observing a cause of its passing out of existence in real life.**

तन्नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः। अनित्यत्वग्रहाद्बुद्धेर्बुद्ध्यन्तराद्विनाशः शब्दवत्। ज्ञानसमवेतात्मप्रदेश-  
संनिकर्षान्मनसः

**tat** thus **nityatva-prasaṅgaḥ** as a constancy – occupation with life // (3.2.24) **anityatva-grahāt** (abl. by) inconstancy – grasping an idea **buddheḥ** (abl. w/antara "other"; than) power of discerning **buddhi-antarāt** (abl. known by) power of discerning – inner, other **vināśaḥ** passing out of existence **śabdavat** (vati like) sound (3.2.25) **jñāna-samaveta – ātma-pradeśa – saṁnikarṣāt** (abl. known by) one who has come to true comprehension – self-realm – drawing-in-together **manasaḥ** (gen. for) mind

6.12 Thus, it (ours) is an occupation with life as a constancy. Our passing out of existence is known through an understanding that is other than (inner to) any understanding that comes about by (merely) grasping the idea of inconstancy (of objects). This is the case for a mind that is known by the drawing-in-together within the realm of the individual *self* (the cause of mind, see SD Ch. three) of one who has come to true comprehension.

स्मृत्युत्पत्तेर्न युगपदुत्पत्तिः। नान्तःशरीरवृत्तित्वान्मनसः। साध्यत्वादहेतुः। स्मरतः

शरीरधारणोपपत्तेरप्रतिषेधः।

(3.2.25 cont.) **smṛti-utpatteḥ** (abl. according to) law – coming into existence **na** not the case **yugapat** immediate **utpattiḥ** coming into existence (3.2.26) **na** not the case **antaḥ-śarīra** – **vṛttitvāt** (abl. known by) inner – body – mode of existence **manasaḥ** (gen. for) mind (3.2.27) **sādhya tvāt** (abl. from) (meant) to be demonstrated (cf. 2.1.33) – the existence of **ahetuḥ** not basis of knowledge (3.2.28) **smarataḥ** (tasil; resulting from) fondness, physical intimacy (*This is a euphemism for sex and a play on other √smṛ words nearby.*) **śarīra-dhāraṇa-upapatteḥ** (abl. by) body – holding, maintaining – evidence **apratishedhaḥ** no denying

6.13 According to the *smṛti*'s (teaching of) coming into existence, our immediate coming into existence is not the case. It is not the case for a mind known (only) by its mode of existence as the inner aspect of a (preexisting) *body*, (but) that is without our grounds for knowledge, because it would have to be demonstrated. There is no denying (our premise) just by their evidence of that (mind) being contained by a body that results from 'physical intimacy'.

न तदाशुगतित्वान्मनसः। न स्मरणकालानियमात्। आत्मप्रेरणयदृच्छाज्ञताभिश्च न संयोगविशेषः।

(3.2.29) **na** not the case **tat-āśu-gati-tvāt** (abl. known by) quickly – moving – tendency of **manasaḥ** (gen. for) mind (3.2.30) **na** cannot be **smaraṇa-kāla-anīyamāt** (abl. ind. w/na + privative alpha) remembering (the *smṛti* MW) – time – without fixing (3.2.31) **ātma-preraṇa -yadṛcchā -jñatābhiḥ** (f. inst. pl. with) individual self – deliberate action – spontaneous nature – (jñatā) "wise and learned" MW **ca\_na** nor **saṃyoga-viśeṣaḥ** conjunction – special

**6.14 It is not the case for a mind that is known by its tendency of quick movement in that (recitation of *smṛti*, literally, "remembering")—which itself cannot be without fixing the actual *time* of remembering (the present). Nor is its special conjunction with that individual's deliberate (proper) action, his spontaneous (pure) nature, and his being wise and learned, the case.**

The self, the whole, the possessor of parts, is known in the immediate present, and it doesn't need to be explained. The explanation of all the parts—marks, qualities, indicators, etc.—seems to move into and out of the mind, into and out of memory, over time, but the time of that act of remembering is the present. To say someone is quick and knowledgeable is only to say he is *capable* of recalling and reciting points of knowledge one at a time, in the present. Even that potential is in the end nothing but the vague belief in the potential, in the present.

व्यासक्तमनसः पादव्यथनेन संयोगविशेषेण समानम्। प्रणिधानलिङ्गादिज्ञानानामयुगप-  
द्भावात्

(3.2.32) **vyāsakta-manasaḥ** (gen. for) preoccupied – mind **pāda-vyathanena** (inst. with) feet – hurting **saṁyoga-viśeṣeṇa** (inst. with) conjunction – special **samānam** same (3.2.33) **praṇidhāna-liṅga-ādi-jñānānām** (gen. pl. for) attention – indicator – beginning with (*not "etc." here*) – those whose comprehension **ayugapat** not immediate **bhāvāt** (abl. according to) view

**6.15 For a mind thus preoccupied (3.2.31), it is the same with foot pain (for example) as it is with that special conjunction. For those whose comprehension begins with the *indicator* of that attention (the foot), according to that view, that (conjunction) is not immediate.**

अयुगपत्स्मरणम्। इत्येच्छाद्वेषनिमित्तत्वादारम्भनिवृत्त्योः। तल्लिङ्गत्वादिच्छाद्वेषयोः

पथिवाद्येष्वप्रतिषेधः।

(3.2.33 cont.) **ayugapat** not immediate **smaraṇam** the act of remembering (3.2.34) **jñasya** (gen.) the comprehender's **icchā-dveṣa-nimittatvāt** (abl. caused by) desire – aversion – its being instrumental cause **ārambha-nivṛttyoḥ** (gen. of) beginning – cessation (3.2.35) **tat-liṅgatvāt** (abl. by) his – the being an indication **icchā-dveṣayoḥ** (gen. dual on the part of) desire – aversion **parthiva-ādyeṣu** (loc. pl. within) consisting of organic substance etc. **apratishedhaḥ** no denying

6.16 The memory of the comprehender's origination and cessation, being caused by his (previous) desire and aversion, cannot be immediate either. There is no denying (our premise) by (asserting) the desire and aversion being his *indicator*, (residing) within that which consists of organic substance and the others (his body).

परश्चादिष्वारम्भनिवृत्तिदर्शनात्। (कुम्भादिष्वनुपलब्धेरहेतुः। Vb) नियमानियमौ तु  
तद्वि-शेषकौ यथोक्तहेतुत्वात्

(3.2.36) *paraśu-ādiṣu* (loc. in) axes and the like *ārambha-nivṛtti-darśanāt* (abl. known from) origination – cessation – seeing / *kumbha-ādiṣu* (loc. in) pitchers and the like *anupalabdheḥ* (abl. since) no observation *ahetuḥ* no grounds for knowledge (3.2.37) *niyama-aniyamau* rule – lack of rule *tu* however *tat-viśeṣakau* on that (point) – petty distinctions (*a kan kamārtha taddhita form; "only resembling a valid distinction"*) (3.2.38) *yathā-ukta-hetu-tvāt* (abl. for) has been declared – motivation (*a different use for hetu*) – being a matter of

6.17 From seeing origination (impulse) and cessation (letting go) in (wielding) axes and such (*like pestles and arrows, see VD on karma*), we know that (body as indicator) is no grounds for knowledge, since there is no observation of it in pitchers and the like. That rule (of karma) and the lack of it, however, are petty distinctions on the point, that being a matter of the motivation (toward proper behavior) supplied by that (law) which has been declared.

पारतन्त्र्यादकृताभ्यागमाच्च न मनसः। परिशेषाद्यथोक्तहेतूपपत्तेश्च। स्मरणं त्वात्मनो  
ज्ञस्वाभाव्यात्।

*pāratantryāt* (abl. according to) (*See paratantra 1.1.29.*) being a theory for others *akṛta-abhyāgamāt* (abl. known by) (*recalls "aparīkṣita-abhyupagamāt" 1.1.31*) who has not done – accepting *ca\_na* nor is it the case *manasaḥ* (gen. for) mind (3.2.39) *pariśeṣāt* (abl. ind.) left over *yathā-ukta-hetu-upapatteḥ* (abl. from) has been declared – motive – evidence *ca* even (3.2.40) *smaraṇam* the act of remembering *tu* but *ātmanaḥ* (gen. belonging to) individual self *jñā-svābhāvyāt* (abl. emerging from) comprehender – state of self-existence

6.18 Nor is it the case for a mind known by that which we accept without having done (the examination), according to our 'theory for others' (see 1.1.29); but even our act of remembering that (before-state), left over from our evidence of the motive supplied by that (law, *smṛti*) which has been declared, belongs to our individual self emerging from the state of self-existence of the comprehender.

(प्रणिधाननिबन्धाभ्यासलिङ्गलक्षणसादृश्यपरिग्रहाश्रयाश्रितसम्बन्धानन्तर्यवियोगैककार्य-  
विरोधातिशयप्राप्तिव्यवधानसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषभावार्थित्वक्रियारागधर्माधर्मनिमित्तेभ्यः।

कर्मनवस्थायिग्रहणात्। अव्यक्तग्रहणम अनवस्थायित्वात् विद्युत्सम्पातेरूपाव्यक्तग्रहण-  
वत्।)

((3.2.41) *praṇidhāna -nibandha -abhyāsa -liṅga -lakṣaṇa -sādrśya -parigraha -aśraya -aśrita -sambandha -ānantarya -viyoga -ekakārya -virodha -atiśaya -prāpti -vyavadhāna -sukha -duḥkha -icchā -dveṣa -bhāya -arthitva -kriyā -rāga -dharma -adharma -nimittebhyaḥ* (3.2.42) *karma-anavasthāyigrahaṇāt* (3.2.43) *avyakta-grahaṇam / an-avasthāyitvāt vidyut-sampāte rūpa-avyakta-grahaṇavat*; The causes (of karmic 'memories') are: (as stated in 3.2.41). The idea of being unmanifest arises from the personal apprehension of being without any karmic circumstance, like the personal apprehension of the unmanifest (leftover) visual image after lightning strikes, without the condition of having the actual circumstance (of lightning).

This interpolation, between chapters, and identifiable by the long compound, seems to be inspired by the mention of memory (*smaraṇa*) and soul (*ātman*). The commenter attempts to explain how residual karma exists as 'memories' while the soul is unmanifest between incarnations. But he misunderstands the author's thesis, as religious commentators to the Darshanās are apt to do, so instead of any sign of comprehension, we see just another list of words to be memorized and recited by the students of his school. The lightning example is nice though.

## 7.)

हेतूपादानात्प्रतिषेधव्याभ्यनुज्ञा। प्रदीपार्चिःसंतत्यभिव्यक्तग्रहणवत्तद्ग्रहणम्। द्रव्ये स्वगुण-  
परगुणोपलब्धेः संशयः।

(3.2.44) **hetu-upādānāt** (abl. since) grounds – accepting unto oneself **pratiṣedha-vyābhyanuñā** denial – comprehensive admittance (3.2.45) **pradipa-  
arciḥ** illumination, exposition – light **saṁtati-abhivyakta-grahaṇavat** (vati like)  
continuity – become manifest – self-perception **tat-grahaṇam** in it – personal  
apprehension (3.2.46) **dravye** (loc. when it comes to) physical substance **svaguṇa-  
paraguṇa** -(gen.)- **upalabdheḥ** (gen. of, about) one's own essential constituents –  
another's essential constituents -(gen. of)- observation **saṁśayaḥ** uncertainty

7.1 (Therefore,) since one must accept any grounds for knowledge unto oneself, there should be comprehensive admittance of the *denials* (as well). (So) there is the light of our exposition, in which personal apprehension is like perceiving oneself as the continuity (of sound) become manifest, (but) there is (also) the uncertainty about the observation of one's own essential constituents vs. those of another, when it comes to the physical (world).

The term "accepting unto oneself" (upādāna cf. SD) means that, for a person who comprehends that truth, *any* idea he entertains or understands must be owned, even if rejected. He is certainly not advising that we hold to the truth of some assertion and to the truth of its logical opposite in the *same* universe of discourse.

यावच्छरीरभावित्वाद्द्रुपादीनाम्। न पाकजगुणान्तरोत्पत्तेः। प्रतिद्वंद्विसिद्धेः पाकजानाम-  
प्रतिषेधः।

(3.2.47) **yāvat** to whatever extent **śarīra-bhāvitvāt** (abl. stemming from) body – inevitability **rūpādīnām** (gen. of *ref.=upalabdhi* 3.2.46) form and the others (3.2.48) **na** not the case **pākaja-guṇa-antara-utpatteḥ** (gen. of; *ref.=upalabdhi* 3.2.46) born of development – essential constituents – inner – coming into existence (3.2.49) **pratidvaṁdvi-siddheḥ** (abl. by) opposition – affirmation **pākajānām** (gen. of) born of development **apraṭiṣedhaḥ** no denying

7.2 To whatever extent that (observation) of visual form and the other (essential constituents) stems from the inevitability of a (pre-existing) body,

that (observation) of the coming into existence through inner essential constituents on the part of one born out of their development, is *not* the case, (but) there is no denying (our premise) just by our opposition's affirmation of being born out of (karmic) development.

(शरीरव्यापित्वात्। न केशनखादिष्वनुपलब्धेः। त्वक्पर्यन्तत्वाच्छरीरस्य) केशनखादि-  
ष्वप्रसङ्गः। शरीरगुणवैधर्म्यात्। न रूपादीनामितरेतरवैधर्म्यात्। ऐन्द्रियकत्वाद्वापादीना-  
मप्रतिषेधः।

[ (3.2.50) *śārīra-vyāpitvāt* (3.2.51) *na keśa-nakhādiṣu anupalabdheḥ* (3.2.52) *tvac-paryantatvāt śārīrasya*; This (following material) is according to his theory of pervasion of those (*guṇas*) in the body, but they are not known from the body's being encompassed by feel, because there would be no observation (of *guṇas*) in hair and nails and so on. "Hair and nails" stands out, so he comments on it.] *keśa-nakhādiṣu* (loc. in) hair – nails – etc. *aprasaṅgaḥ* no occupation with (life) (3.2.53) *śārīra-guṇa-vaidharmyāt* (abl. because) body – essential constituents – inconsistency (3.2.54) *na* not *rūpādīnām* (gen. of) visual form and the others *itaretara-vaidharmyāt* (abl. because) one vs. another – inconsistency (3.2.55) *aindriyakatvāt* (abl. by) being related to the senses *rūpādīnām* (gen. of) visual form etc. *apratishedhaḥ* no denying

**7.3 There is no occupation (with life) in the hair and nails and so on, because of the inconsistency of that with our (thesis of) essential constituents of the body. It is not (however) because of a lack of consistency with the visual form etc. of one (person's body) vs. another's, (so) there is no denying (our premise) just by that form and the others' being related to the physical senses.**

Obviously, the body is not made of air, fire, water, and earth, in the sense that one could examine it under magnification and find tiny bits of those things held together somehow. Notwithstanding the reality of the body that we all know as made of molecules, the authors of the Darshanās describe another equally true reality where the body is not just an object that is experienced and then explained, but the very experience itself. The experience is the thing that can be realized as the essential constituents, first of feel, and developing out of that, visual form, taste, and smell, corresponding respectively to the four elements mentioned. Those four essential constituents are pervaded by a constant ethereal spatial substance (*ākāśa*), which manifests as the subtlest comprehension of sound. This notion of



the priority of experience over physical reality is the basic idea behind subjective idealism. Interestingly, the author's choice of hair and nails to illustrate this point has the additional charm that those are most noticeable parts of the body in which there is no sensation of feel.

ज्ञानायौगपद्यादेकं मनः। न युगपदनेकक्रियोपलब्धेः। अलातचक्रदर्शनवत्तदुपलब्धिराशु-  
संचारात्। यथोक्तहेतुत्वाच्चाणु।

(3.2.56) **jñāna-ayaugapadyāt** (abl. for) true comprehension – not having immediacy (*The author's yugapat in compound doesn't require the determinative complement to be "simultaneous with something".*) **ekam** alone solitary, on its own **manaḥ** mind (3.2.57) **na** not **yugapat** immediate / **aneka-kriya-upalabdheḥ** (abl. for) many – activities – observation (3.2..58) **alāta-cakra-darśanavat** (vati like) firebrand ("unconced" torch?) – circle – seeing **tat-upalabdhīḥ** it – observation // **āśu-samcārāt** (abl. ind.) quickly – moving (3.2.59) **yathā-ukta-hetutvāt** (abl. ind.) that which has been declared (*not "as stated above"*) – with the motivation of **ca** and **aṇu** finely divided

**7.4 (In fact,) not having the immediacy of true comprehension, that 'mind' (the "aindriyaka") on its own (without comprehension) is not immediate, for one does observe its manifold activity. Observation of it is like seeing a (whole) circle made by (swinging) a burning stick. Moving quickly and with the motivation of that (law, smṛti) which has been declared, that (karma which is the object of this metaphor) is finely divided.**

He gives an example of the relationship of a sense impression as one of a series progressing through time and the impression as it exists in the present. With the swinging firebrand, what is *seen* as a whole orange circle in the dark is *considered* to be an innumerable series of positions of the burning tip, in time *and* space, as parts of the whole. (Of course, the physiological explanation of this phenomenon, as interesting as it may be, is not really the point here.)

पूर्वकृतफलानुबन्धात्तदुत्पत्तिः। भूतेभ्यो मूर्त्युपादानवत्तदुपादानम्। न साध्यसमत्वात्।

नोत्पत्तिनिमित्तत्वान्मातापित्रोः

(3.2.60) **pūrva-kṛta** – **phala-anubandhāt** (abl. known by) previous action – consequence – incidental attachment **tat-utpattiḥ** those – coming into existence

(3.2.61) **bhūtebhyaḥ** (abl. from) gross elements **mūrti-upādānavat** (vati like) physical form – accepting unto oneself **tat-upādānam** it – accepting unto oneself  
 (3.2.62) **na** not **sādhya-samatvāt** (abl. by) premise – its being an equivalent  
 (3.2.63) **na** not **utpatti-nimittatvāt** coming into existence – being the instrumental cause **mātā-pitroḥ** (loc. having to do with) mother – father

**7.5 The coming into existence of that (mind) is known by its incidental attachment as the maturation of the previously created (individual self, "ātman" 3.2.40). Accepting that unto oneself is like accepting one's own physical form, (made) from the gross elements, unto oneself; (but) not by its being an equivalent for our premise (that the highest dharma is by true comprehension), (that is,) not because of that (pūrva-kṛta) being the instrumental cause of the coming into existence (bodily incarnation) that has to do with a mother and father.**

This could just as easily be read as a declaration of karma and re-incarnation. I think, however, that the author meant to use these same words to express his own quite different thesis, perhaps even with the dual meaning in mind. The language is clear and precise for the task: Phala "fruit" from √phal meaning to "burst open", as a ripened pod, is the perfect description of the development of the subtle senses "rūpādi" (=tanmātrāni) through the mind, out of the *individual* self "ātman" (=ahankāra SD, =ahamṇāman BU), which is made (not "done") previously "pūrva-kṛta" in the series, out of the *constant* self (jñā-svābhāvya in 3.2.40, =Brahman in BS, =Mahat in VD, SD). All of this is consistent with the series as outlined in both the Vaisheshika and Sankhya Darshanas.

As in 4.1.14-17, the close proximity of na+abl phrases need not be read as an exchange of pointless laconic rejoinders, like a schoolyard squabble. The author is using the technique of clarifying what is within the scope of his thesis by *explicitly* rejecting what is outside the scope. After all we have learned about the author's true thesis, surely he is not suddenly teaching us the religious doctrine of karma! It has been his style throughout to give a fresh and profound experience-based interpretation to some of the tired dogmas of the traditional faith-based "for it is written" system that was as prevalent in his time as it is now. That's why this treatise, like the other Darshanas, is considered to be a work of philosophy, as distinct from the many ancient texts on religion, science, law, legend, etc.

तथाहारस्य। प्राप्तौ चानियमात्। शरीरोत्पत्तिनिमित्तवत् (संयोगोत्पत्तिनिमित्तं कर्म। एते-  
नानियमः प्रत्युक्तः।) तददृष्टकारितमिति चेत्पुनस्तत्प्रसङ्गोऽपवर्गः। (न करणाकरणयोगा-  
रम्भदर्शनात्। Vb)

(3.2.64) **tathā** the same way **āhārasya** (gen. of) livelihood (*not "food" here*)  
(3.2.65) **prāptau** (loc. with) acquisition **ca** in addition to that **aniyamāt** (abl. ind.)  
without the rule (3.2.66) **śarīra-utpatti-nimittavat** (vati like it is with) body –  
coming into existence – instrumental cause // (*saṃyoga-utpatti-nimittam karma*  
(3.2.67) *etena aniyamaḥ pratyuktaḥ*; *One's karma is the instrumental cause of*  
*the manifestation of one's connection (with body and livelihood). Thereby his*  
*lawless (doctrine) is refuted. (a typical "proof" by assertion of religious dogma.))*  
(3.2.68) **tat-adṛṣṭa-kāritam** those – unseen – caused **iti\_cet** to the objection that:  
**punar** again, repeatedly **tat-prasaṅgaḥ** him – occupation with life **apavarge** (loc.  
until) final release (an opponent's definition) / **na** no **kaṛaṇa-akaraṇa-yoga-**  
**ārambha-darśanāt** (abl. because) making – not making – union – origination –  
seeing

7.6 In addition to that (body), it is the same way with the acquisition of  
one's livelihood (life-circumstance)—without our rule (of "coming into  
existence")—as it is with the (rule of the) instrumental cause of the coming  
into existence of one's body (from 3.1.63; i.e., *not* the case). To the objection  
that those (body and livelihood) are caused by an unseen force, and our  
occupation (with life) is repeated until final release; the reply is: no, for we see  
(or "according to the darshana on" cf. BU?) its origination as a union of creator  
and non-creator.

मनःकर्मनिमित्तत्वाच्च संयोगानुच्छेदः। नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गश्च प्रायणानुपपत्तेः। अणु (इयाम-  
तानित्यत्वदेतत्स्यात्।) नाकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गात्। प्रवृत्तिर्यथोक्ता। तथा दोषाः।

(3.2.69) **manas-karma-nimitta-tvāt** (abl. because) mind – activity –  
instrumental cause – the fact that **ca** moreover **saṃyoga-anucchedaḥ** conjunction  
(cf. *saṃyoga* 3.2.31-32) – not cut off (3.2.70) **nityatva-prasaṅgaḥ** constancy –  
occupation **ca** and so **prāyaṇa-anupapatteḥ** (abl. since) going away – no  
evidence ((3.2.71) *aṇu śyāmatā-nityatvavat etat syāt*; *Perhaps that (constancy) is*  
*atomic, like the constancy of the blackness (of space.)* (3.2.72) **na** not **akṛta-**

**abhyāgama-prasaṅgāt** (abl. known from) by one who has not done (the examination) – accepted – occupation (4.1.1) **pravṛttiḥ** true account **yathā-uktā** already stated (*cf. pravṛttiḥ vāk 1.1.17*) (4.1.2) **tathā** likewise **doṣāḥ** faulty or false ones (*the counterpart of pravṛtti, cf. 1.1.17-18*)

**7.7 Moreover, because of the fact that the (body and livelihoods') instrumental cause is the activity of one's mind, its (the mind's) conjunction (with objects see saṃyoga 3.2.31-32) is never cut off and so we know that occupation as a constancy, since there is no evidence that it ever goes away. This (constancy) is not known from the kind of occupation that is accepted by one who hasn't done (the examination). This (3.2.69) is the (true) account we have already declared (in 1.1.17), and likewise (shall we speak of) the false ones, as follows:**

The overall cause (kāraṇa) is the "supreme being" level of consciousness (4.1.19), whereas the subordinate "instrumental cause" (nimitta) is the mind. This is consistent with the outline presented in chapter three of the Sankhya.

Here the author says that one's experience of some kind of body and some kind of life never goes away. The truth that there can be times with no mental experience, like deep sleep or deep meditation, obviously cannot be an experienced truth or even a remembered one. It can only be (falsely) inferred. Even the inevitability of one's own eventual loss of consciousness through death, as true as it may be, is an inferred knowledge, and like an experience or a memory, the inference happens in the immediate present.

तत्तैराशयं रागद्वेषमोहार्थान्तरभावात्। नैकप्रत्यनीकभावात्। व्यभिचारादहेतुः। तेषां

मोहः पापीयान्नामूढस्येतरोत्पत्तेः।

(4.1.3) **tat** (ind.) as follows (*The translation of this is appended to the previous sentence. See also 5.1.2.*) **trairāśyam** a group of three **rāga-dveṣa-moha-artha-antara-bhāvāt** (abl. known by) passion – aversion (=vairagya) – mindlessness – meanings – alternate – view (4.1.4) **na** it doesn't mean **eka-pratyanīka-bhāvāt** (abl. from) singular, pre-eminent, excellent (MW) – adversaries – view (4.1.5) **vyabhicārāt** (abl. just because) deviation **ahetuḥ** lack of grounds for knowledge (4.1.6) **teṣām** (gen. of) those **mohaḥ** mindlessness **pāpīyāt** (abl. for) worst // **na** not **amūḍhasya** (gen. of) non-mindless **itara-utpatteḥ** (abl. known by) as a counterpart – creation of, creating a

**7.8** There is a (certain) group of three things known by a view of alternate meanings of passion, aversion (to passion), and mindlessness (representing *rajas*, *sattva*, and *tamas*). Just because this is a deviation from the view of our most excellent adversaries (the 'sattvic' priest/scholar class), that doesn't mean we lack grounds for knowledge. Of those (three), that (lack of grounds) is rather the mindlessness itself, for it is the worst, (but) this (mindlessness) is not known by creating a non-mindless (class) as a counterpart to it.

निमित्तनैमित्तिकभावादर्थान्तरभावो दोषेभ्यः। न दोषलक्षणावरोधान्मोहस्य। निमित्तनै-  
मित्तिकोपपत्तेश्च तुल्यजातीयानामप्रतिषेधः।

(4.1.7) **nimitta-naimittika-bhāvāt** (abl. coming from) instrumental cause and effect relation **artha-antara** -(gen.)- **bhāvaḥ** meaning – alternate – view (*The connection with bhāva is always gen. but translated as "with".*) **doṣebhyaḥ** (abl. w/antara apart from) false ones (4.1.8) **na** not **doṣa-lakṣaṇa-avarodhāt** (abl. just because) the false (accounts) – those characterized by – separating from **mohasya** (gen. of) mindlessness (*ref.=bhāva 4.1.7*) (4.1.9) **nimitta-naimittika-upapatteḥ** (abl. just by) instrumental cause – effect – evidence **ca** and again **tulya-jāṭīyānām** (gen. belonging to, held by) equals, peers – those of some class (*The referent of this gen. term is amūḍhasya in 4.1.6, the learned class (=prāptānām in 2.2.47, =āpta in 2.1.52, =śabda-artha-vyavasthāna/sampratyaya in 2.1.55, =śabda-samūha in 2.2.60)*) **apraṭiṣedhaḥ** no denying

**7.9** From our instrumental cause and effect relation (of 3.2.69) comes our view of those alternate meanings, apart from the false (accounts). Ours is not one (a view) of mindlessness, just because we separate ourselves from those (scholars) who are characterized by the false (accounts), and so there is no denying (our premise) just by the evidence of the instrumental cause and effect (karma) held by those who are of that class of our (highborn) peers.

आत्मनित्यत्वे प्रेत्यभावसिद्धिः। व्यक्ताद्यक्तानां प्रत्यक्षप्रामाण्यात्। न घटाद्वटनिष्पत्तेः।  
व्यक्ताद्वटनिष्पत्तेरप्रतिषेधः।

(4.1.10) **ātma-nityatve** (loc. as) individual soul – constancy, perpetuity **pretyabhāva-siddhiḥ** state of existence having passed on – affirmation (4.1.11) **vyaktāt** (abl. from) manifestation **vyaktānām** (gen. of) manifestations **pratyakṣa-prāmāṇyāt** (abl. because) perception – validity (4.1.12) **na** not the case **ghaṭāt**

(abl. following from) pot, vessel (*metaphor for body*) **ghaṭa** – **aniṣpatteḥ** (abl. for) vessel – (*caus. sense*) no fashioning (4.1.13) **vyaktāt** (abl. by) manifestation **ghaṭa-niṣpatteḥ** (gen. of) vessel – fashioning **apraṭiṣedhaḥ** no denying

**7.10** There is their affirmation that there is a 'state of existence having passed on' (1.1.9, 19) as a (kind of) perpetuity of the soul, because from its manifestation they validate their perception of (past) manifestations; but this is not the case, for there is no such fashioning of a (soul's) vessel following from a (previous) vessel. There is no denying (our premise) just by their manifestation by fashioning a vessel.

अभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिर्नानुपमृद्य (प्रादुर्भावात्। व्याघातादप्रयोगः।) नातीतानागतयोः कार-  
कशब्दप्रयोगात्। न विनष्टेभ्योऽनिष्पत्तेः। क्रमनिर्देशादप्रतिषेधः।

(4.1.14) **abhāvāt** (abl. arising out of) state of non-presence **bhāva-utpattiḥ** view – arising / **na** not such that **anupamṛdya** (fut. pass. part.) never to be crushed, depressed (destroyed) (**prādur-bhāvāt** (see interpolation 3.2.15) (4.1.15) **vyāghātāt aprayogaḥ**; That (*anupamṛdya*) does not apply, being absurd because it is a manifestation (and therefore destructible). (4.1.16) **na** not **atīta-anāgatayoḥ** (loc. dual; in the sense of) past – future **kāraka-śabda -prayogāt** (abl. understood by) action words – applying (4.1.17) **na** not **vinaṣṭebhyaḥ** (abl. pl. out of) things destroyed **aniṣpatteḥ** (abl. because) no fashioning (4.1.18) **krama-nirdeśāt** (abl. by) series – dictating **apraṭiṣedhaḥ** no denying

**7.11** Our view (4.1.7) does *arise* out of a state where it is not present, but not such that it could never again be *depressed* (by *tamas*)—which is not to be understood by applying those action words (utpatti and upamṛdya) in the sense of past and future. This is not because there is *no* fashioning something anew out of (the atoms of) things that have previously been destroyed. There is no denying (our premise) just by their dictating a series (of incarnations).

The cycle of appearance and disappearance of realization of the subjectivist "theory of being" or view (*bhāva*), seemingly temporal but ever in the present and independent of time, is easy to experience but very difficult to describe. The languages of the world have evolved to describe a physical universe of time, space, and matter, and to virtually embody in our minds all the objective realities of human life. Sanskrit is no exception, so it is not surprising that this author's attempts to guide the reader to an understanding of the present-moment self-

creative reality are as awkward and easily misread as those of every other author who has tried it, ancient and modern. Here, he goes back and forth across the line between the inner layered reality without time, and the outer cycle of physical creation and destruction through time, diligently trying to cover both sides of the duality, so that both can be embraced as a union, a yoga. He has done this to some extent from the very beginning of the work.

ईश्वरः कारणं पुरुषकर्माफल्यदर्शनात्। न पुरुषकर्माभावे फलानिष्पत्तेः। तत्कारितत्वाद-  
हेतुः। अनिमित्ततो भावोत्पत्तिः

(4.1.19) **īśvaraḥ** supreme governor, (*not "God"*) **kāraṇam** cause **puruṣa-karma-aphalya**-(gen.)-**darśanāt** (abl. according to) personal karma – (fut.p.p. >caus.√phal) not to be brought to fruition – understanding (*or "according to the Darshana" ? cf. VD 1.9, YD 2.1*) (4.1.20) **na** not **puruṣa-karma - abhāve** (loc.) personal karma – without **phala-anīṣpatteḥ** (gen. of *ref.=darśana 4.1.19*) fruit – no fashioning (4.1.21) **tat-kāritatvāt** (abl. for) by that – would be caused **ahetuḥ** without grounds for knowledge (4.1.22) **animittataḥ** (ind.) without instrumental cause (*referring to the most recent mention in 4.1.9*) **bhāva-utpattiḥ** a being – coming into existence

**7.12 The supreme being (Īśvara) is our cause. This is according to our understanding of 'not brought to fruition by personal karma', not that (understanding) of 'no fashioning of fruit without personal karma'. That is without our grounds for knowledge, for then one would be caused by that (karma, and not Īśvara). The coming into existence of a (human) being happens without that instrumental cause (karma 4.1.9).**

The author's Īśvara is not the "God" we know from religious beliefs. It is rather the "inner" Īśvara we know from the other Darshanas.

कण्टकतैक्ष्ण्यादिदर्शनात्। अनिमित्तनिमित्तत्वान् नानिमित्ततः। निमित्तानिमित्तयोरर्था-  
न्तरभावादप्रतिषेधः।

(4.1.22 cont.) **kaṇṭaka-taiṣṇya-ādi-darśanāt** (abl. according to) thorns – sharpness – etc. – understanding (4.1.23) **animitta-nimitta-tvāt** (abl. just because) without cause – cause – being **na** not **animittataḥ** (ind.) no instrumental cause (4.1.24) **nimitta-animittayoḥ** (gen. dual; of) cause – no cause **artha-antara-**

**bhāvāt** (abl. by) meaning – other – view **apratīṣedhaḥ** no denying (*Again we see the confounded repetition, this time of the word "nimitta".*)

7.13 According to our understanding of the sharpness of thorns and the like, it is not a matter of no instrumental cause (of the pain), just because of the instrumental cause (of pain, the thorn) being without that instrumental cause (karma). There is no denying (our premise) just by the view of that other meaning of both instrumental cause (karma) and then no such instrumental cause (liberation).

सर्वमनित्यमुत्पत्तिविनाशधर्मकत्वात्। नानित्यतानित्यत्वात्। तदनित्यत्वमग्नेर्दाह्यम् वि-  
नाश्यानुविनाशवत्। नित्यस्याप्रत्याख्यानम्

(4.1.25) **sarvam** everyone **anityam** inconstant **utpatti-vināśa-dharmakatvāt** (abl. because) coming into existence – passing out of existence, extinction – its being the nature (4.1.26) **na** not the case **anityatā-nityatvāt** (abl. because) inconstancy – constancy (4.1.27) **tat-anityatvam** his – inconstancy **agneḥ** (gen. of) fire "Agni's" **dāhyam** "burning-ness", tendency to burn / **vināśya-anuvinaśavat** (vati like) to be extinguished – after extinction (*as little flames on a bed of burning coals will intermittently go out and re-ignite.*) (4.1.28) **nityasya** (gen. of) (*in the gen.*) the constant one **apratyākhyānam** no refutation

7.14 That the 'everyone' is inconstant, because of its being their nature to come into existence and then to pass out of existence, is not the case either, because of the very constancy of their inconstancy. Like that which remains to be extinguished (embers) even after extinguishing him, Agni's (constant) tendency to burn *is* (ironically) his inconstancy (as he consumes his own fuel), but this is no refutation of the constant one (Īśvara).

यथोपलब्धिव्यवस्थानात्। सर्वं नित्यम्प्रभूतनित्यत्वात्। नोत्पत्तिविनाशकारणोपलब्धेः।

तल्लक्षणावरोधादप्रतिषेधः। (नोत्पत्तितत्कारणोपलब्धेः।)

(4.1.28 cont.) **yathā** whatever (*ref.=pratyākhyāna*) **upalabdhi-vyavasthānāt** (abl. inferred or admitted by) observation – persevering (4.1.29) **sarvam** all **nityam** constant **pañca-bhūta-nityatvāt** (abl. because, "the reason is that") five – gross elements – constancy (4.1.30) **na** not valid **utpatti-vināśa-kāraṇa-upalabdheḥ** (abl. for) coming into existence – passing out of existence – cause



(recalls *īśvaraḥ kāraṇam* in 4.1.19) – observing (4.1.31) **tat-lakṣaṇa-avarodhāt** (abl. by) their – personal qualities – disallowing **apratīṣedhaḥ** no denying (4.1.32) (*na utpatti-tat-kāraṇa-upalabdheḥ*) (This is a repetition of 4.1.30. Tat would represent *vināśa*, but its position in the compound is odd.)

**7.15 Whatever (refutation) there might be that by our perseverance in that observation that the 'everyone' is constant, we admit to constancy of the five gross elements; that (refutation) is not valid, for we observe *our* cause (*īśvara* 4.1.19) of their coming into existence and passing out of existence, (so) it is not a denial (of our own premise) by disallowing personal qualities on their part.**

The idea is that the constancy of one's own awareness, *as* the awareness of the supreme governor, pervades all notions of creation and destruction, including birth and death. He allows that physical objects, said to consist of gross elements, come and go, but the awareness that gives rise to them through the sensory powers is constant. According to this observation, it is not the actual physical flame, but one's awareness of "burning" that is the real nature of fire and thus its cause.

Again it may be emphasized that this is philosophy and not science. Everyone knows the scientific explanation of combustion, but a devoted reader of material like this must surely be one who wishes to delve into a deeper examination of the essential truth of what it really *means* to say there is such a thing as knowledge or a knower of it. Indeed, any paradigm like that of pure scientific reasoning that dismisses the value of such an examination out of hand wouldn't even count as philosophical knowledge. Nor should it be expected to, for this examination is outside the scope of scientific investigation.

न व्यवस्थानोपपत्तेः। सर्वं पृथग्भावलक्षणं पृथक्त्वात्। नानेकलक्षणैरेकभावनिष्पत्तेः। लक्षणव्यवस्थानादेवाप्रतिषेधः।

(4.1.33) **na** not **vyavasthāna-upapatteḥ** (abl. known by) perseverance – evidence (4.1.34) **sarvam** everyone **pr̥thak-bhāva-lakṣaṇa-pr̥thaktvāt** (abl. known from) distinct individual – view – qualities – individuality (4.1.35) **na** not **aneka-lakṣaṇaiḥ** (inst. pl. assessed by means of) several – qualities **eka-bhāva-niṣpatteḥ** (abl. for) one – view – fashioning (4.1.36) **lakṣaṇa-vyavasthānāt** (abl. by) qualities – persevering **eva** only **apratīṣedhaḥ** no denying

7.16 The 'everyone' known from the individuality of human qualities (found) in the view of (many) distinct individuals is not known by the evidence of our perseverance. That (individuality) is not assessed by means of its several qualities, for it is a matter of the 'fashioning' (4.1.13) found in our view of the *one* (being). There is no denying (our premise) just by persevering only in the (division of human) qualities.

सर्वमभावो भावेष्वितरेतराभावसिद्धेः। न स्वभावसिद्धेर्भावानाम्। न स्वभावसिद्धेरापेक्षित्वात्। व्याहतत्वादयुक्तम्।

(4.1.37) **sarvam** the everyone (*Some of these terms read best as labels for the concepts being discussed, so I have used single quotes to emphasize that sense, without indicating an actual "iti" quotation.*) **abhāvaḥ** not existent (*Any translation like "all are non-entities" is absurd.*) **bhāveṣu** (loc. in the sense of) beings / **itare tara -abhāva-siddheḥ** (abl. for) one with respect to the other – empty affirmation (4.1.38) **na** not **svabhāva-siddheḥ** (abl. by) self-existence – affirming **bhāvānām** (gen. belonging to) beings (4.1.39) **na** nor **svabhāva-siddheḥ** (abl. inferring from) self-existence – affirmation **āpekṣikatvāt** (abl. by) tendency of "looking around", considering (others) (4.1.40) **vyāhatatvāt** (abl. because) an idea "struck aside" as nonsense, absurdity **ayuktam** incompatible

7.17 Our 'everyone' does not exist in the sense of 'beings' (plural), for that is just the empty affirmation of the 'one (soul) with respect to another' (view). It is not by any affirmation that one's own self-existence belongs (also) to those beings, nor by a tendency to see that (self-existence) all around, inferring it from the affirmation of one's own self-existence. Because of its absurdity, this is incompatible with that (concept of "self-existence").

संख्यैकान्तसिद्धिः कारणानुपपत्त्युपपत्तिभ्याम्। न कारणावयवभावात्। निरवयवत्वाद-हेतुः।

(4.1.41) **sāṃkhyā-ekānta-asiddhiḥ** reckoning numbers – exclusive – no affirmation **kāraṇa-anupapatti-upapattibhyām** (abl. known by) cause – not evident – evident (4.1.42) **na** not **kāraṇa-avayava-bhāvāt** (abl. known by) cause – subdivisions – view (4.1.43) **niravayavatvāt** (abl. known from) state of being without subdivisions **ahetuḥ** lacking grounds

**7.18 There can be no affirmation of their reckoning of numbers (of souls) as the only way. That (self-existence) is known by our cause (īśvara 4.1.19, 30 being evident vs. not being evident, not by the view of subdivisions of that cause. We know from the state of being without any subdivisions, that such (a view) lacks our grounds for knowledge.**

The view of the self-existence of others fades to nothing, deep into the examination of one's own self-existence, but *only* there. That place is a profound and very real dimension of existence, but it is ultimately private and has no practical application in ordinary life. This must have been just as clear to the authors of the Darshanās as it is to us. One doesn't proceed through daily life thinking about the souls of others. Both self-examination and the examination of scientific explanations for things require special deliberate attention in their own time, apart from the daily routine of life.

## 8.)

सद्यः कालान्तरे च फलनिष्पत्तेः संशयः। न सद्यः कालान्तरोपभोग्यत्वात्। कालान्तरे-  
णानिष्पत्तिर्हेतुविनाशात्। प्राङ्निष्पत्तेः (वृक्षफलवत्तत्स्यात्!)

(4.1.44) **sadyaḥ** right away, at the very moment **kāla-antare** (ind.) after a period of time **ca** and **phala-niṣpatteḥ** (abl. because) fruit – fashioning **saṁśayaḥ** uncertainty (4.1.45) **na** not **sadyaḥ** in the moment **kāla-antara-upabhogyatvāt** (abl. because) time – period – to be enjoyed (4.1.46) **kāla-antareṇa** (inst. ind.) after a period of time **aniṣpattiḥ** no fashioning **hetu-vināśāt** (abl. because) grounds for knowledge – nullification (4.1.47) **prāñc-niṣpatteḥ** (abl. by) ahead of time – fashioning (*vṛkṣa-phalavat tat syāt; vati+tat+syāt like the interp. 3.2.71*)

**8.1 There is uncertainty because any fashioning (incarnation) as the fruit of that (cause) must be in the moment, and after a period of time. That (incarnation) cannot be in the moment, because (the expectation of) what is to be enjoyed would be after a period of time, (yet) one does not fashion it after a period of time, because one's whole grounds for knowledge would be nullified by (the corollary) fashioning ahead of time (in the cycle).**

नासन्न सन्न सदसत्सदसतोर्वैधर्म्यात्। उत्पादव्ययदर्शनात्। बुद्धिसिद्धं तु तदसत्। आश्रय-  
व्यतिरेकाद् वृक्षफलोत्पत्तिवदित्यहेतुः। प्रीतेरात्माश्रयत्वादप्रतिषेधः।

(4.1.48) **na** not **asat** non-enduring **na** not **sat** enduring **na** neither **sat-asat** both enduring and non-enduring **sat-asatoḥ** (loc. dual between) enduring – non-enduring **vaidharmyāt** (abl. because) inconsistency (4.1.49) **utpāda-vyaya-darśanāt** (abl. from) coming forth – passing away – seeing (4.1.50) **buddhi-siddham** understanding – affirmation **tu** however **tat** after all **asat** not enduring (4.1.51) **āśraya-vyatirekāṭ** (abl. because) seat – exclusion, separation **vṛkṣa-phala-utpattivat** (vati like) tree – fruit – coming into existence **iti** to say that **ahetuḥ** without grounds for knowledge (4.1.52) **prīteḥ** (abl. by) satisfaction, joy **ātma-āśrayatvāt** (abl. due to) soul – its being the seat **apratīṣedhaḥ** no denying

8.2 'That (incarnation) is not non-enduring, yet it is not enduring, (but) neither can it be both enduring and non-enduring, because of the inconsistency between enduring and not enduring.' By seeing both its coming forth and its passing away, however, one would affirm his understanding that it is, after all, not enduring, (but) because that would mean separation of the seat (the bodily incarnation, from the soul), the saying that it is "like the coming into existence of the fruit of a tree", is not our grounds for knowledge. There is no denying (our premise) just by the notion that its (the incarnation's) joy is due to its being the seat of one's (advanced) soul.

न पुत्रपशुस्त्रीपरिच्छदहिरण्यान्नादिफलनिर्देशात्। तत्सम्बन्धात्फलनिष्पत्तेस्तेषु फलवदु-  
पचारः। विविधबाधनायोगाद्दुःखमेव जन्मोत्पत्तिः।

(4.1.53) **na** not the case **putra-paśu-strī-paricchada-hiraṇya-anna-ādi-phala-nirdeśāt** (abl. just because) sons – cattle – wives – household – money – food – etc. – fruits – dictating (4.1.54) **tat** it is so **sambandhāt** (abl. according to) their – kinship / **phala-niṣpatteḥ** (abl. by) fruit – fashioning **teṣu** (loc. if) those **phalavat** (vati like) **upacāraḥ** figuratively (4.1.55) **vividha-bādhana-**(gen.)-**yogāt** (abl. because) various – frustrations – association **duḥkham** suffering **eva** indeed, actually **janma-utpattiḥ** birth – coming into existence

8.3 That (notion of joy as 'fruit') is not the case, just because they dictate that sons, cattle, wives, household, money, food, etc. are fruits (of karma). It is

so, according to the (religious) kinship, (but) if those things are by some 'fashioning' of fruit, it means only *like* fruit, figuratively. Indeed, because of the association of various frustrations, the coming into existence by birth is actually suffering.

न सुखस्य (अपि MUM) आन्तरालनिष्पत्तेः। बाधनानिर्वृत्तेर्वेदयतः पर्येषणदोषादप्रति-  
षेधः। दुःखविकल्पे सुखाभिमानाच्च।

(4.1.56) **na** not **sukhasya** (gen. of; *ref.*=*yogāt*) happiness **api** even **āntarāla-  
niṣpatteḥ** (gen. for) possessed of the inner realm (*the aṇ vikārārthaka taddhita  
termination*) – fashioning (4.1.57) **bādhana-nirvṛtteḥ** (abl. since) frustration –  
cessation (= *nirvṛtteḥ*) **vedayataḥ** (√vid (transitive) caus.pres.3rd.dual) those two  
cause one to find them, i.e., "show themselves" (= *darśayataḥ* in BS 9.18) //  
**paryeṣaṇa-doṣāt** (abl. by) striving after – fault, mistake **apraṭiṣedhaḥ** no denying  
(4.1.58) **duḥkha-vikalpe** (loc. in the midst of) suffering – diversity **sukha-  
abhimānāt** (abl. by) happiness – mistaken conception **ca** and

**8.4** There is not even any (association) of the fashioning of happiness for one who is possessed of his inner realm, (but) since that is just the cessation of his frustration, both show themselves. There is no denying (our premise) by the false (account of) striving after it, and by the false conception of happiness in the midst of all the diversity of suffering.

ऋणक्लेशप्रवृत्त्यनुबन्धात् (अपवर्गाभावः।) प्रधानशब्दानुपपत्तेर्गुणशब्देनानुवादो निन्दाप्र-  
शंसोपपत्तेः। (अधिकाराच्च विधानं विद्यान्तरवत्। Vb) समारोपणादात्मन्यप्रतिषेधः।

(पात्रचयान्तानुपपत्तेश्च MUM) (फलाभावः। MUM)

(4.1.59) **ṛṇa-kleṣa-pravṛtti-anubandhāt** (abl. since) the three obligations – struggle – account – incidental attachment (*apavarga-abhāvaḥ*) (4.1.60) **pradhāna-śabda-anupapatteḥ** principal, prime – word, sound – not evident **guṇa-śabdena** (inst. by way of) secondary, subordinate – word, teaching (*like guṇakarman MW*) **anuvādaḥ** explanation **nindā-praśamsā-upapatteḥ** (abl.) reproach – praise – evident by (*adhiḥkārāt ca vidhānam vidyā-antaravat*) (4.1.61) **samāropanāt** (abl. by) (*fr. caus. of √ruḥ to grow*) causing to ascend, having an advancing effect **ātmani** (loc. on) individual self, soul **apraṭiṣedhaḥ** no denying (4.1.62) **pātra-caya – anta-anupapatteḥ** (abl. by) masters – assemblage (*This*

*pun* also reads, "a bunch of (soul) vessels".) – boundaries (See *vibhakti-antāḥ* in 2.2.58.) – without evidence *ca* and (*phala-abhāvaḥ*)

**8.5** Since that (frustration) is just an incidental attachment to the account of struggle though the (three) obligations (outlined in the *smṛti*), that ('struggle') explanation, evident by the reproach vs. praise (method) known by way of the subordinate 'word' (the *smṛti*), is due the prime word (*om*) *not* being evident. There is no denying (our premise) by (the view of) that (obligation) having an advancing effect on one's soul, and by the 'boundaries' (of souls, see 2.2.58) held by the assemblage of masters, without any evidence.

सुषुप्तस्य स्वप्नादर्शने क्लेशाभाववदपवर्गः। न प्रवृत्तिः प्रतिसंधानाय हीनक्लेशस्य। न क्लेश-  
संततेः स्वाभाविकत्वात्। प्रागुत्पत्तेरभावानित्यत्ववत्स्वाभाविकेऽप्यनित्यत्वम्।

(4.1.63) *suṣuptasya* (gen. for) one who is asleep (*a pun* on *svapna*) *svapna-adarśane* (loc. where) dreaming – no experience of *kleśa-abhāvavat* (vati as if) struggle – absence *apavargaḥ* state after final release (4.1.64) *na* not *pravṛttiḥ* account of life *pratisaṁdhānāya* (dat. for the purpose of) "back-together-putting", rebuilding *hīna-kleśasya* (gen. on the part of) inadequacy – one who struggles (4.1.65) *na* nor *kleśa-saṁtateḥ* (gen. one of) struggle – continuous *svābhāvikatvāt* (abl. ind) as being the nature of one's existence (4.1.66) *prāṇ-utpatteḥ* (gen. of) before-birth state (see 2.2.12) *abhāva-anityatvavat* (vati like, as if) absence – impermanence *svābhāvike\_āpi* (loc. w/āpi even though) nature of existence *anityatvam* impermanence

**8.6** For one who is asleep (to the truth), there is (the notion of) a state *after* final release, as if there were a (permanent) absence of struggle, where one doesn't even experience dreaming, (but) our account of life is not for the purpose of a 'rebuilding' on the part of one who struggles through his inadequacy, nor of the continuous struggle (itself) as being the very nature of one's existence. (Conversely,) there would be impermanence of one's *before-birth* state (see 2.2.12), as if that absence (of struggle) were not permanent, even though *that* (absence) should then be the very nature of one's existence.

(अणुश्यामतानित्यत्ववद्वा॥) न संकल्पनिमित्तत्वाच्च रागादीनाम्। दोषनिमित्तानां तत्त्व-  
ज्ञानादहंकारनिवृत्तिः। दोषनिमित्तं रूपादयो विषयाः संकल्पकृताः। तन्निमित्तं त्ववयव्य-  
भिमानः।

[ (4.1.67) *aṇu śyāmatā-nityatvavat vā; The alternative is that like the constancy of the blackness (of space,) so is the atomic (constant). (see interpolation 3.2.71)* (4.1.68) **na** not **saṁkalpa-nimittatvāt** (abl. due to) deliberate acts – instrumental cause **ca** also **rāgādīnām** (gen. of) passion etc. (4.2.1) **doṣa-nimittānām** (gen. of) faults – instrumental causes **tattva-jñānāt** (abl. by) essence – true comprehension **ahaṁkāra-nivṛttiḥ** personal identity, ego – turning away from (4.2.2) **doṣa-nimittam** fault – instrumental cause **rūpādayaḥ** forms etc. **viśayāḥ** spheres of experience **saṁkalpa-kṛtāḥ** things deliberately done (4.2.3) **tat-nimittam\_tu** those – instrumental cause – but really, "the true" **avayavi-abhimānaḥ** having parts, subdivided but whole – mistaken conception

8.7 That (nature of one's existence) is not also due to that (struggle) being the instrumental cause of one's deliberate acts of passion etc. It is by true comprehension of the essence of the instrumental causes of such faults that one turns away from that (passion etc.) of his personal identity (ego). This instrumental cause of his inadequacy would be the forms etc. (he has taken), the spheres (of life) he has experienced, and the acts he has deliberately done; but the true instrumental cause of it is rather his mistaken conception of a subdivided whole (of humanity)

विद्याविद्याद्वैविध्यात् संशयः। तदसंशयः पूर्वहेतुप्रसिद्धत्वात्। वृत्त्यनुपपत्तेरपि तर्हि न  
संशयः। कृत्स्नैकदेशावृत्तित्वादवयवानामवयव्यभावः।

(4.2.4) **vidyā-avidyā-dvaividhyāt** (abl. due to) profound knowledge – lacking profound knowledge – twofold nature **saṁśayaḥ** uncertainty (4.2.5) **tat** then **asaṁśayaḥ** no uncertainty **pūrva-hetu-prasiddhatvāt** (abl. ind. as) as before, again – basis of knowledge – being (becoming) well-established (4.2.6) **vṛtti-anupapatteḥ** pursuit of life – lacking evidence **api** surely **tarhi** when it is / **na** no **saṁśayaḥ** uncertainty (4.2.7) **kṛtsna-ekadeśa-avṛttitvāt** entirety – single individual – there being no such life **avayavānām** (gen. on the part of) subdivisions **avayavi-abhāvaḥ** subdivided whole – no such thing

8.8 Due to the twofold nature of having the profound knowledge and then not having the profound knowledge, there is uncertainty about it, and then no uncertainty, as our grounds for knowledge becomes thoroughly established again. When it is (established), since that (grounds of knowledge) is surely lacking any evidence of such a (faulty) life, one has no uncertainty that there is no such thing as a subdivided whole, because of that (grounds) being without any such (faulty) life on the part of (human) subdivisions as single individuals within the entirety (of humanity).

तेषु चावृत्तेरवयव्यभावः। पृथक् चावयवेभ्योऽवृत्तेः। न चावयव्यवयवाः। एकस्मिन्नेदा-  
भावाद्भेदशब्दप्रयोगानुपपत्तेरप्रश्नः।

(4.2.8) *teṣu* (instr. along with) them *ca* and *avṛtteḥ* (abl. since) without such life *avayavi-abhāvaḥ* subdivided whole – no such thing (4.2.9) *prṛthak* (ind. as) an individual *ca* and *avayavebhyah* (abl. apart from) subdivisions *avṛtteḥ* (abl. because) no way of life (4.2.10) *na\_ca* indeed not *avayavi-avayavāḥ* subdivided whole – subdivisions (4.2.11) *ekasmin* (instr. along with) the one *bheda-abhāvāt* (abl. since) partition – not existing *bheda-śabda-prayoga-anupapatteḥ* (abl. for) partition – scripture – applying – not evidence *apraśnaḥ* in the absence of inquiry

8.9 Since one is without any such (faulty) life *along with* those (subdivisions), and since one is without any such (faulty) life even as an individual *apart* from any subdivisions, it is indeed not a matter of subdivisions of a subdivided whole. Since the partition does not exist along with the one (being), that (theory of subdivisions) appears in the absence of our (private) inquiry, for that (inquiry) is not considered to be (proper) evidence when applying the scripture on partition (the *smṛti*).

अवयवान्तराभावेऽप्यवृत्तेरहेतुः। केशसमूहे तैमिरिकोपलब्धिवत्तदुपलब्धिः। स्वविषयान-  
तिक्रमेणोन्द्रियस्य पटुमन्दभावाद्विषयग्रहणस्य

(4.2.12) *avayava-antara-abhāve\_api* (loc. w/api even ... still) subdivision – inner – without considering the view *avṛtteḥ* (abl. because) without the life *ahetuḥ* no grounds for knowledge (4.2.13) *keśa-samūhe* (loc. in) (dark) hairs – bunch (*assuming the author and his audience had dark hair*) *taimirika-upalabdhiḥ* (vati like) dark-colored (*one of the miscellaneous hak terminations*,



"colored") – observing **tat-upalabdhiḥ** such – observation (4.2.14) **svaviṣaya-anatikrameṇa** (instr. ind.) self-sphere – without stepping beyond (=vyatireka) **indriyasya** (gen. belonging to) sense **paṭu-manda-bhāvāt** (abl. ind.) sharp – dull – view **viṣaya-grahaṇasya** (gen. belonging to) object sphere – personal apprehension

**8.10** Even without considering the view of our *inner* subdivision (of essential constituents, etc.) that (scripture) is still no grounds for knowledge, because one is without any such (faulty) life. The observation of such (a life among others) would be like observing, in a bunch of (dark-colored) hair, a dark-colored one. Without stepping beyond the self-sphere, that (observation) belongs to one's *sense* (of sight), but according to the view of the sharp vs. the dull (non-mindless vs. mindless 4.1.6), it belongs only to one's (limited) personal apprehension in the object sphere.

तथाभावो नाविषये प्रवृत्तिः। अवयवावयविप्रसङ्गश्चैवमाप्रलयात्। न प्रयलोऽणुसद्भावात्।

(परं वा त्रुटेः।) आकाशव्यतिभेदात्तदनुपपत्तिः।

(4.2.14 cont.) **tathā** according to that **abhāvaḥ** without substance / **na** neither **aviṣaye** (loc. ind.) without the object sphere **pravṛttiḥ** account of life (4.2.15) **avayava-avayavi-prasaṅgaḥ** subdivisions – whole – happens **ca** moreover **evam** exactly, just so **ā-pralayāt** (abl. ind.) up to the point of – dissolution (4.2.16) **na** not **prayaḥ** dissolution **aṇu-sat-bhāvāt** (abl. according to) atoms – primary reality ((4.2.17) *param\_vā truteḥ; the alternative being that it is of the atom. see interpolations 3.2.71, 4.1.67*) (4.2.18) **ākāśa**-(gen.)-**vyati-bhedāt** (abl. because) ether – going beyond – partition **tat-anupapattiḥ** that – failure of evidence

**8.11** According to that (object sphere), that (self sphere) has no substance and neither does our account of life without the object sphere. Moreover, our occupation with that (life) as a whole with its subdivisions, just as it is, only happens up to the point of its dissolution, and that dissolution can *not* happen according to the view of the (primary) reality of atoms. That (view) fails because, going beyond that, there would then be partition of the ether.

आकाशासर्वगतत्वं वा। अन्तर्बहिश्च कार्यद्रव्यस्य कारणान्तरवचनादकार्ये। तदभावः।

शब्दसंयोगविभवाच्च सर्वगतम्।

(4.2.19) **ākāśa** -(gen.)- **asarvagatatvam** for the ether – no universality, not "going" (applying) for everyone (*Sarva maintains the sense of "everyone" here.*) **vā** alternatively (4.2.20) **antaḥ** inner **bahiḥ** outer **ca** and **kārya-dravyasya** (gen. for) effect – physical reality // **kāraṇa-antara-vacanāt** (abl. according to) cause – inner – teaching (*Antaḥ-kāraṇa SD 3.9 is less ambiguous.*) **akārye** (loc. ind.) with nothing to be caused **tat-abhāvaḥ** that (*Tat has the same referent as it did in 4.2.18, "aṇu-sat-bhāva".*) no such thing (4.2.21) **śabda-saṃyoga-vibhavāt** (abl. according to) scripture – joining together – preeminence (*śabda refers to bheda-śabda of 4.2.11.*) **ca** and **sarva-gatam** going for everyone

**8.12** The (third see 4.2.35-38) alternative is that the 'everyone' does not apply for the ether, (but rather) for the physical reality as its effect, both inner and outer, (i.e.) both according to the teaching that that (ether) is the inner cause, yet with nothing to be caused, which is without that (atomic) view, and according to the preeminent authority joining together in that scripture (the *smṛti*), that that (view of the primacy of atoms) applies for everyone; ...

अव्यूहाविष्टम्भविभुत्वानि चाकाशधर्माः। मूर्तिमतां च संस्थानोपपत्तेरवयवसद्भावः।

(संयोगोपपत्तेश्च) अनवस्थाकारित्वादनवस्थानुपपत्तेश्चाप्रतिषेधः।

(4.2.22) **avyūha-aviṣṭambha-vibhutvāni** without structure, without support, the being causative of what is manifest (*see √vibhū caus. MW, also vibhāvana*) **ca** both/and **ākāśa**-(gen.)-**dharmāḥ** ether – essential qualities (4.2.23) **mūrtimatām** (gen. of) incarnations (*ref.=dharmāḥ in 4.2.22*) **ca** both/and **saṃsthāna-upapatteḥ** (abl. known by) physical forms – evidence **avayava-sat-bhāvaḥ** subdivisions – primary reality – view [(4.2.24) **saṃyoga-upapatteḥ ca**] (4.2.25) **anavasthā-kāritvāt** (abl. by) transience – the notion of an agent **anavasthā-anupapatteḥ** (abl. by) transience – failed evidence **ca** and **apratishedhaḥ** no denying

**8.13** ... (i.e.) both that those essential qualities of the ether are its being without an ordered structure, without external support, and causative of whatever is manifest, and that those (essential qualities) of incarnations are known by the evidence of their physical forms, which is the view of the primary reality of subdivisions. There is no denying (our premise) by (the notion of) being the agent of one's own transience, and by the failed evidence that there even is transience.

बुद्ध्या विवेचनात्तु भावानां याथात्म्यानुपलब्दिस्तत्त्वपकर्षणे पटसद्भावानुपलब्धिवत्तदनुप-  
लब्धिः। व्याहतत्वादहेतुः।

(4.2.26) **buddhyā** (inst. by means of) intellect **vivecanāt** (abl. coming from) distinguishing **tu** however **bhāvānām** (gen of) beings **yāthātmya-anupalabdhīḥ** the real nature or essence – lacking observation (*This serves as an insight into exactly what the author means by the ubiquitous term "upalabdhi", in that buddhyā vivacana is a kind of upalabdhi.*) // **tantu-apakarṣaṇe** (loc. when) warp threads (*in this context of paṭa and apakarṣaṇa taken literally, it is not "web fibers"*) – pulling out **paṭa-sat-bhāva-anupalabdhivat** (vati like) woven material – primary reality – failure to observe **tat-anupalabdhīḥ** that – failure to observe (4.2.27) **vyāhatatvāt** (abl. because) absurdity **ahetuḥ** without grounds

**8.14 But it (the notion of transience) lacks the kind of observation of the true nature of those beings that comes from distinguishing it by means of one's own intellectual power. The failure to observe that (primacy of intellect) is like the failure to observe the primary reality in cloth (on the loom) when pulling out the warp threads (the foundation). Because of it's absurdity, that (notion of transience) is not our grounds for knowledge.**

तदाश्रयत्वादपृथग्रहणम्। प्रमाणतश्चार्थप्रतिपत्तेः। प्रमाणानुपपत्त्युपपत्तिभ्याम्।

(4.2.28) **tat-āśrayatvāt** (abl. arising from) that – being the seat **apṛthak** (ind.) without separation (*I do not read this as compounded with grahana: "no separate understanding".*) **grahaṇam** personal apprehension (4.2.29) **pramāṇataḥ** (tasil according to) validation **ca** and **artha-pratipatteḥ** (abl. arising from) meaning – understanding (4.2.30) **pramāṇa-anupapatti-upapattibhyām** (abl dual by) validation – missing the evidence – having evidence (*Perhaps there is some text missing here.*)

**8.15 There is the personal apprehension 1.) arising from being the seat (body) of that (intellect) without separation from it, and 2.) arising from understanding the meaning according to our validation, (i.e.,) by either missing the evidence or having the evidence of our validation (respectively).**

स्वप्नविषयाभिमानवदयं प्रमाणप्रमेयाभिमानः। मायागन्धर्वनगरमृगतृष्णिकावद्वा। हेत्व-  
भावादसिद्धिः। स्मृतिसंकल्पवच्च स्वप्नविषयाभिमानः।

(4.2.31) **svapna-viṣaya-abhimānavat** (vati like) dream – sphere, world – self-conception **ayam** (w/vati) this too (*ayam stands out here. It has the sense of "this" reality right here before our eyes.*) **pramāṇa-prameya-abhimānaḥ** validation – to be validated – self-conception (4.2.32) **māyā -gandharva-nagara- mṛga-tṛṣṇikāvat** (vati like) (ibc) illusory image of: – heavenly singers – city – a "seeking" (water) thirst, a mirage **vā** on the other hand (4.2.33) **hetu-abhāvāt** (abl. due to) grounds for knowledge – absence **asiddhiḥ** no affirmation (4.2.34) **smṛti-saṁkalpavat** (vati like) memory – imagination **ca** and then **svapna-viṣaya-abhimānaḥ** dream – sphere, world – self-conception

**8.16** Like a self-conception in a dream world, this (world) too is a self-conception that arises according to our (definition of) 'validation and what is to be validated'. On the other hand, 'like the illusory image of the city of the Gandharvas, or a mirage', there may be no affirmation (of our validation) due to the absence of our grounds for knowledge, and then it (actually) is just a self-conception in a dream world, just like memory or imagination is.

मिथ्योपलब्धेर्विनाशस्तत्त्वज्ञानात् स्वप्नविषयाभिमानप्रणाशवत् प्रतिबोधे। बुद्धेश्चैवं निमित्तसद्भावोपलम्भात्। तत्त्वप्रधानभेदाच्च मिथ्याबुद्धेर्द्वैविध्योपपत्तिः।

(4.2.35) **mithyā** wrongly **upalabdheḥ** (gen. of, with) observing **vināśaḥ** destruction of (w/gen.), doing away with **tattva-jñānāt** (abl. by) essence – true comprehension / **svapna-viṣaya-abhimāna-praṇāśavat** (vati like) dream – world – self-conception – disappearance **pratibodhe** (loc. upon) waking (4.2.36) **buddheḥ** (abl. by) understanding **ca** and **evam** the way it actually is **nimitta-sat-bhāva-upalambhāt** (abl. by) instrumental cause – primary reality – observation (4.2.37) **tattva-pradhāna – bhedāt** (abl. w/ mithyā; compared to) essence – (ifc) having as its head – partition **ca** moreover **mithyā** wrongly **buddheḥ** (abl. since) understanding **dvaividhya-upapattiḥ** dual nature – evidence

**8.17** One does away with observing wrongly (like that) 1.) by true comprehension of the essence, and, 2.) like the disappearance of one's dream-world self-conception upon waking, by understanding the way things actually

are by the observation that *that* primary ('waking') reality is the instrumental cause. Moreover, 3.) since that (alone) is understanding wrongly, compared to that partition having our essence as its head, the evidence *is* of a dual nature.

These three clearly correspond to the threefold "sāmyama" of YD 6.7, 6.9, and 6.8 respectively

समाधिविशेषाभ्यासात्। नार्थविशेषप्राबल्यात्। क्षुदादिभिः प्रवर्तनाच्च। पूर्वकृतफलानु-  
बन्धात्तदुत्पत्तिः। अरण्यगुहापुलिनादिषु योगाभ्यासोपदेशः।

(4.2.38) **samādhi-viśeṣa-abhyāsāt** (abl. accomplished by) contemplation – particular kind of – repeating (4.2.39) **na** not **artha-viśeṣa-prābalyāt** (abl. by) particular – object – predominance (4.2.40) **kṣud-ādibhiḥ** (inst. including) hunger etc. **pravartanāt** (abl. by) proceeding with life **ca** and also (4.2.41) **pūrva-kṛta-phala-anubandhāt** (abl. known by) previously – created – development – incidental attachment **tat-utpattiḥ** that – evidence (4.2.42) **araṇya-guhā-pulinādiṣu** (loc. in) forests – caves – river banks **yoga-abhyāsa-upadeśaḥ** union – discipline – teaching

8.18 By the discipline of repeating this particular (threefold) contemplation—but not by predominance of the particular object—and also by proceeding with life as usual, by (attending to) hunger, etc., the evidence of that (life) becomes known by its incidental attachment as an outward development of the previously created (individual self). This is the discipline of Yoga they teach in the forest, in the caves, and on the banks of the river (Ganges). (See gaṅgā and yoga sādhanā 2.2.62.)

## 9.) Equivalents

अपवर्गेऽप्येवं प्रसङ्गः। न निष्पन्नावश्यम्भावित्वात्। तदभावश्चापवर्गे। तदर्थं यमनियमा-  
भ्यामात्मसंस्कारो योगाच्चाध्यात्मविध्युपायैः।

(4.2.43) **apavarge api** (loc. with api; hypothetical, "even though ... it would be") done with **evam** exactly as it is **prasaṅgaḥ** occupation (4.2.44) **na** not the case **niṣpanna-avaśyam** fashioned – not according to will (*Avaśyam as an indeclinable adverb means "necessarily", which is derived from its literal meaning, "not by will", something predetermined as opposed to being by free will.*)

**bhāvitvāt** (abl. just because) inevitability (4.2.45) **tat-abhāvaḥ** it – not existing **ca** also **apavarge** (loc. when) done with (4.2.46) **tat-artham** to that end **yama-niyamābhyām** (abl. according to) prohibitions – rules, vows **ātma-saṁskāraḥ** soul – (constructing) the perfect / **yogāt** (abl. according to) the yoga teaching **ca** even **adhyātma-vidhi-upāyairḥ** (inst. by means of) supreme spirit – (*√vidhā seems more likely than √vidh with adhyātma.*) worshipping – methods

9.1 Even though one would be done with it, there is the occupation with life exactly as it is, (but) it is not the case that, just because of it's inevitability, that (life) which is thus fashioned is not according to one's will. There is also (the notion) that it would *not* exist when one is done with it. To that end, one would construct the perfect (karmic) soul according to prohibitions and vows, and even, according to the yoga (cf. Īśvara, obstacles YD), by methods of worshipping a supreme human spirit.

ज्ञानग्रहणाभ्यासः तद्विद्यैश्च सह संवादः। तं शिष्यगुरुसब्रह्मचारिविशिष्टश्रेयोऽर्थिभिरन-  
सूयभिरभ्युपेत्यात्। प्रतिपक्षहीनमपि वा

(4.2.47) **jñāna-grahaṇa-abhyāsaḥ** true comprehension – personal apprehension – discipline **tat** thus **vidyairḥ** (inst. within) paths of higher knowledge, philosophies **ca** in addition to **saha-saṁvādaḥ** in community – conversation with (among) (4.2.48) **tam** (acc. *the object of abhyupeya*) such **śiṣya-guru-sabrahmacāri** – **viśiṣṭa-śreyas-arthibhiḥ** (instr. with, in the company of) students – "heavies" masters – fellow brahmacarins – distinguished – the better (life) – those who desire **anasūyubhiḥ** not disdainful **abhyupeyāt** to be approached or taken up (4.2.49) **pratipakṣa-hīnam** (ind.) in the absence of an adversary **api** even **vā** or

9.2 That discipline of personal apprehension through true comprehension is thus in addition to a discussion within the community of these philosophies, for such (a discussion) is to be taken up in the company of students, masters, or fellow brahmacarins, whether distinguished or just desiring something better; with any who are not disdainful (of us); or even in the absence of an adversary.

प्रयोजनार्थमर्थित्वे। तत्त्वाध्यवसायसंरक्षणार्थं जल्पवितण्डे वीजप्ररोहसंरक्षणार्थं कण्टक-  
शाखावरणवत्। (ताभ्यां विगृह्य कथनम्। MUM) उपसंहारे

(4.2.49 cont.) **prayojana-artham** motivation – for the purpose of **arthitve** (loc. when) state of desire (4.2.50) **tattva-adhyavasāya-saṁrakṣaṇa-artham** essence – firm resolve – safeguarding, preservation, protection – for the purpose of **jalpa-vitaṇḍe** (loc. when) prattle – pointlessly argumentative **vīja-praroha-saṁrakṣaṇa-artham** (=bīja) seed – sprouting, sprout – safeguarding – purpose **kaṇṭaka-śākhā-āvaraṇavat** thorn – branch – concealing (4.2.50) **tābhyām** (inst. dual) those two **vigṛhya** (ind. part.) having disengaged **kathanam** telling, relating **upasaṁhāre** (loc. when) conclusion, end

9.3 When there is the state of desire (for something better), that (discussion) is for the purpose of motivation. When there is just argumentative prattle (by the disdainful adversary) it is for the purpose of the protection of one's firm resolve toward the essence (of knowledge), like a screen of thorny branches for the purpose of protecting the sprouting seed (of knowledge). When that (discussion) is at a conclusion, with those two (factions) having disengaged, there is the telling (of the argument), as follows:

Again, he obliquely recalls the threefold process: the declaration without proof, the proof by examination, and the conclusion on the basis of the examination.

(साधर्म्यवैधर्म्योत्कर्षापकर्षवर्ण्यवर्ण्यविकल्पसाध्यप्राप्त्यप्राप्तिप्रसङ्गप्रतिद्वष्टान्तनुत्पत्तिसं-  
शयप्रकरणहेत्वर्थापत्त्यविशेषोपपत्त्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिनित्यानित्यकार्यसमाः। साधर्म्यवै-  
धर्म्यभ्याम्)

[(5.1.1) *sādharmya-vaidharmya-utkarṣa-apakarṣa-varṇya-avarṇya-vikalpa-sādhyā-prāpti-aprāpti-prasaṅga-pratidṛṣṭānta-anutpatti-saṁśaya-prakaraṇa-hetu-arthāpatti-aviśeṣa-upapatti-upalabdhī-anupalabdhī-nitya-anitya-kārya-samāḥ* (5.1.2) *sādharmya-vaidharmyābhyām* (This is just another list, the last two sama's of which are made up by the commenter! The commenter to the Yoga does the same thing in its opening sutras.)

तद्धर्मविपर्ययोपपत्तेः साध्यम्यवैधर्म्यसमौ। गोत्वाद्गोसिद्धिवत्तत्सिद्धिः। साध्यदृष्टान्तयोर्ध-  
र्मविकल्पादुभयसाध्यत्वात् च

(5.1.2 cont.) **tat** thus, as follows (*The translation of this is appended to the previous sentence.*) **dharma-viparyaya-upapatteḥ** (gen. of) their – roles, duties – alternate – evidence **sādharmya-vaidharmya-samau** conformity – conformity – equivalents (5.1.3) **gotvāt** (abl. by) its being a cow **go-siddhivat** (vati like) cow – affirmation **tat-siddhiḥ** it (each) – affirmation (5.1.4) **sādhya-dṛṣṭāntayoḥ** (loc.) premise – a standard **dharma-vikalpāt** (abl. apart from) (*The comparative, with "equivalent of" or "substitute for", similar but "rather than". The context makes this use of the ablative obvious.*) duty – diversity **ubhaya-sādhya-tvāt** (abl. apart from) both – being the premise **ca** and

**9.4** Of our evidence of an opposing version of dharma, there are the (adversaries') *equivalents* as conformity and conformity with (their) dharma, the affirmation of each like the (tautological see 2.1.58) affirmation of a cow just by its being a cow—as apart from our diversity of dharmas in terms of both our premise (that the highest dharma is by true comprehension) and our standard (equal value of the diversity of dharmas 1.1.25), and apart from (our idea of) both being the premise.

उत्कर्षापकर्षवर्ण्यवर्ण्यविकल्पसाध्यसमाः। किञ्चित्साध्यम्यादुपसंहारसिद्धेर्वैधर्म्यादप्रतिषे-  
धः। साध्यातिदेशाच्च दृष्टान्तोपपत्तेः।

(5.1.4 cont.) **utkarṣa-apakarṣa -varṇya-avarṇya -vikalpa -sādhya-samāḥ** superior – inferior – of a certain varṇa caste – not of that caste – diversity – premise – equivalents (5.1.5) **kimcid\_sādharmyāt** (abl. since) a little – conformity **upasamhāra-siddheḥ** (abl. because) conclusion – affirming **vaidharmyāt** (abl. from) not conforming **apratishedhaḥ** no denying (5.1.6) **sādhya-atideśāt** (abl. apart from) premise – placing beyond reach **ca** and **dṛṣṭānta-upapatteḥ** (abl. by) standard – evidence

**9.5** There are their equivalents of that *premise* (that the highest dharma is by true comprehension), as the diversity of the superior, the inferior, those of their (and our) caste, and those not of that caste. Since there is a little conformity (of our own see 1.2.17), we would not deny (our own premise) by



refusing to conform with our dharma just because that would affirm our conclusion, or by overruling our premise (that the highest dharma is by true comprehension), by the evidence of our standard (equal value of our daily life and our examination of its meaning).

प्राप्य साध्यमप्राप्य वा हेतोः प्राप्त्याविशिष्टत्वादप्राप्त्यासाधकत्वाच्च प्राप्त्यप्राप्तिसमौ। घटा-  
दिनिष्पत्तिदर्शनात्पीडने चाव्यभिचारादप्रतिषेधः।

(5.1.7) **prāpya** (ind. part. √ pra-āp) having attained, reached, or arrived (after some time) **sādhya** (acc.) premise **aprāpya** (ind. part.) not having attained **vā** or / **hetoh** (gen. of) grounds **prāptyā** (inst. by) gaining, achieving **viśiṣṭatvāt** (abl. since) becoming distinguished **aprāptyā** (inst. by) failure to earn **asādhakatvāt** (abl. since) not becoming accomplished **ca** and **prāpti-aprāpti-samau** attaining – not attaining – equivalents (5.1.8) **ghaṭa-ādi-niṣpatti-darśanāt** (abl. since) vessels –to begin with – fashioning – seeing **pīḍane** (loc. regarding) molding **ca** and **avyabhicārāt** (abl. apart from) not deviating **apratishedhaḥ** no denying

9.6 Of our grounds for knowledge—having either attained (arrived at) our premise (that the highest dharma is by true comprehension), or having not yet attained it—there are the (adversaries') *equivalents* as attaining and not attaining (knowledge), being distinguished by attaining it, and being unaccomplished by failure to attain it. There is no denying (our premise) by seeing 'fashioning' as of a (soul) vessel to begin with, and by (simply) not deviating from that (adversaries' learned knowledge) regarding the molding (of the vessel).

दृष्टान्तस्य कारणानपदेशात्प्रत्यवस्थानाच्च प्रतिदृष्टान्तेन प्रसङ्गप्रतिदृष्टान्तसमौ प्रदीपोपादान-  
नप्रसङ्गविनिवृत्तिवत्तद्विनिवृत्तिः।

(5.1.9) **drṣṭāntasya** (gen. of) standard **kāraṇa-anapadeśāt** cause – failure to indicate (see *utpatti-kāraṇa-anapadeśāt* 3.2.23) **pratyavasthānāt** (abl. because) opposition of life standing **ca** and **prati-drṣṭāntena** (inst. by way of, as) counterpart – standard / **prasaṅga-prati-drṣṭānta-samau** life occurrence – counterpart – standard – equivalent **pradīpa-upādāna-prasaṅga-vinivṛttivat** (vati like) lamp, illumination of a thesis, a treatise – accepting unto oneself – occurrence of life – turning away **tat-vinivṛttiḥ** that – turning away

9.7 Of our standard—due to their failure to indicate the (proper) cause (īśvara 4.1.19) and due to their opposition of life-standing as a counterpart to our standard—there are the (adversaries') equivalents as that life-occupation (of opposition) and as that counterpart to our standard. Turning away from that (cause) is like turning away from a life-occupation in the self-acceptance (taught) by our treatise.

प्रतिदृष्टान्तहेतुत्वे च नाहेतुदृष्टान्तः। प्रागुत्पत्तेः कारणाभावादनुत्पत्तिसमः। तथाभावा-  
त्पन्नस्य कारणोपपत्तेर्न कारणप्रतिषेधः।

(5.1.10) **prati-dr̥ṣṭānta-hetu-tve** (loc. even with) counterpart – standard – grounds – there being **ca\_na** not (never) even **a-hetu-dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ** without – grounds – standard (5.1.11) **prāñc-utpatteḥ** (gen. of) before birth state **kāraṇa-abhāvāt** (abl. according to) cause – empty **anutpatti-samaḥ** non-birth – equivalent (5.1.12) **tathā** similarly **bhāvāt** (abl. according to) theory of being, view // **utpannasya** (gen. of) born, having come into existence **kāraṇa-upapatteḥ** (abl. because) cause – evidence **na no kāraṇa-pratiṣedhaḥ** cause – denial

9.9 Even with there being (two) counterparts within the grounds for our standard, we are never without that (dual) standard (including the *existence* of life) in our grounds. Of our pre-existent (unmanifest see *avyakta* 3.2.43) state, there is the (adversaries') equivalent of (a liberation of) *not* coming into existence at all, according to their empty cause (karma). Similarly, according to *our* view, there can be no denying of our cause (īśvara), because of our evidence that it is the cause of whatever has come into existence.

सामान्यदृष्टान्तयोरैन्द्रियकत्वे समाने नित्यानित्यसाधर्म्यात् संशयसमः। साधर्म्यात्संशये  
(न संशयो वैधर्म्यादुभयथा वा संशयेऽत्यन्तसंशयप्रसङ्गो) नित्यत्वानभ्युपगमाच्च सामा-  
न्यस्याप्रतिषेधः।

(5.1.13) **sāmānya-dr̥ṣṭāntayoḥ** (gen. dual of) common truth – standard **aindriyakatve** (loc. in that) existing in that which consists of the powers of sense **samāne** (loc. considering) same **nitya-anitya-sādharmyāt** (abl. due to) constant – inconstant **saṁśaya-samaḥ** uncertainty – equivalent (5.1.14) **sādharmyāt** (abl. just because) conformity **saṁśaye** (loc. in) uncertainty [*na saṁśayaḥ* // *vaidharm-*

*yāt ubhayathā vā saṁśaye atyanta-saṁśaya-prasaṅgaḥ; One must not doubt. In his nonconformity or in his 'both ways', whenever he doubts, it becomes his 'ultimate doubt'.]* nityatva-anabhyupagamāt (abl. just because) constancy – disagreement **ca** and **sāmānyasya** (gen. of) the common **apratīṣedhaḥ** no denying

**9.10 Of (the uncertainty as to) the universally agreed (dharma) vs. our standard** (equal value of the diverse dharmas of those just living life and those seeking to examine it)—**considering that they are (both) the same in that they exist only in the mind** ("that which consists of the powers of sense")—**there is the (adversaries') equivalent, as the uncertainty that arises from constant vs. inconstant conformity. There is no denying (of our premise) just because there is conformity in that uncertainty, and just because there is disagreement with our constancy on the part of the common (man).**

The adversary's uncertainty would cause him to lapse in his adherence to proper civil and religious behaviors, which in their belief system would result in a certain bad karma that would in turn cause further doubt and further lapsing in future incarnations. This is the interpretation of the commenter in 2.1.7 and 5.1.14.

उभयसाधर्म्यात्प्रक्रियासिद्धेः प्रकरणसमः। प्रतिपक्षात्प्रकरणसिद्धेः प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः प्रति-  
पक्षोपपत्तेः। त्रैकाल्यानुपपत्तेर्हेतोरहेतुसमः

(5.1.15) **ubhaya-sādharmyāt** (abl. ind.) both ways – conformity **prakriyā-siddheḥ** (gen. of) positive action to some end, a formal procedure, or its officiant **prakaraṇa-samaḥ** the subject (ultimate knowledge) – equivalent (5.1.16) **pratipakṣāt** (abl. ind.) against an adversary **prakaraṇa-siddheḥ** (abl. by) subject – proving // **pratiṣedha-anupapattiḥ** denial – lacking evidence **pratipakṣa-upapatteḥ** (abl. because) adversary – evidence (5.1.17) **traikālya-anupapatteḥ** (abl. ind.) threefold time paradigm – without evidence **hetuḥ** (gen. of) grounds for knowledge **ahetu-samaḥ** without grounds – equivalent

**9.11 Of our affirmation by our formal practice (of contemplation 4.2.38-42), with our conformity being both ways, there is the (adversaries') equivalent to the subject (of dharma), by (the practice of) proving that subject against an adversary (4.2.47-50). We lack the evidence to deny that (existence of an adversary) because that (denial) would be the very evidence of an adversary. (see the "other ... other ... other" passage in 2.1.30-32) Of our grounds for knowledge, without any evidence of a threefold time paradigm,**

there is the (adversaries') equivalent that is without our grounds (i.e., *with a karmic past and future*).

न हेतुतः साध्यसिद्धेस्त्रैकाल्यासिद्धिः। प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तेश्च प्रतिषेद्धव्याप्रतिषेधः। अर्थापत्ति-  
तः प्रतिपक्षसिद्धेरर्थापत्तिसमः।

(5.1.18) **na** not (*referring to the nom. "asiddhi"*) **hetutaḥ** (tasil resulting from) grounds **sādhya-siddheḥ** (abl. because) premise – affirmation **traikālya-asiddhiḥ** threefold time paradigm – without affirmation (5.1.19) **pratiṣedha-anupapatteḥ** (abl. since) denial – lacking evidence **ca** w/na either **pratiṣeddhavya-apraṣedhaḥ** to be denied – no denying (5.1.20) **arthāpattitaḥ** (tasil according to) interpretation **pratipakṣa-siddheḥ** (gen. of) adversaries – affirmation **arthāpatti-samaḥ** interpretation – equivalent

**9.12** We are not without *any* affirmation of the threefold time paradigm (cf. 2.1.12-14), because the affirmation of our premise (that the highest dharma is by true comprehension) results (only) from our grounds for knowledge (our 'cause'). They cannot deny anything which (they say) is to be denied either, since they lack the evidence to deny it. Of the *affirmation of adversaries according to our interpretation (of traditional texts)*, there is the (adversaries') equivalent interpretation.

अनुक्तस्यार्थापत्तेः पक्षहानेरुपपत्तिरनुक्तत्वादनैकान्तिकत्वाच्चार्यापत्तेः। एकधर्मोपपत्तेरवि-  
शेषे सर्वाविशेषप्रसङ्गात्सद्भावोपपत्तेरविशेषसमः।

(5.1.21) **anuktasya** (gen. of) not declared **arthāpatteḥ** (abl. coming about through) interpretation **pakṣa-hāneḥ** (gen. of) side – rejection **upapattiḥ** evidence / **anuktatvāt** (because) not being declared **anaikāntikatvāt** (abl. because) not being exclusive **ca** and **arthāpatteḥ** (gen. of; *same referent as anuktasya*) interpretation (5.1.22) **eka-dharma-upapatteḥ** (abl. known by) singular (*as opposed to "aneka-dharma" in 1.1.23 and 2.1.1*) – duty – evidence **aviśeṣe** (loc. where) absence of distinction **sarva-aviśeṣa-prasaṅgāt** (abl. known by) everyone – without distinguishing – occupation with life **sat-bhāva-upapatteḥ** (gen. of) primary reality – evidence **aviśeṣa-samaḥ** not distinguishing (*This approaches the meaning of "aviveka" in SD and YD*) – equivalent

**9.13** Their evidence is by *rejection* of some side that comes about through an interpretation of anything not declared (in the *smṛti*). Such (a rejection) of our interpretation is because of its not being declared (in the *smṛti*), and because of its not being their exclusive way. Of our evidence of a primary reality known by occupation with life without distinguishing an 'everyone', that absence of distinction being known by the evidence of the *singular dharma* (as opposed to "for the many" 1.1.23, 2.1.1), there is the (adversaries') equivalent of not distinguishing.

The "singular dharma" here is the dharma "without superior" given in the first sutra as the subject of the entire treatise. Here it is stated anew as the subject and subsequently recalled with or without pronouns in every sutra up to the conclusion of the work.

क्वचित्तद्धर्मोपपत्तेः क्वचिच्चानुपपत्तेः प्रतिषेधाभावः। उभयकारणोपपत्तेरुपपत्तिसमः। उप-  
पत्तिकारणाभ्यनुज्ञानादप्रतिषेधः।

(5.1.23) **kvacit** in the one case **tat-dharma-upapatteḥ** (gen. of) that (= *eka* 5.1.22) – duty – evidence **kvacit** in the other case **ca** and **anupapatteḥ** (gen. of) failed evidence **pratiṣedha-abhāvaḥ** denial – lack of existence or substance, empty (= *the bahuvrīhi "abhāva- pratiṣedha"*) (5.1.24) **ubhaya-kāraṇa-upapatteḥ** (gen. of) in both – cause – evidence **upapatti-samaḥ** evidence – equivalent (5.1.25) **upapatti-kāraṇa-abhyanuññānāt** (abl. by) evidence – cause – permitting **apraṣedhaḥ** no denying

**9.14** Their empty denial is, in the one (our) case, of the evidence of that (singular) dharma, and in the other (their) case, of their (own) failed evidence. That (tautological) evidence is their equivalent of our evidence that there is 'cause' in both (dharma), (but) they cannot deny (our premise) just because we permit a 'cause' in our evidence (cf. 3.2.7).

निर्दिष्टकारणाभावेऽप्युपलम्भादुपलब्धिसमः। कारणान्तरादपि तद्धर्मोपपत्तेरप्रतिषेधः। त-  
दनुपलब्धेरनुपलम्भात्

(5.1.26) **nirdiṣṭa-kāraṇa-abhāve\_ api** (loc. w/api; even though) dictated – cause – empty **upalambhāt** (abl. arising out of) recognition **upalabdhi-samaḥ**

observation – equivalent (5.1.27) **kāraṇa-antarāt** (abl. by) cause – different **api** so very **tat-dharma-upapatteḥ** (abl. of comparison w/antara; from) that (=eka 5.1.22) – duty – evidence **apratishedhaḥ** no denying (5.1.28) **tat-anupalabdheḥ** (abl. for) that – lack of observation **anupalambhāt** (abl. arising out of) lack of recognition

**9.15** Even though there is no substance to their dictated cause (karma), out of their recognition of that (karma) there arises their equivalent observation (of dharma), (but) they cannot deny (our premise) by (asserting) that 'cause' (karma) that is so very different from our evidence of that (singular 5.1.22) dharma, for out of their non-recognition (of our cause), arises their lack of observation of that (singular dharma).

अभावसिद्धौ तद्विपरीतोपपत्तेरनुपलब्धिसमः। अनुपलम्भात्मकत्वादनूपलब्धेरहेतुः।

ज्ञानविकल्पानां च भावाभावसंवेदनादध्यात्मम्।

**abhāva-siddhau** (loc. regarding) without substance – affirmation **tat-viparīta-upapatteḥ** (arising out of) that (*This has the same referent as the tats in 5.1.23 and 5.1.27, and 5.1.28, i.e., "eka-(dharma)" 5.1.22.*) – reverse, opposition – evidence **anupalabdhī-samaḥ** lack of observation – equivalent (5.1.29)(*identical to 2.2.21*) **anupalambha**-(gen.)-**ātmakatvāt** (abl. for) lack of recognition – the very nature of **anupalabdheḥ** (abl. due to) lack of observation **ahetuḥ** lack of grounds (5.1.30) **jñāna-vikalpānām** (gen. of) true comprehension – diversities, different kinds **ca** and // **bhāva-abhāva-saṁvedanāt** (abl. coming from) presence – absence – internal feel **adhyātmam** (ind.) concerning one's individual self

**9.16** Out of the evidence in opposition to that (unique dharma) in their empty affirmation, there arises their equivalent *lack* of observation. Their lack of grounds for knowledge is due to the lack of observation (of the unique dharma), for that is the very nature of their lack of recognition and of their 'comprehension' of (three) kinds (castes of individuals), (but) when it comes to the individual self, that (comprehension) must come from the presence vs. absence of the *internal* feel of it.

He is speaking here about the two different views of dharma that have been thoroughly discussed earlier. The adversary (within us) denies, without distinction, both the immediate evidence of his "unique" dharma and the weakness of his own tautological evidence for the scheme of caste, karma, reincarnation, etc. It seems to

me that the author uses the term "aviśeṣa" in the same sense that "aviveka" is used by the Sankhya and Yoga, to mean "non-distinguishing" as causing bondage.

साधर्म्यात्तुल्यधर्मोपपत्तेः सर्वानित्यत्वप्रसङ्गादनित्यसमः। साधर्म्यादसिद्धेः प्रतिषेधासिद्धिः प्रतिषेध्यसामर्थ्यात्।

(5.1.31) **sādharmyāt** (abl. known by) conformity **tulya-dharma-upapatteḥ** (gen. of) equals, peers – duty – evidence **sarva-anityatva-prasaṅgāt** (abl. due to) everyone – inconstancy – occupation **anitya-samaḥ** inconstant – equivalent (5.1.32) **sādharmyāt** (abl. apart from, other than) conformity with dharma **asiddheḥ** (abl. since) no affirmation **pratiṣedha-asiddhiḥ** denial – no affirmation **pratiṣedhya-sāmarthyāt** (abl. because) to be denied – having common interest

9.17 Of our evidence of the dharma of the peers, which we know by our own conformity with it, since that is our occupation with the inconstancy of the 'everyone'; there is the (adversaries') equivalent of what is 'inconstant' (our deviation). Since there is no affirmation of that, apart from their own conformity (with dharma), there can be no affirmation of their denial (of our deviation) just because they have common interest in what should be denied.

दृष्टन्ते च साध्यसाधनभावेन प्रज्ञातस्य धर्मस्य हेतुत्वात्तस्य चोभयथाभावान्नविशेषः।

(5.1.33) **dr̥ṣṭante** (loc. when it comes to) standard **ca** moreover **sādhya-sādhana-bhāvena** (inst. known by means of) premise – established – view // **prajñā** true knowledge, wisdom **tasya** (gen. of) that **dharmasya** (gen. of) duty, right **hetutvāt** (abl. resulting from) motivation **tasya** (gen. of) that **ca** indeed / **ubhayathā** both ways **bhāvāt** (abl. for) view **na** no **viśeṣaḥ** difference

9.18 Moreover, when it comes to our standard, that is known by means of the view established by our premise. True knowledge of *that* (view) is that (true knowledge) of dharma, and (true knowledge) of that (dharma) is the result of one's motivation. There is no difference (between motivation towards true knowledge and dharma), for our view is both ways.

### End of the Nyaya Darshana

It is clear to me that the Nyaya Darshana ends here and that the remaining material is something else, even though the style looks similar:

नित्यमनित्यभावादनित्ये नित्यत्वोपपत्तेर्नित्यसमः ॥ ५।१।३४ ॥ प्रतिषेध्ये नित्यमनित्य-  
 भावादनित्येऽनित्यत्वोपपत्तेः प्रतिषेधाभावः ॥ ३५ ॥ प्रयत्नकार्यानेकत्वात्कार्यसमः ॥ ३६ ॥  
 कार्यान्यत्वे प्रयत्नाहेतुत्वमनुपलब्धिकारणोपपत्तेः ॥ ३७ ॥ प्रतिषेधेऽपि समानो दोषः ॥ ३८ ॥  
 सर्वत्रैवम् ॥ ३९ ॥ प्रतिषेधविप्रतिषेधे प्रतिषेधदोषवद्दोषः ॥ ४० ॥ प्रतिषेधं सदोषमभ्युपेत्य  
 प्रतिषेधविप्रतिषेधे समानो दोषप्रसङ्गो मतानुज्ञा स्वपक्षलक्षणापेक्षोपपत्त्युपसंहारे हेतुनिर्देशे  
 परपक्षदोषाभ्युपगमात्समानो दोषः ॥ ४१ ॥

(इति प्रथमाधिकः)

(पञ्चमोऽध्यायः द्वितीयाधिकः )

प्रतिज्ञाहानिः प्रतिज्ञान्तरं प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासो हेत्वन्तरमर्थान्तरं निरर्थकमवि-  
 ज्ञातार्थमपार्थक्यमप्राप्तकालं न्यूनमधिकं पुनरुक्तमननुभाषणमज्ञानमप्रतिभा विक्षेपो मतानु-  
 ज्ञा पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणं निरनुयोज्यानुयोगोऽपसिद्धान्तो हेत्वाभासाश्च निग्रहस्थानानि ॥ १ ॥  
 प्रतिदृष्टान्तधर्माभ्यनुज्ञा स्वदृष्टान्ते प्रतिज्ञाहानिः ॥ २ ॥ प्रतिज्ञातार्थप्रतिषेधे धर्मविकल्पात्त-  
 दर्थनिर्देशः प्रतिज्ञान्तरम् ॥ ३ ॥ प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोर्विरोधः प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः ॥ ४ ॥ पक्षप्रतिषेधे प्रति-  
 ज्ञातार्थापनयनं प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासः ॥ ५ ॥ अविशेषोक्ते हेतौ प्रतिषेधे विशेषमिच्छतो हेत्वन्त-  
 रम् ॥ ६ ॥ प्रकृतादर्थादप्रतिसम्बद्धार्थमर्थान्तरम् ॥ ७ ॥ वर्णक्रमनिर्देशवन्निरर्थकम् ॥ ८ ॥  
 परिषत्प्रतिवादिभ्यां त्रिरभिहितमप्यविज्ञातमविज्ञातार्थम् ॥ १० ॥ पौर्वापर्यायोगादप्रतिस-  
 म्बद्धार्थमपार्थक्यम् ॥ अवयवविपर्यासवचनमप्राप्तकालम् ॥ ११ ॥ हीनमन्यतमेनाप्यवयवेन  
 न्यूनम् ॥ १२ ॥ हेतूदाहरणाधिकमधिकम् ॥ १३ ॥ शब्दार्थयोः पुनर्वचनं पुनरुक्तमन्यत्रानुवा-  
 दात् ॥ १४ ॥ अर्थादापन्नस्य स्वशब्देन पुनर्वचनं पुनरुक्तम् ॥ १५ ॥ विज्ञातस्य परिषदा



त्रिरभिहितस्याप्यप्रत्युच्चारणमननुभाषणम् ॥ १६ ॥ अविज्ञातं चाज्ञानम् ॥ १७ ॥ उत्तरस्या-  
 प्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिभा ॥ १८ ॥ कार्यव्यासङ्गात्कथाविच्छेदो विक्षेपः ॥ १९ ॥ स्वपक्षे दोषाभ्युप-  
 गमात्परपक्षे दोषप्रसङ्गो मतानुज्ञा ॥ २० ॥ निग्रहस्थानप्राप्तस्यानिग्रहः पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्ष-  
 णम् ॥ २१ ॥ अनिग्रहस्थाने निग्रहस्थानाभियोगो निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः ॥ २२ ॥ सिद्धान्त-  
 मभ्युपेत्यानियमात्कथाप्रसङ्गोऽपसिद्धान्तः ॥ २३ ॥ हेत्वाभासाश्च यथोक्ताः ॥ २४ ॥

(5.1.34) nityam anitya-bhāvāt anitye nityatva-upapatteḥ nitya-samaḥ  
 (5.1.35) pratiṣedhye nityam anitya-bhāvāt anitye anityatva-upapatteḥ  
 pratiṣedha-abhāvaḥ (5.1.36) prayatna-kārya-anekatvāt kārya-samaḥ (5.1.37)  
 kārya-anyatve prayatna-ahetutvam anupalabdhī-kāraṇa-upapatteḥ (5.1.38)  
 pratiṣedhe api samānaḥ doṣaḥ (5.1.39) sarvatra evam (5.1.40) pratiṣedha-  
 vipratiṣedhe pratiṣedha-doṣavat doṣaḥ (5.1.41) pratiṣedham sadoṣam  
 abhyupetya pratiṣedha-vipratiṣedhe samānaḥ doṣa-prasaṅgaḥ mata-anujñā  
 svapakṣa-lakṣaṇa-apekṣa-upapatti-upasamhāre hetu-nirdeśe parapakṣa-doṣa-  
 abhyupagamāt samānaḥ doṣaḥ (5.2.1) pratijñā-hāniḥ pratijñā-antaram  
 pratijñā-virodhaḥ pratijñā-samnyāsaḥ hetu-antaram arthāntaram  
 nirarthakam avijñāta-artham apārthakam aprāpta-kālam nyūnam adhikam  
 punar-uktam ananubhāṣaṇam ajñānam apratibhā vikṣepaḥ mata-anujñā  
 paryanuyojya-upekṣaṇa niranuyojya-anuyogaḥ apasiddhāntaḥ hetu-ābhāsaḥ  
 ca nigrāha-sthānāni (5.2.2) pratidṛṣṭānta-dharma-abhyānujñā svadrṣṭānte  
 pratijñā-ahāniḥ (5.2.3) pratijñāta-artha-pratiṣedhe dharma-vikalpāt tat-  
 artha-nirdeśaḥ pratijñā-antaram (5.2.4) pratijñā-ahetvoḥ virodhaḥ pratijñā-  
 avirodhaḥ (5.2.5) pakṣa-pratiṣedhe pratijñāta-artha-apanayanam pratijñā-  
 samnyāsaḥ (5.2.6) aviśeṣa-ukte hetau pratiṣiddhe viśeṣam icchataḥ hetu-  
 antaram (5.2.7) prakṛtāt arthāt apratisambaddha-artham artha-antaram  
 (5.2.8) varṇa-krama-nirdeśavat nirarthakam (5.2.9) pari-ṣat-prativāḍibhyām  
 tris-abhihitam api avijñātam avijñāta-artham (5.2.10) paurvāparya-ayogāt  
 apratisambaddha-artham apārthakam (5.2.11) avayava-viparyāsa-vacanam  
 aprāpta-kālam (5.2.12) hīnam anya-tamena api avayavena nyūnam (5.2.13)  
 hetu-udāharaṇa-adhikam adhikam (5.2.14) śabda-arthayoḥ punar vacanam  
 punar-uktam anyatra anuvādāt (5.2.15) arthāt āpannasya svaśabdena punar-  
 vacanam punaruktam (5.2.16) vijñātasya pariṣadā tris-abhihitasya api  
 apratyuccāraṇam ananubhāṣaṇam (5.2.17) avijñātam ca ajñānam (5.2.18)

uttarasya-apratipattiḥ apratibhā (5.2.19) kārya-vyāsaṅgāt kathā vicchedaḥ  
 vikṣepaḥ (5.2.20) svapakṣe doṣa-abhyupagamāt parapakṣe doṣa-prasaṅgaḥ  
 mata-anujñā (5.2.21) nigrāhassthāna-prāptasya anigrāhaḥ paryanuyojya-  
 upekṣaṇam (5.2.22) anigrāhassthāne nigrāhassthāna-abhiyogaḥ niranuyojya-  
 anuyogaḥ (5.2.23) siddhāntam abhyupetya aniyamāt kathā prasaṅgaḥ  
 apasiddhāntaḥ (5.2.24) hetu-ābhāsāḥ ca yathā-uktāḥ

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